OCR Scan (approximately)

This OCR scan may contain automatically generated text as generated using Apache Tika and Tesseract. It may not be correct. No effort has been made to correct any of these scans (so far). These OCR scans are also used in the site's Search feature. Please review the Search Policy for details about the site features. The OCR scan is provided here for reference purposes. It provides searchable text when the underlying document might not. But the scan process may not always work perfectly.

UNITED STATES
DEPARIEN OF IAR
MINE SA AND HEATH ADINISTRION
OFFICE OF THE ADItUSTRR
mAL MINE SAFE AND HEATH
RERT OF INVSTIGlTION
UNDERGROD CO MINE INUNffTION (BLACKANP)
Moss No. 3 Portal A Mine (1. D. 44-01642)
Clinchfield Coal Comny
Duty, Dickensn County, Virginia
IIril 4, 1978
Originating Office - Mine Safety ~nè 'æalth Administration
4015 wilson Blvd… Arlington, Virninia 22203
UNITED STATES
DEPARIMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR
QOAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
UNDERGROUND COAL MINE INUNDATION (BLACKDAMP)
Moss No. 3 Portal A Mine (I. D. 44-01642)
Clinchfield Coal Company
Duty, Dickenson County, Virginia
April 4, 1978
Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
4015 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, Virginia 22203
UNED STATES
DEARl’ OF LAIDR
MI SA lID HEATH AINISION
CFFICE CF TH AIINISTR
mA MINE SA AND HEATH
RæRT OF INlSTGlTICN
UNDERi mA MINE INffTICN (BLCK)
Mos No. 3 Portal A Mine (1. D. 44-01642)
Clinchfield Co Capany
Duty, Dickensn Couty, Virginia
Apil 4, 1978
By
James D. Micheal
Coa Mine Specialist
Robert A. Elam
Mining Enineer
Paul J. Caponation
Coal Mine Safety Specialist
Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health A.dmiiiistrat~on
4015 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, Virginia 22203
Joseph O. Co - Adinistrator for Coal Mi ri8 : .cj "C"2J ::l,
UNETED STATES
DEPARIMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION.
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR
OAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
UNDERGROUND COAL MINE INUNDATION (BLACKDAMP)
Moss No. 3 Portal A Mine (I. D. 44-01642)
Clinchfield Coal Company
Duty, Dickenson County, Virginia
April 4, 1978
By
James D. Micheal
Coal. Mine Specialist
Robert A. Elam
Mining Engineer
Paul J. Componation
Coal Mine Safety Specialist
originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Adninistration
4015 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, Virginia 22203
Joseph 0. Cook - Administrator for Coal Mine
Abstract
This report is based on an investigation made pursuant to
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977
(83 Stat. 742 as amended by 91 Stat. 1290).
At approximately 12:30 p.m., on Tuesday, April 4, 1978, the
single entry Drainway on Fryingpan Creek of the Moss No. 3
Portal A Mine, Clinchfield Coal Company, Duty, Dickenson
County, Virg inia, was inunda ted by an inrush of blackdamp
(oxygen deficient air). The Drainway that was being advanced
by a continuous mining machine cut into a mined out inacces-
sible abandoned area of the same mine. Two of the four men
that were in the face area when the Drainway entry cut through
were killed by the blackdamp; the other two men (one dragged
the other) retreated to the surface and survived. Three other
men were killed by the blackdamp while attempting to rescue
the two missing men. Two other men were overcome by the black-
damp while attempting rescue efforts and had to be assisted
to the surface; and another man involved in rescue at tempts
reportedly carne out of the Drainway unassisted at approximately
1 :30 p.m., after having been underground for about 40 minutes.
The names of the victims, their ages, occupations, and
mining experience are listed in Appendix A.
Abstract.
ghis report is based on an investigation made pursuant to
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977
(83 Stat. 742 as amended by 91 Stat. 1290).
At approximately 12:30 p.m., on Tuesday, April 4, 1978, the
single entry Drainway on Fryingpan Creek of the Moss No. 3
Portal A Mine, Clinchfield Coal Company, Duty, Dickenson
County, Virginia, was inundated by an inrush of blackdamp
(oxygen deficient air). The Drainway that was being advanced
by a continuous mining machine cut into a mined out inacces-
sible abandoned area of the same mine. Two of the four men
that were in the face area when the Drainway entry cut through
were killed by the blackdamp; the other two men (one dragged
the other) retreated to the surface and survived. Three other
men were killed by the blackdamp while attempting to rescue
the two missing men. Two other men were overcome by the black-
damp while attempting rescue efforts and had to be assisted
to the surface; and another man involved in rescue attempts
reportedly came out of the Drainway unassisted at approximately
1:30 p.m., after having been underground for about 40 minutes.
The names of the victims, their ages, occupations, and
mining experience are listed in Appendix A.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Part I - Inunda tion (blackdamp) and Recovery
Operations - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
Part II - Investigation, Discussion and
Evaluation - - - - - - - 13
Part III - Findings: Summary of Evidence - - - - - - 27
Part IV - Conclusions - - - 33
APPENDICES
A - Victims of Inundation and Certificates of Death
B - General Informa tion
C - List of Persons Who Took Part in or Were Present
During Recovery Operations and/or Investigation
D - List of Persons Who Took Part in or Were Present
During Interviews
E - Citations Issued during Investigation
F - Photographs - 1 through 8
G - Company Plans for Developing and Completing
Drainway - Nos. 1, 2 and 3
H - Report of Special Tests Conducted by MSHA
I - Sketches Accident Area - Figures land 2
J - Moss No. 3 Mine Map
Part I -
Part II -
Part III -
Part IV -
APPENDICES
A-
Be
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Inundation (blackdamp) and Recovery
Operations - - - - ~ - ---------
Investigation, Discussion and
Evaluation - - - - - ~------e ee 13
Findings: Summary of Evidence - - - - - - 27
Conclusions - - - - - - - - ------- 33
Victims of Inundation and Certificates of Death
General Information
List of Persons Who Took Part in or Were Present
During Recovery Operations and/or Investigation
List of Persons Who Took Part in or Were Present
During Interviews
Citations Issued during Investigation
Photographs - 1 through 8
Company Plans for Developing and Completing
Drainway - Nos. 1, 2 and 3
Report of Special Tests Conducted by MSHA
Sketches Accident Area - Figures 1 and 2
Moss No. 3 Mine Map
PART I
INUNDATION (BLACKDAMP) AND RECOVERY
OPE RA’l’ IONS
'I’he Moss No. 3 Mine, Clinchfield Coal Company, located near
Duty, Dickenson County, Virginia, was opened into the Thick
Tiller Coalbed on October ll, 1957. Clinchfield Coal
Company, a subsidiary of The pittston Company Coal Group, is
the operating company of the Moss No. 3 Mine. At the time
of this investigation, corporate and supervisory officials
were as follows:
The pittston Company Coal Group
G. R. Swanson
J. E. Nypaver
J. W. Crawford
Pres ident
Vice-president, Operations
Director of Health and Safety
Clinchfield Coal Company
Robert Yokum
Vice-Pres ident
General ~lanage r
Division Manager
Manager, Safety Division
superintendent, goss No. 3
Mine
Mine Foreman, Moss No.3 mine
C. M. Bailes
Henry Kiser
w. B. Couch
M. L. i.est
Strickler Mullins
The Moss No. 3 mine consists of Portal A, Portal B, Portal C,
portal D and the most recent opening, Portal A-2. The mine
area associated with this accident was developed from the
Moss No. 3 Portal A mine. See Appendix B for the general infor-
mation for the Moss No. 3 nine.
Mining Conditions Prior to Inundation
The main entries of the Moss No. 3 Portal A mi~e were de-
veloped in a southwesterly direction f.C)r a di.stance of
approximately 12,300 feet. The coalbed dips northwest about
l.5 percent for approximately 8,600 feet from an elevation
of about 1,600 feet at the portal entry to an elevation of
1,465 feet. The coalbed tnen rises about 0.7 percent for a
distance of approximately 7,300 feet to the northwest pro-
perty line. According to company estimates, 23,000,000
gallons of water enter the mine each 24 hours and 6,000,000
gallons per day were pUlùped from the mine. During develop-
ment mining, the water was removed with pumps. However, as
1
PART I
INUNDATION (BLACKDAMP) AND RECOVERY
OPERATIONS
the Moss No. 3 Mine, Clinchfield Coal Company, located near
puty, Dickenson County, Virginia, was opened into the Thick
Tiller Coalbed on October 11, 1957. Clinchfield Coal
Company, a subsidiary of The Pittston Company Coal Group, is
the operating company of the Moss No. 3 Mine. At the time
of this investigation, corporate and supervisory officials
were as follows:
The Pittston Company Coal Group
G. R. Swanson President
J. E. Nypaver vice-President, Operations
J. W. Crawford Director of Health and Safety
Clinchfield Coal Company
c. M. Bailes Vice-President
Henry Kiser General Manager
W. B. Couch Division Manager
M. L. West Manager, Safety Division
strickler Mullins Superintendent, Moss No. 3
Mine
Robert Yokum Mine Foreman, Moss No. 3 mine
The Moss No. 3 mine consists of Portal A, Portal B, Portal C,
Portal D and the most recent opening, Portal A-2. The mine
area associated with this accident was developed from the
Moss No. 3 Portal A mine. See Appendix B for the general infor-
mation for the Moss No. 3 Mine.
Mining Conditions Prior to Iaundation
The main entries of the Moss No. 3 Portal A mine were de-
veloped in a southwesterly direction for a distance of
approximately 12,300 feet. ‘he coalved dips northwest about
1.5 percent for approxin ately 8,600 feet from an elevation
of about 1,600 feet at the portal entry to an elevation of
1,465 feet. The coalbed then rises about 0.7 percent for a
distance of approximately 7,300 feet to the northwest pro-
perty line. According to company estimates, 23,000,000
gallons of water enter the mine each 24 hours and 6,000,000
gallons per day were pumped from the mine. During develop-
ment mining, the water was removed with pumps. However, as
areas were second mined, the pumps had to be removed wh ich
resulted in water accumulations at the lower elevations. At
the time of the accident, mining in the areas of the ,mine
below the 1,510 foot elevation had been completed and wa ter
had accumulated to the 1,495 foot elevation. See mine map in
Appendix J. Parts of the 1 Right off 1 Right. off 11 Right
section along the northwest mine boundary and the 5 Right off
1 Righ t of f the A Ma ins sect ion, along the northeast boundary,
were above the 1,495 foot elevation. These areas were not
flooded but the rising water sealed the 1 Right abandoned
area from the rest of the mine and this abandoned area became
pressurized by the encroachment of the water.
The new Moss No.3 Portal A-2 mine (see mine map, Appendix J)
intersected the abandoned 5 Right section of the Moss No. 3
Portal A mine at the 1,504 foot elevation. The rising water
in the abandoned areas of the Moss No. 3 Portal A mine pre-
sented a problem of eventual flooding of some of the active
areas of the new Moss No. 3 Portal A-2 mine.
Near the first of March 1978, M. L. West, Manager, Safety
Division, Clinchfield Coal Company, met with MSHA officials,
Ray G. Ross, Frank C. Mann, Willis D. Ison, and James V.
Bowman at Norton, Virginia, and discussed plans that would
prevent flooding of the new Moss No. 3 Portal A-2 mine. The
plan discussed at this meeting was to drill an 8-inch diameter
horizontal hole from the surface into the abandoned 1 Right
area, a distance of approximately 265 feet. This 8-inch bore-
hole would permi t monitoring of the atmosphere in the abandoned
area and would serve as a centerline for an entry which would
be driven wi th a continuous mining machine. According to the
testimony of W. B. Couch, Division Manager, mine management
considered enlarging the 8-inch diameter borehole to 24 or
30 inches; however, this part of the plan was not discussed
at this meeting.
Shortly after the meeting with MSHA officials, the company
employed a contractor to drill the 8-inch borehole. The
borehole was drilled a distance of approximately 5 .feet and
the plan was abandoned due to the inabil i ty of the contrac-
tor to control the direction of the drill. West informed
MSHA by telephone of the inabil i ty of the contractor to drill
the 8-inch borehole, and received permission from MSHA to
proceed wi th the plan to develop the Drainway entry with a
cont inuous mining macli ine.
On March 17, 1978, West submitted a plan to MSHA for develop-
ing the Drainway entry. The plan stipulated that the entry
would be developed by a continuous mining machine from the
surface into an abandoned area a distance of about 225 feet;
that adequate ventilation will be provided by a fan and venti-
2
areas were second mined, the pumps had to be removed which
resulted in water accumulations at the lower elevations. At
the time of the accident, mining in the areas of the-mine
below the 1,510 foot elevation had been completed and water
had accumulated to the 1,495 foot elevation. See mine map in
Appendix J. Parts of the 1 Right off 1 Right off 11 Right
section along the northwest mine boundary and the 5 Right off
1 Right off the A Mains section, along the northeast boundary,
were above the 1,495 foot elevation. ‘These areas were not
flooded but the rising water sealed the 1 Right abandoned
area from the rest of the mine and this abandoned area became
pressurized by the encroachment of the water.
The new Moss No. 3 Portal A-2 mine (see mine map, Appendix J)
intersected the abandoned 5 Right section of the Moss No. 3
Portal A mine at the 1,504 foot elevation. The rising water
in the abandoned areas of the Moss No. 3 Portal A mine pre-
sented a problem of eventual flooding of some of the active
areas of the new Moss No. 3 Portal A-2 mine
Near the first of March 1978, M. L. West, Manager, Safety
Division, Clinchfield Coal Company, met with MSHA officials
Ray G. Ross, Frank C. Mann, Willis D. Ison, and James V.
Bowman at Norton, Virginia, and discussed plans that would
prevent flooding of the new Moss No. 3 Portal A-2 mine. The
plan discussed at this meeting was to drill an 8-inch diameter
horizontal hole from the surface into the abandoned 1 Right
area, a distance of approximately 265 feet. This 8-inch bore-
hole would permit monitoring of the atmosphere in the abandoned
area and would serve as a centerline for an entry which would
be driven with a continuous mining machine. According to the
testimony of W. B. Couch, Division Manager, mine management
considered enlarging the 8-inch diameter borehole to 24 or
30 inches; however, this part of the plan was not discussed
at this meeting.
Shortly after the meeting with MSHA officials, the company
employed a contractor to drill the 8-inch borehole. The
borehole was drilled a distance of approximately 5 feet and
the plan was abandoned due to the inability of the contrac-
tor to control the direction of the drill. West informed
MSHA by telephone of the inability of the contractor to drill
the 8-inch borehole, and received permission from MSHA to
proceed with the plan to develop the Drainway entry with a
continuous mining machine.
On March 17, 1978, West submitted a plan to MSHA for develop-
ing the Drainway entry. The plan stipulated that the entry
would be developed by a continuous mining machine from the
surface into an abandoned area a distance of about 225 feet;
that adequate ventilation will be provided by a fan and venti-~
lation ~ubing; that the roof will be supported with either
conventional roof bolts or resin grouted rods and supple-
mented with timbers and/or crossbars where needed. Tpe
plan stated that, according to surveys, the abandoned area
near the connection point did not contain water. Although
the plan made no reference to the possibilities that the
abandoned area might contain methane and/or blackdamp, it
did provide that test drill holes will be kept 20 feet in
advance of the face. The plan was received in the MSHA
district office on March 21, 1978, and approved by the
District Manager on March 24, 1978. See Appendix G Plan
No. 1.
The development of the Drainway entry wi th a continuous
mining machine was begun on Tuesday, March 28, 1978. Mining
was done on three shifts each day. During the afternoon
shift, (4:00 p.m. to midnight) on Friday, March 31, the
continuous mining machine developed a mechanical problem
and had to be brought to the surface for repair. The Drainway
entry had been driven approximately 191 feet. At this time
the first test boreholes were drilled.
On Monday morning, April 3, 1978, a second continuous mining
machine was brought from the mine yard to the Drainway site
to replace the malfunctioning machine. Glen Beverly, Ambrose
Conley and Lawrence Shelby (victim), representatives from the
National Mine Service Company, arrived at the Drainway site
to repair the continuous mining machine.
At approximately 1:30 p.m., the same day, Ronald W. Franks
and Vearle Hileman, MSHA District 5 personnel, arrived at
the Drainway site. They had completed inspection duties at
another mine and were enroute to their office in Norton,
Virginia, via a mountain road (shortcut) which took them by
the Drainway site. Although the Drainway entry was not part
of their area of assignment, they decided to stop and in-
vestigate what. appeared to them to be a new mine opening.
According to Franks and Hileman there were two continuous
mining machines on the surface. One machine was being re-
paired and the other was being serviced. No work was being
done underground and the ventilation fan was not operating.
Franks and Hileman discussed the Drainway project with Henry
Kiser, Manager of Mines, and Pete Capelli, Assistant to
the General Manager. They were advised by Capelli that the
company was concerned about encountering methane when the
Drainway entry holed through into the abandoned area and
that test boreholes were being drilled. The subject of black-
damp was not discussed by MSHA and company officials. The
ventilation fan was started and Franks and Hileman checked
the air movement in the drift opening and shortly afterwards
left the mine site.
3
lation tubing; that the roof will be supported with either
conventional roof bolts or resin grouted rods and supple-
mented with timbers and/or crossbars where needed. The
plan stated that, according to surveys, the abandoned area
near the connection point did not contain water. Although
the plan made no reference to the possibilities that the
abandoned area might contain methane and/or blackdamp, it
did provide that test drill holes will be kept 20 feet in
advance of the face. The plan was received in the MSHA
district office on March 21, 1978, and approved by the
District Manager on March 24, 1978. See Appendix G Plan
No. l.
The development of the Drainway entry with a continuous
mining machine was begun on Tuesday, March 28, 1978. Mining
was done on three shifts each day. During the afternoon
shift, (4:00 p.m. to midnight) on Friday, March 31, the
continuous mining machine developed a mechanical problem
and had to be brought to the surface for repair. The Drainway
entry had been driven approximately 191 feet. At this time
the first test boreholes were drilled.
On Monday morning, April 3, 1978, a second continuous mining
machine was brought from the mine yard to the Drainway site
to replace the malfunctioning machine. Glen Beverly, Ambrose
Conley and Lawrence Shelby (victim), representatives from the
National Mine Service Company, arrived at the Drainway site
to repair the continuous mining machine
At approximately 1:30 p.m., the same day, Ronald W. Franks
and Vearle Hileman, MSHA District 5 personnel, arrived at
the Drainway site. They had completed inspection duties at
another mine and were enroute to their office in Norton,
Virginia, via a mountain road (shortcut) which took them by
the Drainway site. Although the Drainway entry was not part
of their area of assignment, they decided to stop and in-
vestigate what appeared to them to be a new mine opening.
According to Franks and Hileman there were two continuous
mining machines on the surface. One machine was being re-
paired and the other was being serviced. No work was being
done underground and the ventilation fan was not operating.
Pranks and Hileman discussed the Drainway project with Henry
Kiser, Manager of Mines, and Pete Capelli, Assistant to
the General Manager. They were advised by Capelli that the
company was concerned about encountering methane when the
Drainway entry holed through into the abandoned area and
that test boreholes were being drilled. The subject of black-
damp was not discussed by MSHA and company officials. The
ventilation fan was started and Franks and Hileman checked
the air movement in the drift opening and shortly afterwards
left the mine site.
At the end of the midnight to 8 :00 a.m. shift on Tuesday,
April 4, 1978, the Drainway entry had been developed to
wi thin approximately 13 feet of the abandoned workings.
The time remaining on the third shift did not permit the
last advance of the Drainway to be roof bolted before the
dayshift crew reported for \wrk. See Appendix. F, Photo 2.
According to the preshift examination record book for the
8 :00 a.m. shift at the Drainway entry, no unsafe conditions
were found and 5,400 cubic feet a minute of air was measured
at the inby end of the line curtain.
The Inundation
The Drainway crew consisting of Charles Breeding, contin-
uous mining machine operator, Earl Castle Jr., shuttle car
operator, William Arden, roof-bolting machine operator,
Jack Nowlin, roof-bolting machine operator helper, and 11arion
Johnson, maintenance foreman, supervised by Richard Carson,
Superintendent, began their work duties at 8:00 a.m., Tues-
day, April 4, 1978.
Also Glen Beve rly, Ambrose Conley and Lawrence Shelby, re-
presentatives from the National Mine Service Company,
arrived at the Drainway site and began making repairs to
the continuous mining machine that was located on the surface
about 150 feet from the drift mouth.
At the start of the shift the crew trammed the continuous
mining machine from the face of the Drainway entry to the
surface. The roof-bolting roch ine was trammed from the sur-
face to the face and the place was bolted. Strickler
Mullins, Superintendent, arrived at the Drainway site
about 9:30 a.m. He had been at the company shop having
some shorter sections of drill steel augers made which
would el iminate the wh ipping act ion that was occurring when
test boreholes were drilled with the 10-foot auger sections.
Mullins met Carson in the Drainway entry where they examined
the face area for test boreholes that were drilled on the
previous shift. They found a test borehole in the center
of the entry, about 2 feet above the floor, and 8 1/2 feet
deep. Breeding and Earl Castle Jr. extended the 8 1/2 foot
borehole to a depth of approxima tely 13 feet where it
penetrated the abandoned 1 Righ t area of the Moss No.3,
Portal A mine. The borehole was cleaned by allowing the
drill auger to rotate freely as the drill augers were re-
moved from. the borehole. Air was flowing from the gob area
into the Drainway. Breeding and Castle stated it blew dust
3 or 4 feet into the Drainway entry.
4
At the end of the midnight to 8:00 a.m. shift on Tuesday,
April 4, 1978, the Drainway entry had been developed to
within approximately 13 feet of the abandoned workings.
The time remaining on the third shift did not permit the
last advance of the Drainway to be roof bolted before the
dayshift crew reported for work. See Appendix F, Photo 2
According to the preshift examination record book for the
8:00 a.m. shift at the Drainway entry, no unsafe conditions
were found and 5,400 cubic feet a minute of air was measured
at the inby end of the line curtain
The Inundation
The Drainway crew consisting of Charles Breeding, contin-
uous mining machine operator, Earl Castle Jr., shuttle car
operator, William Arden, roof-bolting machine operator
Jack Nowlin, roof-bolting machine operator helper, and Marion
Johnson, maintenance foreman, supervised by Richard Carson,
Superintendent, began their work duties at 8:00 a.m., Tues-
day, April 4, 1978.
Also Glen Beverly, Ambrose Conley and Lawrence Shelby, re-
presentatives from the National Mine Service Company,
arrived at the Drainway site and began making repairs to
the continuous mining machine that was located on the surface
about 150 feet from the drift mouth.
At the start of the shift the crew trammed the continuous
mining machine from the face of the Drainway entry to the
surface. The roof-bolting machine was trammed from the sur-
face to the face and the place was bolted. Strickler
Mullins, Superintendent, arrived at the Drainway site
about 9:30 asm. He had been at the company shop having
some shorter sections of drill steel augers made which
would eliminate the whipping action that was occurring when
test boreholes were drilled with the 10-foot auger sections
Mullins met Carson in the Drainway entry where they examined
the face area for test boreholes that were drilled on the
previous shift. They found a test borehole in the center
of the entry, about 2 feet above the floor, and 8 1/2 feet
deep. Breeding and Earl Castle Jr. extended the 8 1/2 foot
borehole to a depth of approximately 13 feet where it
penetrated the abandoned 1 Right area of the Moss No. 3,
Portal A mine. The borehole was cleaned by allowing the
drill auger to rotate freely as the drill augers were re-
moved from the borehole. Air was flowing from the gob area
into the Drainway. Breeding and Castle stated it blew dust
3 or 4 feet into the Drainway entry.
Immediately after the drill auger was removed trom the hole,
Mullins made tests for methane with an approved methane
detector and found 0.15 percent. Carson 1 s de tector was in-
operative and he obtained another from Mullins i vehicle.
Mullins and Carson continued testing for methane and when
very little could be detected, Mullins became concerned. He
told Carson" that bleeder is three or four miles in there
and there ought to be some methane coming out of the hole."
Mullins instructed Breeding to go to the surface and get a
flame safety lamp that was hanging on the canopy near the
entry portal. Breeding and Castle were removing an air line
from the face area to the compressor on the surface. The
drills used to drill the test boreholes were operated by com-
pressed air. Carson told Breeding to continue removing the
air line and he would get the flame safety lamp. Carson
returned wi th the flame safe ty lamp and started making tes ts
for methane across the face of the Drainway entry. Accord-
ing to Mullins, the flame on the flame safety lamp “had a
little red on it” and was extinguished as the safety lamp
was passed across the front of the hole. Mullins, dissatis-
fied with Carson’s method of testing, got the flame safety
lamp from him, and either requested one of the workmen to
take the flame safety lamp back from the face area and re-
1 igh tit or he took the flame safe ty lamp back from the face
and relit it himself. Mullins adjusted the flame of the
flame safety lamp to the first ring on the safety lamp glass
chimney and made tests across the face of the Drainway entry
but did not approach closer than 4 feet to the tes t borehole.
The flame of the flame safety lamp was not extinguished and
methane was not detected. Mullins stated that he gave the
flame safety lamp back to "my boy. (person unidentified) and
told him to take the safety lamp and to “put it back on the
miner; set it up on a little square box on the miner (methane
monitor) which they use for methane.” However, as near as
could be ascertained, the cont inuous mining mach ine had not
been brought to the face at this time. After removing the
air line from the Drainway entry to the surface, Breeding and
Castle started tramming the continuous mining machine into
the Drainway.
After completing the testing, Mullins returned to tne sur-
face, got into his vehicle, and traveled to the Bucu fan
house located approximately l, 500 feet from the Drainway site.
He telephoned Clarence Adkins (base operator) at the company
office and told him to contact Henry Kiser, General Manager
of Mines, or W. B. Couch, Division Manager, and advise them
that a borehole had penetrated the abandoned area and that
methane or water was not encountered. Mullins then returned
to the Drainway entry. According to Mullins" testimony no
5
Immediately after the drill auger was removed from the hole,
Mullins made tests for methane with an approved methane
detector and found 0.15 percent. Carson’s detector was in-
operative and he obtained another from Mullins’ vehicle
Mullins and Carson continued testing for methane and when
very little could be detected, Mullins became concerned. He
told Carson “that bleeder is three or four miles in there
and there ought to be some methane coming out of the hole.”
Mullins instructed Breeding to go to the surface and get a
flame safety lamp that was hanging on the canopy near the
entry portal. Breeding and Castle were removing an air line
from the face area to the compressor on the surface. The
drills used to drill the test boreholes were operated by com-
pressed air. Carson told Breeding to continue removing the
air line and he would get the flame safety lamp. Carson
returned with the flame safety lamp and started making tests
for methane across the face of the Drainway entry. Accord-
ing to Mullins, the flame on the flame safety lamp “had a
little red on it” and was extinguished as the safety lamp
was passed across the front of the hole. Mullins, dissatis-
fied with Carson’s method of testing, got the flame safety
lamp from him, and either requested one of the workmen to
take the flame safety lamp back from the face area and re-
light it or he took the flame safety lamp back from the face
and relit it himself. Mullins adjusted the flame of the
flame safety lamp to the first ring on the safety lamp glass
chimney and made tests across the face of the Drainway entry
but did not approach closer than 4 feet to the test borehole.
The flame of the flame safety lamp was not extinguished and
methane was not detected. Mullins stated that he gave the
flame safety lamp back to “my boy" (person unidentified) and
told him to take the safety lamp and to “put it back on the
miner; set it up on a little square box on the miner (methane
monitor) which they use for methane." However, as near as
could be ascertained, the continuous mining machine had not
been brought to the face at this time. After removing the
air line from the Drainway entry to the surface, Breeding and
Castle started tramming the continuous mining machine into
the Drainway.
After completing the testing, Mullins returned to tne sur-
face, got into his vehicle, and traveled to the Bucu fan
house located approximately 1,500 feet from the Drainway site.
He telephoned Clarence Adkins (base operator) at the company
office and told him to contact Henry Kiser, General Manager
of Mines, or W. B. Couch, Division Manager, and advise them
that a borehole had penetrated the abandoned area and that
methane or water was not encountered. Mullins then returned
to the Drainway entry. According to Mullins" testimony no
further tests were made with the flame safety lamp. Breeding
stated that he did not know where the flame safety lamp was,
and that someone told him it was on the machine somewhere but
he did not remember seeing the flame safety iamp sitting on
the “little box” located in front of the operator’s station
of the continuous mining machine. Breeding stated that the
only thing he knew was that Mullins was the only one who had
the flame safety lamp. However, Mullins stated that he saw
the lighted flame safety lamp sitting on the continuous
mining machine after the third shuttle car of coal had been
loaded from the face.
The machine was trammed into position at the Iace of the Drain-
way entry about ll:45 a.m. and mining of coal was started.
Mullins and Carson, thinking there should be methane in
the abandoned area, positioned themselves on either side of
the continuous mining machine inby the operator, and contin-
uously tested for methane with approved detectors during mining
operations. Marion Johnson, maintenance foreman, was stand-
ing behind the operator’s position observing mining. See
sketch, Appendix I, Figure 1.
About 12: 30 p. m. the fourth shuttle car of coal was loaded
and the shuttle car left for the surface. Breeding was
operating the continuous mining machine cutting coal from
the face for the next shuttle car when the cutting head
mined through into the abandoned 1 Right area on the left
side of the entry. Mullins stated that he felt a blast of
air and immediately called to Breeding “hold it, I believe
the thing is through.” See Appendix F., Photo Nos. 3 and 4.
Breeding stopped the machine immediately. At that time
Mullins heard someone hollering and struggling on the oppo-
site side of the continuous mining machine. He crossed
under the boom of the machine to investigate. Breeding
stated, "When we cut through Dick Carson hollered and said,
Boys I am feeling dizzy. i’m going to get out of here and
then it seems like just a matter of seconds that everything
seemed like it blacked out… Mullins, after crossing under
the miner boom, attempted to drag Marion Johnson but was
unable to do so because of Johnson’s size. Mullins then
dragged Breeding toward the surface for a distance of approxi-
mately 150 feet. At this point r~ullins became too weak to
drag Breeding any further and continued to the surface with-
out him. While hanging on to the canopy support at the portal,
Mullins waved his arms to get attention of workmen on the
surface.
6
further tests were made with the flame safety lamp. Breeding
stated that he did not know where the flame safety lamp was,
and that someone told him it was on the machine somewhere but
he did not remember seeing the flame safety lamp sitting on
the “little box” located in front of the operator’s station
of the continuous mining machine. Breeding stated that the
only thing he knew was that Mullins was the only one who had
the flame safety lamp. However, Mullins stated that he saw
the lighted flame safety lamp sitting on the continuous
mining machine after the third shuttle car of coal had been
loaded from the face.
The machine was trammed into position at the face of the Drain-
way entry about 11:45 a.m. and mining of coal was started.
Mullins and Carson, thinking there should be methane in
the abandoned area, positioned themselves on either side of
the continuous mining machine inby the operator, and contin-
uously tested for methane with approved detectors during mining
operations. Marion Johnson, maintenance foreman, was stand-
ing behind the operator’s position observing mining. See
sketch, Appendix I, Figure 1.
About 12:30 p.m. the fourth shuttle car of coal was loaded
and the shuttle car left for the surface. Breeding was
operating the continuous mining machine cutting coal from
the face for the next shuttle car when the cutting head
mined through into the abandoned 1 Right area on the left
side of the entry. Mullins stated that he felt a blast of
air and immediately called to Breeding “hold it, I believe
the thing is through." See Appendix F., Photo Nos. 3 and 4.
Breeding stopped the machine immediately. At that time
Mullins heard someone hollering and struggling on the oppo-
site side of the continuous mining machine. He crossed
under the boom of the machine to investigate. Breeding
stated, “When we cut through Dick Carson hollered and said,
Boys I am feeling dizzy. I’m going to get out of here and
then it seems like just a matter of seconds that everything
seemed like it blacked out.” Mullins, after crossing under
the miner boom, attempted to drag Marion Johnson but was
unable to do so because of Johnson’s size. Mullins then
dragged Breeding toward the surface for a distance of approxi-
mately 150 feet. At this point Mullins became too weak to
drag Breeding any further and continued to the surface with-
out him. While hanging on to the canopy support at the portal,
Mullins waved his arms to get attention of workmen on the
surface.
lecovery Operations
The following description of the recovery operation, and
the account and time of the activities that took place
following the accident are not considered absolute. Con-
sidering the extrer.e emergency that existed immediately
following the inundation, and the physical effect the oxygen
deficient atmosphere had on the persons involved in the
rescue attempts it is unders tandable that areas of confl ict
could exist concerning their activities.
Earl Castle Jr. had just unloaded a shuttle car of coal onto
the surface storage pile and was returning toward the portal
when he saw Mullins waving his arms. He recognized Mullins
was exci ted and heard him say “We got some boys down; come
on let’ s help them.” Castle stopped the shuttle car and went
into the Drainway entry. He found Breeding lying on the
floor near the water hole, approximately 80 feet inby the
Drainway portal. He turned him over and wiped the mud from
his face, loosened his clothing and saw he was breathing.
williæn Arden and Jack Nowlin had just finished their lunch
and were walking toward the Drainway portal when they also
saw Mullins waving his arms and heard him holler. Mullins,
Arden and Nowlin followed Castle into the Drainway to where
Breeding was lying. Apparently Mullins and Nowlin assisted
Breeding a short distance toward the portal and Mullins
returned the remainder of the way to the surface alone.
Nowlin went back to the water hole where he was overcome.
In the meantime, Àrden and Castle continued toward the
face. Castle later stated that he went to within LO or 12
feet of the boom of the continuous mining machine and found
Carson lying near the line brattice and another man near him.
He also saw Arden, who had been overcome, lying on his face
and turned him over. Realizing he could not help the over-
come men, Castle started to run. He ran two or three steps
toward the surface and was overcome.
Lawrence Shelby, Glen Beverly, and Grayson Conley, the
National Mine Service Company representatives, who were re-
pairing the continuous mining machine about 150 feet from
the Drainway portal had just finished their lunch. Shelby
and Beverly were seated on some crib blocks near the machine
when they saw Mullins waving his arms; Conley had gone to
his automobile for a drink of water. Beverly went to the
Drainway portal to ascertain the problem and Mullins informed
him of the situation. Beverly returned to his automobile
for a cap lamp. Enroute he met Ray G. Ross, District Manager,
District 5, MSHA, Frank C. Mann, Supervisory Mining Engineer,
Willis D. Ison, Subdistrict Manager, and M. L. West, Manager
Safety Division, Clinchfield Coal Company, who had stopped
at the Drainway site while enroute to Dante from duties
7
Recovery Operations
The following description of the recovery operation, and
the account and time of the activities that took place
following the accident are not considered absolute. Con-
sidering the extreme emergency that existed immediately
following the inundation, and the physical effect the oxygen
deficient atmosphere had on the persons involved in the
rescue attempts it is understandable that areas of conflict
could exist concerning their activities.
Earl Castle Jr. had just unloaded a shuttle car of coal onto
the surface storage pile and was returning toward the portal
when he saw Mullins waving his arms. He recognized Mullins
was excited and heard him say “We got some boys down; come
on let’s help them.” Castle stopped the shuttle car and went
into the Drainway entry. He found Breeding lying on the
floor near the water hole, approximately 80 feet inby the
Drainway portal. He turned him over and wiped the mud from
his face, loosened his clothing and saw he was breathing.
William Arden and Jack Nowlin had just finished their lunch
and were walking toward the Drainway portal when they also
saw Mullins waving his arms and heard him holler. Mullins,
Arden and Nowlin followed Castle into the Drainway to where
Breeding was lying. Apparently Mullins and Nowlin assisted
Breeding a short distance toward the portal and Mullins
returned the remainder of the way to the surface alone.
Nowlin went back to the water hole where he was overcome.
In the meantime, Arden and Castle continued toward the
face. Castle later stated that he went to within 10 or 12
feet of the boom of the continuous mining machine and found
Carson lying near the line brattice and another man near him.
He also saw Arden, who had been overcome, lying on his face
and turned him over. Realizing he could not help the over-
come men, Castle started to run. He ran two or three steps
toward the surface and was overcome.
Lawrence Shelby, Glen Beverly, and Grayson Conley, the
National Mine Service Company representatives, who were re-
pairing the continuous mining machine about 150 feet from
the Drainway portal had just finished their lunch. Shelby
and Beverly were seated on some crib blocks near the machine
when they saw Mullins waving his arms; Conley had gone to
his automobile for a drink of water. Beverly went to the
Drainway portal to ascertain the problem and Mullins informed
him of the situation. Beverly returned to his automobile
for a cap lamp. Enroute he met Ray G. Ross, District Manager,
District 5, MSHA, Frank C. Mann, Supervisory Mining Engineer
Willis D. Ison, Subdistrict Manager, and M. L. West, Manager
Safety Division, Clinchfield Coal Company, who had stopped
at the Drainway site while enroute to Dante from duties
at the nearby McClure No. 2 mine. Ross, Mann, Ison, and
Wes t saw someone at the Drainway portal, la ter ident ified
as Mullins, waving his arms, but thought he was only.trying
to get the attention of workmen in the area. As they neared
the portal they became aware that something was wrong. West
started running toward the portal followed by Ross, Mann, and
Ison. Mullins told them he had men down on bad air. At
this time there were six men underground: Richard Carson,
Superintendent; Marion Johnson, Maintenance Foreman; Charles
Breeding, continuous mining machine operator; Earl Castle
Jr., shuttle car operator; William Arden, roof-bolting
machine operator; and Jack Nowlin, roof-bolting machine opera-
tor helper.
West, Ross, Ison, Shelby, and Mullins entered the Drainway
wi th Mann following closely behind. They found Breeding
approximately 50 feet inby the portal. After determining he
was in no immediate danger, West, Ross, Ison, and Shelby
continued inby toward the waterhole. Mann and Mullins assist-
ed Breeding to the surface. At this time Mullins told Mann
they had cut into an abandoned area and that men were down on
bad air.
West and Ross, after traveling just inby the waterhole, be-
came dizzy and disoriented. Realizing they were in trouble,
they decided to retreat and struggled to the surface. Ison
and Shel by cont inued on toward the face area where they toc
were overcome by the blackdamp. Beverly who had returned
to his vehicle for a cap lamp entered the mine last. He
stated that as he started underground he met two men coming
out toward the surface. He did not recognize them, but
later they were identified to be West and Ross. On reaching
the waterhole Beverly found someone with a red T-shirt
lying on the floor. It was later ascertained that Nowlin
was wearing a red T-shirt. Beverly was overcome at this
point. At this time there were eight men underground.
On arriving back on the surface, West informed Ross that
they didn’ t have communications at the Drainway site and
that he was going back to the McClure No. 2 mine site to get
Henry Kiser, who had a vehicle equipped with a two-way radio
and he would call the office for assistance. According to
statements from Ross and Mann, after gaining composure,
they reentered the Drainway entry to the wa terhole where
they found Nowlin, in a semi-conscious condition, lying
partially in the water. They assisted him to the surface.
Ross and Mann reentered the Drainway entry a third time and
traveled to the waterhole where they found Glen Beverly and
assisted him to the surface. At approximately 1 :00 p.m.
rescue efforts temporarily ceased with Carson, Johnson,
Ison, Arden, Shelby and Castle still underground.
8
at the nearby McClure No. 2 mine. Ross, Mann, Ison, and
West saw someone at the Drainway portal, later identified
as Mullins, waving his arms, but thought he was only .trying
to get the attention of workmen in the area. As they neared
the portal they became aware that something was wrong. West
started running toward the portal followed by Ross, Mann, and
Ison. Mullins told them he had men down on bad air. At
this time there were six men underground: Richard Carson,
Superintendent; Marion Johnson, Maintenance Foreman; Charles
Breeding, continuous mining machine operator; Earl Castle
Jr., shuttle car operator; William Arden, roof-bolting
machine operator; and Jack Nowlin, roof-bolting machine opera-
tor helper.
West, Ross, Ison, Shelby, and Mullins entered the Drainway
with Mann following closely behind. They found Breeding
approximately 50 feet inby the portal. After determining he
was in no immediate danger, West, Ross, Ison, and Shelby
continued inby toward the waterhole. Mann and Mullins assist-
ed Breeding to the surface. At this time Mullins told Mann
they had cut into an abandoned area and that men were down on
bad air.
West and Ross, after traveling just inby the waterhole, be-
came dizzy and disoriented. Realizing they were in trouble,
they decided to retreat and struggled to the surface. Ison
and Shelby continued on toward the face area where they too
were overcome by the blackdamp. Beverly who had returned
to his vehicle for a cap lamp entered the mine last. He
stated that as he started underground he met two men coming
out toward the surface. He did not recognize them, but
later they were identified to be West and Ross. On reaching
the waterhole Beverly found someone with a red T-shirt
lying on the floor. It was later ascertained that Nowlin
was wearing a red T-shirt. Beverly was overcome at this
point. At this time there were eight men underground.
On arriving back on the surface, West informed Ross that
they didn’t have communications at the Drainway site and
that he was going back to the McClure No. 2 mine site to get
Henry Kiser, who had a vehicle equipped with a two-way radio
and he would call the office for assistance. According to
statements from Ross and Mann, after gaining composure,
they reentered the Drainway entry to the waterhole where
they found Nowlin, in a semi-conscious condition, lying
partially in the water. They assisted him to the surface.
Ross and Mann reentered the Drainway entry a third time and
traveled to the waterhole where they found Glen Beverly and
assisted him to the surface. At approximately 1:00 p.m.
rescue efforts temporarily ceased with Carson, Johnson,
Ison, Arden, Shelby and Castle still underground.
0tatements from Mullins differ from the statements from Ross,
Mann and Beverly regarding their activities during reoovery
efforts. Mullins stated that he helped rescue Beverly who
had entered the Drainway before the arrival of Ross, Mann,
Ison and West to help rescue Breeding. Beverly stated, that
before he went underground and while he was enroute from the
Drainway portal to his automobile to secure a cap lamp, he
met four men walking toward the Drain"ay portal who were
later identified as Ross, Mann, Ison and West. According to
statements from Ross and Mann, Breeding was found in a semi-
conscious condition about 50 feet inby the Drainway portal
and Mann and Mullins assisted Breeding to the surface. Ross
and Mann reentered the Drainway entry and found Beverly down
near the waterhole and they assisted him to the surface.
In the meantime, West contacted Henry Kiser at the McClure
No. 2 mine and informed him of the accident at the Drainway.
Immediately they departed for the Drainway in separate
vehicles. Enroute Kiser attempted to contact the base opera-
tor with his radio but because of terrain and weather condi-
tions he did not make contact. They arrived at the Drain-
way site where Ross informed them that Ison was still under-
ground. Kiser put his cap lamp on and started toward the
portal with the intention of entering the Drainway. West
and Ross restrained him and told him the mine was unsafe and
protect ive equipment was needed.
Ross, Mann and West talked to Breeding in an effort to try
and determine what had occurred in the face of the Drainway
entry and to determine what course of action to take.
Breeding told them that the Drainway entry had cut through
into old works, and as well as he could remember the 1 ine
curtain was 20 to 30 feet from the face. Mann stated that
he checked the air movement into the Drainway entry and
found very little air entering.
Ross, Mann, Kiser and West discussed the Drainway ventila-
tion system and agreed to reverse the fan which would change
the exhaust system to a blowing system of ventilation;
theorizing that the exhaust system of ventilation could be
pulling oxygen deficient air from the abandoned area into
the Drainway entry. The fan was stopped at l:05 p.m. and
turned around to operate blowing. The fan was restarted at
1:08 p.m.
Wh ile the fan was be ing turned around Kiser went to his
vehicle and contacted the base operator by radio. He advised
the base operator about the accident at the Drainway and
told him to have oxygen breathing apparatus delivered to
9
statements from Mullins differ from the statements from Ross,
Mann and Beverly regarding their activities during recovery
efforts. Mullins stated that he helped rescue Beverly who
had entered the Drainway before the arrival of Ross, Mann
Ison and West to help rescue Breeding. Beverly stated, that
before he went underground and while he was enroute from the
Drainway portal to his automobile to secure a cap lamp, he
met four men walking toward the Drainway portal who were
later identified as Ross, Mann, Ison and West. According to
statements from Ross and Mann, Breeding was found in a semi-
conscious condition about 50 feet inby the Drainway portal
and Mann and Mullins assisted Breeding to the surface. Ross
and Mann reentered the Drainway entry and found Beverly down
near the waterhole and they assisted him to the surface.
In the meantime, West contacted Henry Kiser at the McClure
No. 2 mine and informed him of the accident at the Drainway.
Immediately they departed for the Drainway in separate
vehicles. Enroute Kiser attempted to contact the base opera~
tor with his radio but because of terrain and weather condi-
tions he did not make contact. They arrived at the Drain-
way site where Ross informed them that Ison was still under-
ground. Kiser put his cap lamp on and started toward the
portal with the intention of entering the Drainway. West
and Ross restrained him and told him the mine was unsafe and
protective equipment was needed.
Ross, Mann and West talked to Breeding in an effort to try
and determine what had occurred in the face of the Drainway
entry and to determine what course of action to take.
Breeding told them that the Drainway entry had cut through
into old works, and as well as he could remember the line
curtain was 20 to 30 feet from the face. Mann stated that
he checked the air movement into the Drainway entry and
found very little air entering.
Ross, Mann, Kiser and West discussed the Drainway ventila-
tion system and agreed to reverse the fan which would change
the exhaust system to a blowing system of ventilation
theorizing that the exhaust system of ventilation could be
pulling oxygen deficient air from the abandoned area into
the Drainway entry. The fan was stopped at 1:05 p.m. and
turned around to operate blowing. The fan was restarted at
1:08 p.m.
While the fan was being turned around Kiser went to his
vehicle and contacted the base operator by radio. He advised
the base operator about the accident at the Drainway and
told him to have oxygen breathing apparatus delivered to
the Drainway site by helicopter and to notify the company
mine rescue team and have the team transported to Drainway
by helicopter. Kiser also requested that a doctor and nurses
be dispatched to the Drainway site by helicopter as soon as
possible.
After the fan had been operating blowing for approximately
20 minutes Castle, who had been underground for approximately
40 minutes, walked out of the drift mouth.
At approximately 1: 30 p.m. the company helicopter arrived
a t the Drainway site wi th three Draeger oxygen breathing
apparatus and took off immediately after unloading. W. B.
Couch, Division Manager, arrived at the Drainway site about
this time. No one present at the Drainway at this time
had been trained in the care and use of the Draeger oxygen
breathing apparatus. However, West and Couch made a des-
perate attempt to outfit themselves with the Draeger apparatus
with the intent of making rescue attempts underground. Not
be ing famil iar wi th this type of equipment they were unsuccess-
ful in getting the machines to operate properly. At approxi-
mately 1:35 p.m. two company emergency medical rescue units
arrived at the Drainway site.
The helicopter landed at the Drainway site with Doctor W. A.
Davis and two nurses, Lois Buchanan and Virginia Helbert, at
approximately 1 :40 p.m. and took off immediately.
While awaiting the arrival of the rescue team members, West
and Couch decided to explore the Drainway entry by travel-
ing on intake air behind the line brattice. They traveled
as far as the waterhole and began to feel the effects of the
blackdamp and decided to retreat to the surface.
At approximately 2:00 p.m. the helicopter landed at the Drain-
way site a third time with Milton McArthur Kiser, Captain,
and Archie E. Salyer, team member, of the Moss No.2 mine
rescue team and three addi t ional Draeger oxygen breathing
apparatus. The helicopter left imhiediately. The two mine
rescue team members put on the oxygen breathing apparatus
and assisted Couch in putting on a machine. The three men
were briefed by West regarding the accident and the con-
d i t ions expected to be found underground and he instructed
them to recover the first body that they located. The three
men entered the Drainway at 2:10 p.m. By 2:20 p.m. they had
recovered the first three bodies. At this time the heli-
copter landed for the fourth time wi th Harold N. Phil lips,
mine rescue team trainer and Wayne Fields and Davis Moore,
10
the Drainway site by helicopter and to notify the company
mine rescue team and have the team transported to Drainway
by helicopter. Kiser also requested that a doctor and nurses
be dispatched to the Drainway site by helicopter as soon as
possible.
After the fan had been operating blowing for approximately
20 minutes Castle, who had been underground for approximately
40 minutes, walked out of the drift mouth
At approximately 1:30 p.m. the company helicopter arrived
at the Drainway site with three Draeger oxygen breathing
apparatus and took off immediately after unloading. W. B.
Couch, Division Manager, arrived at the Drainway site about
this time. No one present at the Drainway at this time
had been trained in the care and use of the Draeger oxygen
breathing apparatus. However, West and Couch made a des-
perate attempt to outfit themselves with the Draeger apparatus
with the intent of making rescue attempts underground. Not
being familiar with this type of equipment they were unsuccess-
ful in getting the machines to operate properly. At approxi-
mately 1:35 p.m. two company emergency medical rescue units
arrived at the Drainway site.
The helicopter landed at the Drainway site with Doctor W. A.
Davis and two nurses, Lois Buchanan and Virginia Helbert, at
approximately 1:40 p.m. and took off immediately.
While awaiting the arrival of the rescue team members, West
and Couch decided to explore the Drainway entry by travel-
ing on intake air behind the line brattice. They traveled
as far as the waterhole and began to feel the effects of the
blackdamp and decided to retreat to the surface.
At approximately 2:00 p.m. the helicopter landed at the Drain-
way site a third time with Milton McArthur Kiser, Captain,
and Archie E. Salyer, team member, of the Moss No. 2 mine
rescue team and three additional Draeger oxygen breathing
apparatus. The helicopter left immediately. The two mine
rescue team members put on the oxygen breathing apparatus
and assisted Couch in putting on a machine. The three men
were briefed by West regarding the accident and the con-
ditions expected to be found underground and he instructed
them to recover the first body that they located. The three
men entered the Drainway at 2:10 p.m. By 2:20 p.m. they had
recovered the first three bodies. At this time the heli-
copter landed for the fourth time with Harold N. Phillips
mine rescue team trainer and Wayne Fields and Davis Moore,
10
mine rescue team members. The five rescue team members and
Frank Phillips, construction foreman, all wearing oxygen
breathing apparatus went underground and recovered the, last
two bodies. The last body was brought to the surface at
approximately 2~35 p.m. Harold Phillips and Milton Kiser
reentered the Drainway and examined the face area to make
sure all the bodies had been recovered. While at the face
area they made tes ts for methane wi th an approved me thane
detector and made tests for oxygen deficiency with an
Edmont Wilson oxygen analyzer. A maximum of 0.5 percent
methane and 19.5 percent was detected. 1/ See Appendix I,
Figure 2 for location of bodies. During-recovery operations
on April 4, 1978, air measurements were not taken.
Dr. Davis and the two nurses examined the bodies as they were
brough t to the surface and found no signs of 1 i fe. However
they gave each one cardiopulmonary resuscitation but to no
avail. The five victims were taken by the company ambulances
to the Huff-Cook funeral home in St. Paul, Virginia. The
certificates of death, signed by Dr. W. A. Davis, list
asphyxia, exposure to low oxygen tension, as the cause of
death. See Appendix A for Certificates of Death.
The other persons that were overcome by blackdamp during
rescue attempts were examined by Dr. Davis at the Drainway
site. Mullins and Castle were taken by ambulance to a
hospital for observation.
li Normal air contains approximately 21 percent oxygen.The following phys iolog ical ef fects of oxyge n def icient
atmosphere have been observed:
Oxygen Content Ef fect
9%
7%
6%
Faster, deeper breathing
Dizziness, buzzing in ears, rapid
heart beat
May loose consciousness if explosure
prolonged
Fainting, unconsciousness
Life endangered
Convulsive movements, death
17%
l5%
13%
It should be pointed out that all such effects vary with the
individual and the period of his exposure.
The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act requires all active
workings be ventilated by a current of air containing not
less than 19.5% oxygen and not more than 0.5% carbon dioxide.
11
mine rescue team members. The five rescue team members and
Frank Phillips, construction foreman, all wearing oxygen
breathing apparatus went underground and recovered the, last
two bodies. The last body was brought to the surface at
approximately 2:35 p.m. Harold Phillips and Milton Kiser
reentered the Drainway and examined the face area to make
sure all the bodies had been recovered. While at the face
area they made tests for methane with an approved methane
detector and made tests for oxygen deficiency with an
Edmont Wilson oxygen analyzer. A maximum of 0.5 percent
methane and 19.5 percent was detected. 1/ See Appendix I,
Pigure 2 for location of bodies. During recovery operations
on April 4, 1978, air measurements were not taken.
Dr. Davis and the two nurses examined the bodies as they were
brought to the surface and found no signs of life. However
they gave each one cardiopulmonary resuscitation but to no
avail. The five victims were taken by the company ambulances
to the Huff-Cook funeral home in St. Paul, Virginia. The
certificates of death, signed by Dr. W. A. Davis, list
asphyxia, exposure to low oxygen tension, as the cause of
death. See Appendix A for Certificates of Death.
The other persons that were overcome by blackdamp during
rescue attempts were examined by Dr. Davis at the Drainway
site. Mullins and Castle were taken by ambulance to a
hospital for observation.
T/ Normal air contains approximately 21 percent oxygen
The following physiological effects of oxygen deficient
atmosphere have been observed:
Oxygen Content Effect
ls Faster, deeper breathing
158 Dizziness, buzzing in ears, rapid
heart beat
138 May loose consciousness if explosure
prolonged
98 Fainting, unconsciousness
78 Life endangered
6% Convulsive movements, death
It should be pointed out that all such effects vary with the
individual and the period of his exposure.
The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act requires all active
workings be ventilated by a current of air containing not
less than 19.5% oxygen and not more than 0.5% carbon dioxide.
ll
Upon completion of recovery operations, all persons were
removed from the Drainway entry, and a danger sign was posted
at the portal. Company and MSHA personnel. were assigned to
guard the site around the clock to prevent anyone from enter-
ing the Drainway until an investigation of the occurrence
was made. At 5:50 p.m. April 4, 1978, a 103(k) order of with-
drawal was issued by Donnie F. Short, MSHA inspector.
Part icipa ting Organiza tions: The following is a 1 ist of
officials who assisted in directing the recovery operations:
Clinchfield Coal Company
Henry Kiser
W. 13. Couch
Strickler Mullins
General Manager of Mines
Division Manager
Superintendent,
Moss No.3, Portal A mine
Manager, Safety DivisionM. L. West
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Ray G. Ross
Frank C. Mann
District Manager
Supervisory Mining Engineer
See Appendix C for the names of employees of Clinchfield Coal
Company, mine rescue team members and the two service repre-
sentatives from the National Mine Service Company who partici-
pated in the recovery operations.
l/ cont inued.
There are several processes at work underground which cause
oxygen depletion. Removal of oxygen occurs by absorption,
adsorption, and oxidation. Ground water depleted of its own
oxygen will rob the mine atmosphere of oxygen, by absorption.
Coal may occlude oxygen on its surface. Sulfide minerals
oxidizing slowly in place can remove some oxygen from the air.
In an underground area, such as the abandoned 1 Right area,
several processes acting concurrently can create a serious
hazard as was evident by the inundation of April 4, 1978.
A report of tests conducted by Michigan Technological Univer-
sity shows oxygen can decrease to 5 percent within one week
in a sealed off coal mine section without a fire. (USBM
CONTRACT REPORT NO. SO 23107 5. Mich igan Technolog ical
University College of Engineering, Department of Mining
Engineering. )
l2
Upon completion of recovery operations, all persons were
removed from the Drainway entry, and a danger sign was posted
at the portal. Company and MSHA personnel were assigned to
guard the site around the clock to prevent anyone from enter-
ing the Drainway until an investigation of the occurrence
was made. At 5:50 p.m. April 4, 1978, a 103(k) order of with-
drawal was issued by Donnie F. Short, MSHA inspector.
Participating Organizations: ‘The following is a list of
officials who assisted in directing the recovery operations:
Clinchfield Coal Company
Henry Kiser General Manager of Mines
W. B. Couch Division Manager
Strickler Mullins Superintendent,
Moss No. 3, Portal A mine
M. L. West Manager, Safety Division
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Ray G. Ross District Manager
Frank C. Mann Supervisory Mining Engineer
See Appendix C for the names of employees of Clinchfield Coal
Company, mine rescue team members and the two service repre-
sentatives from the National Mine Service Company who partici-
pated in the recovery operations.
J/ continued.
There are several processes at work underground which cause
oxygen depletion. Removal of oxygen occurs by absorption
adsorption, and oxidation. Ground water depleted of its own
oxygen will rob the mine atmosphere of oxygen, by absorption
Coal may occlude oxygen on its surface. Sulfide minerals
oxidizing slowly in place can remove some oxygen from the air
In an underground area, such as the abandoned 1 Right area
several processes acting concurrently can create a serious
hazard as was evident by the inundation of April 4, 1978.
A report of tests conducted by Michigan Technological Univer-
sity shows oxygen can decrease to 5 percent within one week
in a sealed off coal mine section without a fire. (USBM
CONTRACT REPORT NO. $0231075. Michigan Technological
University College of Engineering, Department of Mining
Engineering. )
12
PART II
INVESTIGATION, DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION
Investigation Committee
The underground investigation of the cause of the inundation
(blackdamp) was conducted April 6 and 7, 1978. The follow-
ing persons were members of the investigation committee:
Virginia Division of Mines and Quarries
Frank Linkous Technical Assistant
The Pittston Company Coal Group
John W. Crawford Director of Heal th and Safety
Clinchfield Coal Company
W. B. Couch
M. L. West
Division Manager
Manager, Safety Division
United Mine Workers of America
Edward Gilbert
Floyd T. Mullins
Eugene Marshall
International Safety Director
Safety Coordinator, District 28
Safety Committeeman
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Frank C. Mann
James D. Micheal
James V. Bowman
Clarence A. Goode
Supervisory Mining Engineer
Coal Mine Specialist
Coal Mine Technical Special ist
(Ventilation)
Coal Mine Inspector (Special
Investigator)
Other persons who participated
recovery operations and/or the
Appendix C.
in or were present during
investigation are listed in
interviews
As part of the investigatiön into the cause of the inund~tion
(blackdamp), MSHA, in conjunction with the Virginia Division
of Mines and Quarries, conducted interviews wi th several
company officials and employees. These interviews were
conducted on April 7 and May 4, 1978, at the Clinchfield Coal
Company Training Center at Carbo, Virginia. A list of per-
sons who participated in or were present during all or part
of these interviews is in Appendix D.
13
PART IL
INVESTIGATION, DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION
Investigation Committee
he underground investigation of the cause of the inundation
(blackdamp) was conducted April 6 and 7, 1978. The follow-
ing persons were members of the investigation committee:
Virginia Division of Mines and Quarries
Frank Linkous Technical Assistant
The Pittston Company Coal Group
John W. Crawford Director of Health and Safety
Clinchfield Coal Company
W. B. Couch Division Manager
M. L. West Manager, Safety Division
United Mine Workers of America
Edward Gilbert International Safety Director
Floyd T. Mullins Safety Coordinator, District 28
Eugene Marshall Safety Committeeman
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Frank C. Mann Supervisory Mining Engineer
James D. Micheal Coal Mine Specialist
James V. Bowman Coal Mine Technical Specialist
(Ventilation)
Clarence A. Goode Coal Mine Inspector (Special
Investigator)
Other persons who participated in or were present during
recovery operations and/or the investigation are listed in
Appendix C.
Interviews
As part of the investigation into the cause of the inundation
(blackdamp), MSHA, in conjunction with the Virginia Division
of Mines and Quarries, conducted interviews with several
company officials and employees. These interviews were
conducted on April 7 and May 4, 1978, at the Clinchfield Coal
Company Training Center at Carbo, Virginia. A list of per-
sons who participated in or were present during all or part
of these interviews is in Appendix D.
13
Transcripts of the interviews are available for examination
at the Mine Safety and Health Administration headquarters,
4015 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22203.
Investigation
On AprilS, 1978, MSHA personnel met in District 5 head-
quarters in Norton, Virginia, selected an investigation team
and developed and discussed plans and procedures for conduct-
ing the investigation.
On April 6, 1978, MSHA investigation team met with company,
State and United Mine Workers of America officials at the
Drainway site and discussed plans and procedures for con-
ducting the investigation. At this meeting final plans and
procedures were developed and agreed to by all interested
parties.
The plans and procedures for conducting the investigation
required that a preshift examination of the Drainway be made
by four members of a mine rescue team (three company and one
MSlIA) , wearing self contained oxygen breathing apparatus,
equipped wi th a communication system and testing equipment
consisting of flame safety lamp, oxygen analyzer and carbon
dioxide detectors.
The plan stipulated that four members of a mine rescue team
(three company and one MSHA) be present in the face area of
the Drainway at all times while investigators were under-
ground. The mine rescue team members would constantly
monitor the methane and oxygen content of the air. While
persons were underground a back-up mine rescue team, in
readiness, was required on the surface. The plan limited to
four the number of investigators who could be underground at
one time. Each team of investigators consisted of company,
State, MSHA and UMWA personnel. The plan also required that
a log be kept of all activities during the investigation and
a record made of all persons entering and returning from the
il i ne .
The use of the mine rescue teams in the conduct of the
invest iga tion was cons ide red necessary because the abandoned
area could not be ventilated and cleared of blackdamp; the
blackdamp in the abandoned area would tend to flow into the
Drainway entry during a drop in barometric pressure; 2/ and
the ventilation system employed at the Drainway was considered
~/ The atmosphere in a sealed gOb area will expand during
drops in barometric pressure. A drop in barometric pressure
could have contributed to the black damp entering the
14
Transcripts of the interviews are available for examination
at the Mine Safety and Health Administration headquarters
4015 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22203.
Investigation
On April 5, 1978, MSHA personnel met in District 5 head-
quarters in Norton, Virginia, selected an investigation team
and developed and discussed plans and procedures for conduct-
ing the investigation:
On April 6, 1978, MSHA investigation team met with company,
State and United Mine Workers of America officials at the
Drainway site and discussed plans and procedures for con-
ducting the investigation. At this meeting final plans and
procedures were developed and agreed to by all interested
parties.
The plans and procedures for conducting the investigation
required that a preshift examination of the Drainway be made
by four members of a mine rescue team (three company and one
MSHA), wearing self contained oxygen breathing apparatus,
equipped with a communication system and testing equipment
consisting of flame safety lamp, oxygen analyzer and carbon
dioxide detectors.
The plan stipulated that four members of a mine rescue team
(three company and one MSHA) be present in the face area of
the Drainway at all times while investigators were under-
ground. The mine rescue team members would constantly
monitor the methane and oxygen content of the air. While
persons were underground a back-up mine rescue team, in
readiness, was required on the surface. The plan limited to
four the number of investigators who could be underground at
one time. Each team of investigators consisted of company,
State, MSHA and UMWA personnel. The plan also required that
a log be kept of all activities during the investigation and
a record made of all persons entering and returning from the
mine.
The use of the mine rescue teams in the conduct of the
investigation was considered necessary because the abandoned
area could not be ventilated and cleared of blackdamp; the
blackdamp in the abandoned area would tend to flow into the
Drainway entry during a drop in barometric ‘pressure; 2/ and
the ventilation system employed at the Drainway was considered
2/ ‘The atmosphere in a sealed gob area will expand during
Grops in barometric pressure. A drop in barometric pressure
could nave contributed to the black damp entering the
V4
marginal. The limitation on the number of people permitted
underground at one time was necessary to prevent the restric-
tion of ventilation from the face area of the Drainway.
While the meeting between the company, State, MSHA and UMWA
officials was being conducted, James L. Banfield Jr., MSHA
mining engineer, took pressure measurements 'in the ventila-
tion tubing and calculated that the 6f-28 Jeffrey fan was
supplying approximately 9,300 cubic feet of air a minute to
the Drainway entry.
At approximately 9:31 a.m. on April 6, 1978, the underground
investigation into the cause of the inundation was started.
A mine rescue team wearing oxygen breathing apparatus made a
preshift examination of the Drainway entry and found 21 per-
cent oxygen and 0.05 percent carbon dioxide in the face area
near the last row of installed roof bolts. Methane was not
detected and no unsafe conditions were found. The team
returned to the surface at approxima tely 9: 48 a. m.
A mine rescue team reentered the Drainway and made the
necessary tests at the face and found conditions the same as
were found during the preshift examination. At 10:08 a.m.
the first team (4) of inves tiga tors entered the Dra inway
entry open faced and inspected the area and returned to the
surface at 10:28 a.m. with the mine rescue team.
At LO: 39 a. m. another s imila rly equipped mine rescue team
entered the Drainway. While making tests in the face area
they detected l7 percent oxygen and 0.6 percent carbon diox-
ide in the vicinity of the cont inuous mi ning mach ine. The
team advised the surface control of these conditions and
were ordered to return to the surface. All persons had been
withdrawn from the Drainway entry at 11:02 a.m.
y continued
Drainway. According to the barometric pressure recorder at
the MSHA Laboratory in Norton, Virginia, the following
pressures were recorded on AprilS - 6, 1978.
Date Time Pressure
Apr il 5 l2: 00 noon 29.90
April 6 9: 00 a. m. 29.79
10: 00 a. m. 29.78
11: 00 a.m. 29.76
12: 00 noon 29.73
2: 00 p. m. 29.66
l5
marginal. ‘The limitation on the number of people permitted
underground at one time was necessary to prevent the restric
tion of ventilation from the face area of the Drainway.
While the meeting between the company, State, MSHA and UMWA
officials was being conducted, James L. Banfield Jr., MSHA
mining engineer, took pressure measurements in the ventila-
tion tubing and calculated that the 6F-28 Jeffrey fan was
supplying approximately 9,300 cubic feet of air a minute to
the Drainway entry.
At approximately 9:31 a.m. on April 6, 1978, the underground
investigation into the cause of the inundation was started.
A mine rescue team wearing oxygen breathing apparatus made a
preshift examination of the Drainway entry and found 21 per-
cent oxygen and 0.05 percent carbon dioxide in the face area
near the last row of installed roof bolts. Methane was not
detected and no unsafe conditions were found. The team
returned to the surface at approximately 9:48 a.m.
A mine rescue team reentered the Drainway and made the
necessary tests at the face and found conditions the same as
were found during the preshift examination. At 10:08 a.m.
the first team (4) of investigators entered the Drainway
entry open faced and inspected the area and returned to the
surface at 10:28 a.m. with the mine rescue team.
At 10:39 a.m. another similarly equipped mine rescue team
entered the Drainway. While making tests in the face area
they detected 17 percent oxygen and 0.6 percent carbon diox-
ide in the vicinity of the continuous mining machine. The
team advised the surface control of these conditions and
were ordered to return to the surface. All persons had been
withdrawn from the Drainway entry at 11:02 a.m.
2/ continued
Drainway. According to the barometric pressure recorder at
the MSHA Laboratory in Norton, Virginia, the following
pressures were recorded on April 5 - 6, 1978.
Date Time Pressure
April 5 12:00 noon 29.90
April 6 9:00 a.m. 29.79
10:00 a.m. 29.78
11:00 a.m. 29.76
12:00 noon 29.73
2:00 p.m. 29.66
15
At 11:25 a.m. due to the low oxygen content, a decision was
made to install a larger fan. A larger capacity fan had
been brought to the Drainway site prior to the beginning of
the underground investigation.
The larger capaci ty Joy fan was installed blowing and placed
in operation at 12:37 p.m. on April 6, 1978. Air measure-
ments made wi th a pi tot tube and Magnehel ic gauge in the
ventilation tubing near the fan showed that the larger capacity
fan was producing approximately 17,800 cubic feet of air a
minute. An air measurement taken with an anemometer in the
drift mouth showed that approximately 13,600 cubic feet of
air a minute was returning from the Drainway entry.
At 1 :05 p.m., after the Joy fan had been operating for approxi-
mately 28 minutes, a mine rescue team entered the Drainway.
Tests made in the face area by the team showed that the oxygen
content of the air had been restored to 21 percent and the
carbon dioxide had been reduced to less than O. 1 percent and
methane was not detected. The air measurement made by the
team showed that approxima tely 8,600 cubic feet of air a
minute was reaching the inby end of the line curtain.
At 1: 25 p.m. after the Drainway was reported safe by the
mine rescue team, the underground investigation resumed.
The investigation continued wi thout further disruption
following the same procedures as prev iously described.
After all members of the investigation committee and all
other interested persons present had inspected the accident
area, company engineers, MSIlA, and state personnel entered
the Drainway for the purpose of obtaining information to
prepare a sketch of the Drainway entry and the accident
area. This part of the investigation was concluded at 3:11
p.m.
l:/ cont inued
The 0.06 inch pressure drop that occurred between 9:00 a.m.
and 12:00 noon on April 6, 1978, while the investigation was
be ing conducted, caused an expans ion of the atmosphere in
the abandoned area and resulted in a migration of the black-
damp from the abandoned area into the Drainway entry.
During this time the oxygen content in the Drainway entry,
as measured with an Edmont Wilson oxygen analyzer, decreased
to 17 percent. The carbon dioxide content was 0.6 percent.
The ventilation system being used was incapable of providing
a sufficient quantity of air to dilute, render harmless and
carry away the oxygen deficient atmosphere migrating into
the Drainway entry from the abandoned area.
16
At 11:25 a.m. due to the low oxygen content, a decision was
made to install a larger fan. A larger capacity fan had
been brought to the Drainway site prior to the beginning of
the underground investigation.
The larger capacity Joy fan was installed blowing and placed
in operation at 12:37 p.m. on April 6, 1978. Air measure-
ments made with a Pitot tube and Magnehelic gauge in the
ventilation tubing near the fan showed that the larger capacity
fan was producing approximately 17,800 cubic feet of air a
minute. An air measurement taken with an anemometer in the
drift mouth showed that approximately 13,600 cubic feet of
air a minute was returning from the Drainway entry.
At 1:05 p.m., after the Joy fan had been operating for approxi-
mately 28 minutes, a mine rescue team entered the Drainway.
Tests made in the face area by the team showed that the oxygen
content of the air had been restored to 21 percent and the
carbon dioxide had been reduced to less than 0.1 percent and
methane was not detected. The air measurement made by the
team showed that approximately 8,600 cubic feet of air a
minute was reaching the inby end of the line curtain
At 1:25 p.m. after the Drainway was reported safe by the
mine rescue team, the underground investigation resumed.
The investigation continued without further disruption
following the same procedures as previously described.
After all members of the investigation committee and all
other interested persons present had inspected the accident
area, company engineers, MSHA, and State personnel entered
the Drainway for the purpose of obtaining information to
prepare a sketch of the Drainway entry and the accident
area. This part of the investigation was concluded at 3:11
Pen.
27 continued
The 0.06 inch pressure drop that occurred between 9:00 a.m.
and 12:00 noon on April 6, 1978, while the investigation was
being conducted, caused an expansion of the atmosphere in
the abandoned area and resulted in a migration of the black-
damp from the abandoned area into the Drainway entry.
During this time the oxygen content in the Drainway entry,
as measured with an Edmont Wilson oxygen analyzer, decreased
to 17 percent. ‘The carbon dioxide content was 0.6 percent
The ventilation system being used was incapable of providing
a sufficient quantity of air to dilute, render harmless and
carry away the oxygen deficient atmosphere migrating into
the Drainway entry from the abandoned area
16
Guards were posted at the Drainway site to prevent anyone
from entering the mine. MSHA, company, State and UMWA
officials discussed plans and procedures to continue the
investigation the following morning.
On Friday, April 7, 1978, the investigation of the accident
at the Drainway entry continued. A preshift examination of
the Drainway was made by a mine rescue team before other
persons were permitted to enter the mine. Air measure-
ments, tests and examinations made during the preshift ex-
amination by Harry Markley, MSHA, showed the Joy fan was
producing approximately 15,800 cubic feet of air a minute
and that approximately 7,600 cubic feet of air a minute was
reaching the endby end of the line curtain; that the air in
the face area contained 21 percent of oxygen and no methane,
and no unsafe condi tions were found.
Plans were made on Apr il 6 by the inves tiga tors to recon-
struct the ventilation system of the Drainway using the
Jeffrey fan to simulate as near as possible the ventilation
system that existed at the time of the accident on April 4.
W. B. Couch requested permission to repair any damages that
had occurred to the line curtain during the investigation.
MSHA granted this permission and Couch, C. M. Bailes, Vice
President, and Pete Capelli, Assistant to the General Manager,
accompanied by James Bowman, MSHA, entered the Drainway and
repaired and restored the line curtain to good condition.
At ll:14 a.m. the Joy fan was taken out of service and the
Jeffrey fan which was in use at the time the accident occurred
was reinstalled. During the installation of the Jeffrey fan
the ventilation tubing extending inby from the fan to the line
curtain was straightened to reduce air resistance and the holes
in the ventilation tubing located near the fan were repaired
y continued
Coincidentally, on Tuesday, April 4, 1978, the date of the
accident a similar condi tion existed. Records of the baro-
metric pressure recorded at the laboratory at the MSHA
District 5 office, Norton, Virginia, which is approximately
29 miles from the Drainway site, from LO:OO a.m. to 2:00 p.m.
on Tuesday, April 4, 1978, are as follows:
Time Pressure
lO :00
12:00 noon
2:00 p.m.
29.94
29.88
29.82
17
Guards were posted at the Drainway site to prevent anyone
from entering the mine. MSHA, company, State and UMWA
officials discussed plans and procedures to continue the
investigation the following morning.
on Friday, April 7, 1978, the investigation of the accident
at the Drainway entry continued. A preshift examination of
the Drainway was made by a mine rescue team before other
persons were permitted to enter the mine. Air measure-
ments, tests and examinations made during the preshift ex-
amination by Harry Markley, MSHA, showed the Joy fan was
producing approximately 15,800 cubic feet of air a minute
and that approximately 7,600 cubic feet of air a minute was
reaching the endby end of the line curtain; that the air in
the face area contained 21 percent of oxygen and no methane,
and no unsafe conditions were found.
Plans were made on April 6 by the investigators to recon-
struct the ventilation system of the Drainway using the
Jeffrey fan to simulate as near as possible the ventilation
system that existed at the time of the accident on April 4.
W. B. Couch requested permission to repair any damages that
had occurred to the line curtain during the investigation
MSHA granted this permission and Couch, C. M. Bailes, Vice
President, and Pete Capelli, Assistant to the General Manager,
accompanied by James Bowman, MSHA, entered the Drainway and
repaired and restored the line curtain to good condition
At 11:14 a.m. the Joy fan was taken out of service and the
Jeffrey fan which was in use at the time the accident occurred
was reinstalled. During the installation of the Jeffrey fan
the ventilation tubing extending inby from the fan to the line
curtain was straightened to reduce air resistance and the holes
in the ventilation tubing located near the fan were repaired
2/ continued
Coincidentally, on Tuesday, April 4, 1978, the date of the
accident a similar condition existed. Records of the baro-
metric pressure recorded at the laboratory at the MSHA
District 5 office, Norton, Virginia, which is approximately
29 miles from the Drainway site, from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.
on Tuesday, April 4, 1978, are as follows:
Time Pressure
10:00 29.94
12:00 noon 29.88
2:00 p.m. 29.82
7
to reduce air losses. After these repairs had been made
and the ventilation system restored, as near as it could be
determined, as it was at the time of inundation, a mine
rescue team entered the Drainway entry and took air measure-
ments and gas tests. Air measurements made at the fan showed
the fan was exhausting approximately 16,000 cubic feet of
air a minute and approxima tely 10,000 cubic feet of air a
minute was entering the Drainway portal. An air measurement
made by Raymond Strahin, MSHA, at 12:31 p.m. showed that
approximately 2,600 cubic feet of air a minute was reaching
the endby end of the line curtain which was 30 feet from the
face. The gas tests showed oxygen levels ranging from 19.25
to 21 percent in the face area and no methane ;,as present.
Using chemical smoke the mine rescue team which included
Raymond Strahin and David Wolf of MSHA determined the air
flow pattern in the face area. This pattern showed the intake
air was moving from the boom of the continuous mining machine
to the end of the line curtain and was not penetrating the
face area. The face of the Drainway was not being adequateiy
ventilated by the simulated system. The mine rescue team
returned to the surface at 12:44 p.m.
After the simula ted tes ts were concluded, in order to continue
the investigation the Jeffrey fan was replaced with the Joy
fan operating blowing. A mine rescue team entered the Drainway
at 2:37 p.m. and made air measurements and gas tests which
showed that the ventilation was adequate and the air quality
in the face area was satisfactory.
A permissible-type Marietta continuous mining machine,
serial number 7486 was in the face area. The cutting head of
the machine was down near the mine floor and against the
face of the coal and was part ial ly obscured by loose coal
and thin layers of draw rock which had fallen from the mine
roof. See Appendix 1", , Photo No.3. The opening that had
y cont inued
A barometric pressure drop of 0.12 inches occurred during
the 4-hour period.
Also, when the lower levels of the mine between the main
entries and the 1 Right Section were being inundated, the
water encroachment sealed the 1 Right area from the rest
of the mine and pressurized it. This along with the falling
barometer made the pressure within the sealed abandoned
area greater than the pressure at the face of the Drainway
entry causing airflow from the gob area into the Drainway
when the area was mined into.
18
to reduce air losses. After these repairs had been made
and the ventilation system restored, as near as it could be
determined, as it was at the time of inundation, a mine
rescue team entered the Drainway entry and took air measure—
ments and gas tests. Air measurements made at the fan showed
the fan was exhausting approximately 16,000 cubic feet of
air a minute and approximately 10,000 cubic feet of air a
minute was entering the Drainway portal. An air measurement
made by Raymond Strahin, MSHA, at 12:31 p.m. showed that
approximately 2,600 cubic feet of air a minute was reaching
the endby end of the line curtain which was 30 feet from the
face. The gas tests showed oxygen levels ranging from 19.25
to 21 percent in the face area and no methane was present.
Using chemical smoke the mine rescue team which included
Raymond Strahin and David Wolf of MSHA determined the air
flow pattern in the face area. This pattern showed the intake
air was moving from the boom of the continuous mining machine
to the end of the line curtain and was not penetrating the
face area. The face of the Drainway was not being adequately
ventilated by the simulated system. The mine rescue team
returned to the surface at 12:44 p.m.
After the simulated tests were concluded, in order to continue
the investigation the Jeffrey fan was replaced with the Joy
fan operating blowing. A mine rescue team entered the Drainway
at 2:37 p.m. and made air measurements and gas tests which
showed that the ventilation was adequate and the air quality
in the face area was satisfactory.
A permissible-type Marietta continuous mining machine,
serial number 7486 was in the face area. The cutting head of
the machine was down near the mine floor and against the
face of the coal and was partially obscured by loose coal
and thin layers of draw rock which had fallen from the mine
roof. See Appendix F, , Photo No. 3. The opening that had
2/ continued
A barometric pressure drop of 0.12 inches occurred during
the 4-hour period.
Also, when the lower levels of the mine between the main
entries and the 1 Right Section were being inundated, the
water encroachment sealed the 1 Right area from the rest
Of the mine and pressurized it. This along with the falling
barometer made the pressure within the sealed abandoned
area greater than the pressure at the face of the Drainway
entry causing airflow from the gob area into the Drainway
when the area was mined into.
18
been made into the abandoned area by the continuous mining
machine and the test borehole that had penetrated the aban-
doned area were not visible. See Appendix 1", Photo No.4.
The last 13 feet advance of the Drainway entry was 13 feet
wide, which was the width of the machine cutting head. See
Appendix I, Figure 2 and Appendix F, Photo No.2. The
continuous mining machine controls were in the “off”
position and the control switch for the illumination system
was in the “on” position.
At 2:52 p.m. power was applied to the continuous l!lning
mach ine and the mach ine was trammed back from the face for a
distance of approximately 15 feet by the mine rescue team.
The machine was then deenergized.
After temporary roof supports (posts and jacks) were in-
stalled inby the permanent roof supports (roof bolts), an
examination of _ the face area by the investigators revealed
an irregularly shaped opening into the abandoned area
approximately l4 x 20 inches on the left side of the place
approximately 2 feet from the bottom which had been made by
the continuous mining machine. See Appendix 1", Photo No.4.
Also a test borehole was observed in about the center of the
place approximately 18 inches from the roof. This test hole
had also penetrated the abandoned area and was approximately
5 feet 3 inches in depth.
The quality of the air in the abandoned area was determined
by putting detection equipment through the 14 x 20 inch
opening. These gas tests showed the air in the abandoned
area çontained 12 percent oxygen, 2 percent carbon dioxide
and no methane. The flame safety lamp that was found under-
ground by the investigators on April 6, was taken into
custody and removed to the surface by James Bowman of MSHA.
At 4:30 p.m. all persons returned to the surface and the
underground investigation was concluded.
Following the official investigation into the cause of the
inundation, including the interviews with company officials
and employees on April 7, and May 4, 1978, nine l04(a) and
one 104(d) (1) citations, one l03(k) and one 107(a) orders
of withdrawal were issued to the Clinchfield Coal Company.
See Appendix E.
Discussion and Evaluation
Planning - Drainway project
According to testimony of Henry Kiser, General Manager,
plans for draining the Moss No. 3 mine had been discussed
19
been made into the abandoned area by the continuous mining
machine and the test borehole that had penetrated the aban-
doned area were not visible. See Appendix F, Photo No. 4.
The last 13 feet advance of the Drainway entry was 13 feet
wide, which was the width of the machine cutting head. See
Appendix I, Figure 2 and Appendix F, Photo No. 2. ‘The
continuous mining machine controls were in the “off”
position and the control switch for the illumination system
was in the “on” position.
At 2:52 p.m. power was applied to the continuous mining
machine and the machine was trammed back from the face for a
distance of approximately 15 feet by the mine rescue team.
The machine was then deenergized.
After temporary roof supports (posts and jacks) were in-
stalled inby the permanent roof supports (roof bolts), an
examination of the face area by the investigators revealed
an irregularly shaped opening into the abandoned area
approximately 14 x 20 inches on the left side of the place
approximately 2 feet from the bottom which had been made by
the continuous mining machine. See Appendix F, Photo No. 4
Also a test borehole was observed in about the center of the
place approximately 18 inches from the roof. This test hole
had also penetrated the abandoned area and was approximately
5 feet 3 inches in depth.
The quality of the air in the abandoned area was determined
by putting detection equipment through the 14 x 20 inch
opening. These gas tests showed the air in the abandoned
area contained 12 percent oxygen, 2 percent carbon dioxide
and no methane. The flame safety lamp that was found under-
ground by the investigators on April 6, was taken into
custody and removed to the surface by James Bowman of MSHA.
At 4:30 p.m. all persons returned to the surface and the
underground investigation was concluded.
Following the official investigation into the cause of the
inundation, including the interviews with company officials
and employees on April 7, and May 4, 1978, nine 104(a) and
one 104(d)(1) citations, one 103(k) and one 107(a) orders
of withdrawal were issued to the Clinchfield Coal Company.
See Appendix E.
Discussion and Evaluation
Planning ~ Drainway Project
According to testimony of Henry Kiser, General Manager,
plans for draining the Moss No. 3 mine had been discussed
19
\lith Max Bailes, Vice president, Robert Ryland, Chief
Engineer, W. B. Couch, Division Manager, and Monroe West,
Manager, Safety Divisiqn, over the past two years. ~hese
discussions increased and included M. L. West, Manager,
Safety Division during ,the last six months. Kiser stated
that during this planning “There was not a great discussion
within itself, just any particular, about blackdamp; but
of course, you know, anytime you’re cutting into it, you’re
going to be thinking of that.” He stated that the hazards
presented by water and gas '/ere discussed with these mine
officials during the initial planning of the Drainway project.
Kiser said, “I’m sure everybody was of the salle opinion
that there was more gas, that it was a real gassy part of
the mine.” He stated that he took part in planning the Drain-
way project and that Monroe West submitted the plans to MSHA
and the State.
Kiser visited the Drainway entry about every day from the
time it started. He did not visit the Drainway on Friday,
March 31, 1978, because J. E. Nypaver, Vice President, Opera-
tions, and Max Bailes visited the Drainway that day. On
April 3, the day before the accident, Kiser visited the Drain-
way. He stated that he knew the Drainway entry was getting
close to the abandoned area, and that he discussed the possi-
ibilities of encountering methane and water when the Drain-
way holed through into the abandoned area with Strickler
Mullins. However, he did not discuss the possibilities of
encountering blackdamp with him.
W. B. Couch stated he had knowledge of and was involved in
developing plans for the Drainway entry for a period of from
three to six months prior to the starting of the Drainway
project. About the first of March 1978, plans were made to
develop the Drainway entry wi th a continuous mining machine.
Couch stated that during the planning of the Drainway the
only hazardous condi tions that he was concerned about were
water and methane and that to his knowledge, no one ever
talked to him about blackdamp nor considered a method of
checking for blackdamp through a borehole, except that Strickler
Mullins was infonued to have a flame safety lamp.
Couch also stated that from a study of the water levels and
contours in this area of the mine, he knew that the aban-
doned area in question was pressurized and that the atmosphere
in this area “would back up on them” in the Drainway. Couch
visited the Drainway on April 3, 1978, the day before the
accident and talked to Strickler Mullins. However, he did
not mention or discuss blackdamp in any way with him nor
suggest that blackdamp was a hazard that he should be con-
cerned about when cutting through into the abandoned area.
20
with Max Bailes, Vice President, Robert Ryland, Chief
Engineer, W. B. Couch, Division Manager, and Monroe West,
Manager, Safety Division, over the past two years. These
discussions increased and included M. L. West, Manager,
Safety Division during:the last six months. Kiser stated
that during this planning "There was not a great discussion
within itself, just any particular, about blackdamp; but
of course, you know, anytime you’re cutting into it, you’re
going to be thinking of that." He stated that the hazards
presented by water and gas were discussed with these mine
officials during the initial planning of the Drainway project
Kiser said, "I’m sure everybody was of the same opinion
that there was more gas, that it was a real gassy part of
the mine." He stated that he took part in planning the Drain-
way project and that Monroe West submitted the plans to MSHA
and the State.
Kiser visited the Drainway entry about every day from the
time it started. He did not visit the Drainway on Friday,
March 31, 1978, because J. E. Nypaver, Vice President, Opera~
tions, and Max Bailes visited the Drainway that day. On
April 3, the day before the accident, Kiser visited the Drain-
way. He stated that he knew the Drainway entry was getting
close to the abandoned area, and that he discussed the possi-
ibilities of encountering methane and water when the Drain-
way holed through into the abandoned area with Strickler
Mullins. However, he did not discuss the possibilities of
encountering blackdamp with him.
W. B. Couch stated he had knowledge of and was involved in
developing plans for the Drainway entry for a period of from
three to six months prior to the starting of the Drainway
project. About the first of March 1978, plans were made to
develop the Drainway entry with a continuous mining machine.
Couch stated that during the planning of the Drainway the
only hazardous conditions that he was concerned about were
water and methane and that to his knowledge, no one ever
talked to him about blackdamp nor considered a method of
checking for blackdamp through a borehole, except that Strickler
Mullins was informed to have a flame safety lamp.
Couch also stated that from a study of the water levels and
contours in this area of the mine, he knew that the aban-
doned area in question was pressurized and that the atmosphere
in this area “would back up on them” in the Drainway. Couch
visited the Drainway on April 3, 1978, the day before the
accident and talked to Strickler Mullins. However, he did
not mention or discuss blackdamp in any-way with him nor
suggest that blackdamp was a hazard that he should be con—
cerned about when cutting through into the abandoned area
20
According to Monroe West’s testimony, he was involved, in the
initial planning of the Drainwayproject. He stated that
during the development of the plans for the Drainway he
discussed with Couch “the possibilities of having a big body
or a body of methane and/or blackdamp in behind there.”
However, he did not discuss this possibility with Strickier
Mullins. In .early March, West visited MSHA District 5 head-
quarters and discussed the initial planning of the Drain-
way with MSHA officials. During this discussion West men-
tioned the poss ibil i ties that the abandoned area in question
might contain methane but did not expect the area to contain
water accumulations. The possibil i ty that the abandoned area
might contain blackdamp was not mentioned or discussed during
this meeting.
On March l7, 1978, West informed MSHA officials that the
ini tial plan for the Drainway, wh ich cons isted of dril1,ing
an 8-inch hole into the abandoned area, had fa iled. The
same day West submitted to MSHA a written plan to develop
the Drainway entry with a continuous mining machine. This
plan, which was approved by the District Manager on March 27,
1978, made no reference to the possibility that the aban-
doned area in question might contain methane or blåckdamp.
Strickler Mullins, Superintendent of the Moss No. 3 Portal A
mine, which included the Drainway project, stated that he
never saw a written plan for driving the Drainway but that
his superiors had discussed such a plan wi th him several
times. He stated that these discussions and final planning
for developing the Drainway entry dealt with the problems
of methane and water and what course of action he would take
if methane and/or water were encountered when the Drainway
entry penetrated the abandoned area. Mullins stated that none
of his superiors nor anyone from the Safety Department ever
discussed the possibility of the abandoned area containing
blackdamp, that he did not consider such possibility him-
self, and that he did not discuss such poss ibil i ty wi th his
supervisors and workmen assigned to perform the work at the
Drainway project. Mullins stated, “I was more afraid of
methane than anything else, or water; because we just about
knew where the wa ter was by the eleva tions on the map, and
by it being sealed with water, (it meaning the abandoned
area), the methane bothered me more than anything else.
Because I figured when we bored a hole through it, the thing
would come out pure methane.”
MSHA investigators conclude that the planning of the Drain-
way project by mine management and the Safety Department
was inadequate and incomplete because: (a) due consideration



According to Monroe West’s testimony, he was involved, in the
initial planning of the Drainway project. He stated that
during the development of the plans for the Drainway he
discussed with Couch “the possibilities of having a big body
or a body of methane and/or blackdamp in behind there.”
However, he did not discuss this possibility with Strickler
Mullins. In-early March, West visited MSHA District 5 head-
quarters and discussed the initial planning of the Drain-
way with MSHA officials. During this discussion West men-
tioned the possibilities that the abandoned area in question
might contain methane but did not expect the area to contain
water accumulations. The possibility that the abandoned area
might contain blackdamp was not mentioned or discussed during
this meeting.
On March 17, 1978, West informed MSHA officials that the
initial plan for the Drainway, which consisted of drilling
an 8-inch hole into the abandoned area, had failed. ‘The
same day West submitted to MSHA a written plan to develop
the Drainway entry with a continuous mining machine. This
plan, which was approved by the District Manager on March 27,
1978, made no reference to the possibility that the aban-
doned area in question might contain methane or blackdamp
Strickler Mullins, Superintendent of the Moss No. 3 Portal A
mine, which included the Drainway project, stated that he
never saw a written plan for driving the Drainway but that
his superiors had discussed such a plan with him several
times. He stated that these discussions and final planning
for developing the Drainway entry dealt with the problems
of methane and water and what course of action he would take
if methane and/or water were encountered when the Drainway
entry penetrated the abandoned area. Mullins stated that none
of his superiors nor anyone from the Safety Department ever
discussed the possibility of the abandoned area containing
blackdamp, that he did not consider such possibility him-
self, and that he did not discuss such possibility with his
supervisors and workmen assigned to perform the work at the
Drainway project. Mullins stated, “I was more afraid of
methane than anything else, or water; because we just about
knew where the water was by the elevations on the map, and
by it being sealed with water, (it meaning the abandoned
area), the methane bothered me more than anything else.
Because I figured when we bored a hole through it, the thing
would come out pure methane.”
MSHA investigators conclude that the planning of the Drain-
way project by mine management and the Safety Department
was inadequate and. incomplete because: (a) due consideration
21
was not given to the possibility of the abandoned 1 Right
area containing blackdamp; (b) the final plan contained no
provisions or safety precautions that would permit the Drain-
way to penetrate the abandoned area in a safe manner and under
controlled conditions in the event blackdamp was encountered;
© mine management did not discuss the possibi1ity of the
abandoned 1 Right area containing blackdamp with the employees
at the Drainway prior to or during development of. the Drain-
way entry and four workmen were caught unaware by the inrush
of blackdamp when the entry cut through into the abandoned
area; and (d) during the investigation the Drainway ventila-
tion system was found to be inadequate which indicates that
the ventilation system was a product of inadequate and in-
complete planning.
Ventilation of Drainway Entry
Development of the 1 Right northwest area of the Moss No. 3
Portal A mine (area involved in the accident) was completed
in 1972 and second mining in this area was started the same
year. Pillars of coal were left around the perimeter of
the area to serve as a bleeder system for the gob area.
The Bucu fan located in the northwest area of the mine was
supposed to have been ventilating the 1 Right gob area as
well as other gob areas in the mine. It is unknown how
effectively the 1 Right gob area was ventilated because as
second mining progressed dewatering pumps were removed and
water was permitted to accumulate in the lower elevations
of the mine. By March 1978, water had inundated all areas
of the mine below the 1,495 foot elevation. The rising water
sealed the 1 Right gob area from the rest of the mine and
rendered the Bucu fan ineffect ive. On March 17, 1978, after
an inspection and evaluation of Bucu fan by MSHA, the company
was given permission to remove the Bucu fan from service.
The encrOachment of the rising water pressurized the 1 Right
abandoned area.
The Drainway (single entry) approximately 265 feet in length
was developed from the surface into the abandoned 1 Right
area of the Moss No.3 Portal A mine. Since the Drainway
entry was developed from the surface, the main mine ventila-
ting system could not be utilized to provide the ventilation.
The Drainway entry was ventilated by a Jeffrey 6F-28 aerodyne
fan located on the surface and operated exhausting. In
development of the Dra inway entry, management planned to
use 24- inch d iame ter, spiral reinforced collapsible tubing
to direct the air to the face a~ea. However, when a few
sect ions of the tubing had been installed, some of the
tubing collapsed from the fan pressure. All but about
50 feet of the collapsible tubing was replaced by 18 ounce
plastic line brattice which was used from the end of the
tubing inby to within 30 feet of the face. See Appendix F,
photo. Nos. 1 and 5.
22
was not given to the possibility of the abandoned 1 Right
area containing blackdamp; (b) the final plan contained no
provisions or safety precautions that would. permit the Drain-
way to penetrate the abandoned area in a safe manner and under
controlled conditions in the event blackdamp was encountered;
© mine management did not discuss the possibility of the
abandoned 1 Right area containing blackdamp with the employees
at the Drainway prior to or during development of the Drain-
way entry and four workmen were. caught unaware by the inrush
of biackdamp when the entry cut through into the abandoned
area; and (d) during the investigation the Drainway ventila-
tion system was found to be inadequate which indicates that
the ventilation system was a product of inadequate and in-
complete planning.
Ventilation of Drainway Entry
Development of the 1 Right northwest area of the Moss No. 3
Portal A mine (area involved in the accident) was completed
in 1972 and second mining in this area was started the same
year. Pillars of coal were left around the perimeter of
the area to serve as a bleeder system for the gob area
The Bucu fan located in the northwest area of the mine was
supposed to have been ventilating the 1 Right gob area as
well as other gob areas in the mine. It is unknown how
effectively the 1 Right gob area was ventilated because as
second mining progressed dewatering pumps were removed and
water was permitted to accumulate in the lower elevations
of the mine. By March 1978, water had inundated all areas
of the mine below the 1,495 foot elevation. The rising water
sealed the 1 Right gob area from the rest of the mine and
rendered the Bucu fan ineffective. On March 17, 1978, after
an inspection and evaluation of Bucu fan by MSHA, the company
was given permission to remove the Bucu fan from service.
The encroachment of the rising water pressurized the 1 Right
abandoned area.
The Drainway (single entry) approximately 265 feet. in length
was developed from the surface into the abandoned 1 Right
area of the Moss No. 3 Portal Amine. Since the Drainway
entry was developed from the surface, the main mine ventila~
ting system could not be utilized to provide the ventilation.
The Drainway entry was ventilated by a Jeffrey 6F-28 aerodyne
fan located on the surface and operated exhausting. In
development of the Drainway entry, management, planned to
use 24-inch diameter, spiral reinforced collapsible tubing
to direct the air to the face area. . However, when a few
sections of the tubing had been installed, some of. the
tubing collapsed from the fan pressure. All but about
50 feet of the collapsible tubing was replaced by 18 ounce
plastic line brattice which was used from the end of the
tubing inby to within 30 feet of the face. See Appendix F,
Photo Nos. 1 and 5.
22
From observations and measurements made during the investi-
gation, the Jeffrey fan, equipped with a 40 horsepower motor,
was operating in the B-blade position. The fan characteristit
curves indicate that for this fan to operate efficiently with
this ventilation system in the B-blade position a larger
horsepower motor would be required.
The approved ventilation System and Methane and Dust Control
Plan for the Moss No.3, Portal A mine, of which the Drainway
was a part, required the line brattice to be maintained to
within l8 feet of the deepest point of penetration of the face
and that the continuous mining machine operator be a minimum
of 2 feet outby the end of the line brattice when the machine
is cutting coal from the face. A minimum of 5,000 cubic feet
of air a minute was to be provided at the end of the line
brattice. It was evident from the testimony that the mine
superintendent was not famil iar wi th these requirements. Accora-
ing to the records of the preshift examiners, as recorded in
the book for that purpose, the quantities of air measured at
the end of the line brattice were 3,045 cubic feet a minute on
March 30, 1978, 4,200, 4,600 and 4,800 cubic feet a minute
on April 3, 1978, and 5,400 cubic feet a minute on April 4,
1978, the day of the inundation. Air measurements were not
made during recovery operations on April 4, 1978; However,
the fan was changed from exhausting to blowing during the
recovery operations.
After the ventilation system was reconstructed and the line
curtain repaired and restored to good condition by mine
officials, to simulate as close as practicable the ventila-
tion system in use at the time of the acciòent, MSHA investi-
gators determined that the Jeffrey fan was delivering
approximately 2,600 cubic feet of air a minute to the inby
end of the line curtain, and that 10,000 cubic feet of air a
minute was entering the Drainway portal. Also the air flow
pattern in the face area as determined by chemical smoke showed
that the face area was not ventilated adequately with this
simulated system of ventilation because of the low air quan-
tity and the line curtain being 30 feet from the òeepest
point of penetration of the face.
MSHA investigators conclude that the Drainway ventilation
system was inadequate to comply with the minimum require-
ments of the approved Ventilation System and Methane and
Dust Control Plan which requires at least 5,000 cubic feet
of air a minute at the end of the line curtain in places
where coal is being cut, mined or loaded and where roof
bolts are being installed.
23
From observations and measurements made during the investi-
gation, the Jeffrey fan, equipped with a 40 horsepower motor,
was operating in the B-blade position. ‘The fan characteristic
curves indicate that for this fan to operate efficiently with
this ventilation system in the B-blade position a larger
horsepower motor would be required.
The approved Ventilation System and Methane and Dust Control
Plan for the Moss No. 3, Portal A mine, of which the Drainway
was a part, required the line brattice to be maintained to
within 18 feet of the deepest point of penetration of the face
and that the continuous mining machine operator be a minimum
of 2 feet outby the end of the line brattice when the machine
is cutting coal from the face. A minimum of 5,000 cubic feet
of air a minute was to be provided at the end of the line
brattice. It was evident from the testimony that the mine
superintendent was not familiar with these requirements. Accora-
ing to the records of the preshift examiners, as recorded in
the book for that purpose, the quantities of air measured at
the end of the line brattice were 3,045 cubic feet a minute on
March 30, 1978, 4,200, 4,600 and 4,800 cubic feet a minute
on April 3, 1978, and 5,400 cubic feet a minute on April 4,
1978, the day of the inundation. Air measurements were not
made during recovery operations on April 4, 1978; However,
the fan was changed from exhausting to blowing during the
recovery operations.
After the ventilation system was reconstructed and the line
curtain repaired and restored to good condition by mine
officials, to simulate as close as practicable the ventila~
tion system in use at the time of the accident, MSHA investi-
gators determined that the Jeffrey fan was delivering
approximately 2,600 cubic feet of air a minute to the inby
end of the line curtain, and that 10,000 cubic feet of air a
minute was entering the Drainway portal. Also the air flow
pattern in the face area as determined by chemical smoke showed
that the face area was not ventilated adequately with this
simulated system of ventilation because of the low air quan-
tity and the line curtain being 30 feet from the deepest
point of penetration of the face.
MSHA investigators conclude that the Drainway ventilation
system was inadequate to comply with the minimum require-
ments of the approved Ventilation System and Methane and
Dust Control Plan which requires at least 5,000 cubic feet
of air a minute at the end of the line curtain in places
where coal is being cut, mined or loaded and where roof
bolts are being installed.
23
On April 4, 1978, at the time of the accident, the ventilation
system did not provide sufficient air in the Drainway entry
to dilute and render harmless and carry away the inrush of
blackdamp from the abandoned area.
On April 6, during the investigation, the ventilation system
was found to be inadequate and the investigation was delayed
until a larger capacity fan was installed which provided
adequate face ventilation.
On April 7, after the ventilation system was reconstructed
and repa ired only 2,600 cubic feet of air a minute was
measured at the end of the line curtain which is less than
the minimum requirements of the approved Ventilation System
and Methane and Dust Control Plan.
Test Boreholes, Gas testing Procedures and Gas testing Equipment
The investigation revealed that the Drainway (single entry)
approximately 15 - 17 feet wide and 6 feet high had been
developed a distance of 265 feet. Six test boreholes, three
in each coal rib, had been drilled from l2.66 feet to 22 feet
in depth and were from l3 to 19 feet apart. The first rib
boreholes had been drilled when the face of the Drainway was
approximately 70 feet from the abandoned area. See sketch in
Appendix I, Figure l.
According to the testimony of company officials the 1 Right
area liberated methane during development and therefore they
anticipated encountering methane when the Drainway entry
penetrated the abandoned 1 Right area. Company officials knew
the 1 Right abandoned area was sealed off from the rest of
the mine by water; that the sealed area was pressurized
from the rising water; and that the air would flow from the
abandoned area into the Drainway entry when the Drainway
entry penetrated the abandoned area.
Both Mullins and Carson (victim) had approved methane detec-
tors in their possession underground in the Drainway entry
when the accident occurred. According to Mullins’ state-
ments, adequate tests for methane were made immediately after
the test drill hole penetrated the abandoned area and tests
for methane were made continuously until the continuous mining
machine cut a hole into the abandoned area, and the highest
methane content de tected was 0.15 percent.
Although mine management knew on April 4, 1978, that the
Drainway entry had advanced close to the abandoned area and
would most probably hole through that day, means for detect-
24
On April 4, 1978, at the time of the accident, the ventilation
system did not provide sufficient air in the Drainway entry
to dilute and render harmless and carry away the inrush of
blackdamp from the abandoned area.
On April 6, during the investigation, the ventilation system
was found to be inadequate and the investigation was delayed
until a larger capacity fan was installed which provided
adequate face ventilation.
On April 7, after the ventilation system was reconstructed
and repaired only 2,600 cubic feet of air a minute was
measured at the end of the line curtain which is less than
the minimum requirements of the approved Ventilation system
and Methane and Dust Control Plan.
Test Boreholes, Gas testing Procedures and Gas testing Equipment
The investigation revealed that the Drainway (single entry)
approximately 15 - 17 feet wide and 6 feet high had been
developed a distance of 265 feet. Six test boreholes, three
in each coal rib, had been drilled from 12.66 feet to 22 feet
in depth and were from 13 to 19 feet apart. The first rib
boreholes had been drilled when the face of the Drainway was
approximately 70 feet from the abandoned area. See sketch in
Appendix I, Figure 1.
According to the testimony of company officials the 1 Right
area liberated methane during development and therefore they
anticipated encountering methane when the Drainway entry
penetrated the abandoned 1 Right area. Company officials knew
the 1 Right abandoned area was sealed off from the rest of
the mine by water; that the sealed area was pressurized
from the rising water; and that the air would flow from the
abandoned area into the Drainway entry when the Drainway
entry penetrated the abandoned area.
Both Mullins and Carson (victim) had approved methane detec—
tors in their possession underground in the Drainway entry
when the accident occurred. According to Mullins state-
ments, adequate tests for methane were made immediately after
the test drill hole penetrated the abandoned area and tests
for methane were made continuously until the continuous mining
machine cut a hole into the abandoned area, and the highest
methane content detected was 0.15 percent.
Although mine management knew on April 4, 1978, that the
Drainway entry had advanced close to the abandoned area and
would most probably hole through that day, means for detect~
24
ing oxygen deficiency were not available in the working place
at the time the test borehole penetrated the abandonen area.
As expected, air from the abandoned area entered the Drainway
entry through the borehole with high velocity. After making
methane tes ts in front of the borehole and in the face area
which showed only 0.15 percent methane, Mullins had a flame
safety lamp that was located on the surface brought into the
face area. Mullins stated that when tests were made with the
flame safety lamp in front of the borehole, the flame on the
safety lamp which “had a little red on it.” was extinguished.
He stated that he thought the flame on the safety lamp was
blown out by the veloci ty of the air coming ou t of the bore-
hole.
After the flame safety lamp was rel igh ted, tes ts were made
across the face of the place and the flame was not extin-
guished. Mullins stated that during these tests he kept
the flame safety lamp about 4 feet from the borehole to pre-
vent the flame on the safety lamp from being blown out again
and no further tests were made with the flame safety lamp.
The air from the abandoned area was permitted to enter the
Drainway entry through the borehole for a period of approxi-
mately 45 minutes and, without first determining by adequate
testing or air analysis the content of this air, the con-
tinuous mining machine was permitted to cut through into the
abandoned area.
The fact that the content of the atmospnere in the abandoned
area on April 7, 1978 showed 2 percent carbon dioxide and
l2 percent oxygen, MSHA investigators conclude that the air
entering the Drainway entry through the test borehole from
the abandoned area on Apr il 4, shortly before the accident,
contained blackdamp; that when tes ts were be ing made wi th
the flame safety lamp, the red color on the flame of the
lamp indicated the presence of blackdamp; that the flame of
the safety lamp was extinguished by the blackdamp rather
than being blown out by the force of the air when the lamp
was placed in front of the borehole; that adequate tests for
blackdamp were not made near the mine floor; and that the
blackdamp, being heavier than normal air, accumulated near
the mine floor at the lower elevations of the Drainway entry
and did not affect those persons in the face area until a
larger hole was made into the abandoned area by the contin-
uousmining machine. See profile of Drainway entry in
Appendix I, Figure No.2.
Although the permissible-type flame safety lamp is an approved
instrument for testing oxygen deficiency, its limitations
are well-known. Technology has in recent years made avail-
25
ing oxygen deficiency were not available in the working place
at the time the test borehole penetrated the abandoned area.
As expected, air from the abandoned area entered the Drainway
entry through the borehole with high velocity. After making
methane tests in front of the borehole and in. the face area
which showed only 0.15 percent methane, Mullins had a flame
safety lamp that was located on the surface brought into the
face area. Mullins stated that when tests were made with the
flame safety lamp in front of the borehole, the flame on the
safety lamp which “had a little red on it.” was extinguished.
He stated that he thought the flame on the safety lamp was
blown out by the velocity of the air coming out of the bore-
hole.
After the flame safety lamp was relighted, tests were made
across the face of the place and the flame was not extin-~
guished. Mullins stated that during these tests he kept
the flame safety lamp about 4 feet from the borehole to pre-
vent the flame on the safety lamp from being blown out again
and no further tests were made with the flame safety lamp
The air from the abandoned area was permitted to enter the
Drainway entry through the borehole for a period of approxi-
mately 45 minutes and, without first determining by adequate
testing or air analysis the content of this air, the con-
tinuous mining machine was permitted to cut through into the
abandoned area.
The fact that the content of the atmosphere in the abandoned
area on April 7, 1978 showed 2 percent carbon dioxide and
12 percent oxygen, MSHA investigators conclude that the air
entering the Drainway entry through the test borehole from
the abandoned area on April 4, shortly before the accident
contained blackdamp; that when tests were being made with
the flame safety lamp, the red color on the flame of the
lamp indicated the presence of blackdamp; that the flame of
the safety lamp was extinguished by the blackdamp rather
than being blown out by the force of the air when the lamp
was placed in front of the borehole; that adequate tests for
blackdamp were not made near the mine floor; and that the
blackdamp, being heavier than normal air, accumulated near
the mine floor at the lower elevations of the Drainway entry
and did not affect those persons in the face area until a
larger hole was made into the abandoned area by the contin-
uous mining machine. See profile of Drainway entry in
Appendix I, Figure No. 2.
Although the permissible-type flame safety lamp is an approved
instrument for testing oxygen deficiency, its limitations
are well-known. Technology has in recent years made avail-
25
able reliable and more sophisticated equipment that is
capable of determining the actual percentage of oxygen and
carbon dioxide in the air while the flame safety làmp’ only
determines the presence of oxygen deficiency. The company’s
mine rescue teams are equipped wi th and trained in the use of
an approved Edmont Wilson oxygen analyzer which determines
the percent of oxygen in the air, and an approved Draeger
carbon dioxide detector which determines the perèent of car-
bon dioxide in the air.
MSHA investigators believe that the very nature of the Drain-
way project, which could not be considered as a “business as
usual” mining operation, should have dictated the use of the
more sophisticated gas testing equipment, particularly since
such equipment was available on mine property.
26
able reliable and more sophisticated equipment that is
capable of determining the actual percentage of oxygen and
carbon dioxide in the air while the flame safety lamp:only
determines the presence of oxygen deficiency. The company’s
mine rescue teams are equipped with and trained in the use of
an approved Edmont Wilson oxygen analyzer which determines
the percent of oxygen in the air, and an approved Draeger
carbon dioxide detector which determines the percent of car-
bon dioxide in the air.
MSHA investigators believe that the very nature of the Drain-
way project, which could not be considered as a “business as
usual" mining operation, should have dictated the use of the
more sophisticated gas testing equipment, particularly since
such equipment was available on mine property.
26
PART III
FINDINGS: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
The findings in this part are derived from the following
sourceS: Conditions observed in the mine by MSHA personnel
during recovery operations and the investigation following
the inundation; information obtained from the mine rescue
team and other persons taking part in the recovery operations
and the investigation; information obtained from special
tests conducted by MSHA; information obtained from mine
records and previous Federal coal mine inspection reports
and plans; information obtained from company officials and
miners through interviews. After analysis of all available
evidence, MSHA investigators have summarized their findings
below.


The 1 Righ t Sect ion of the Mos s No.3, Portal A mi ne
(the abandoned area that was involved in the accident) was
developed in 1972 and second mining started immediately there-
after.


Pillars of coal were left around the perimeter of the
1 Righ t area to serve as a bleeder system for the gob area.
This area was ventilated by the Bucu fan.


As retreat mining progressed the lower elevations between
9 Right and 1 Right were inundated with water below the
l,495-foot elevation.


Due to the rising water the Bucu fan became ineffective
and was taken out of service on March 17, 1978.


The rising water sealed the 1 Right abandoned area from
the remainder of the mine, and the area was pressurized by
the encroachme nt of the wa ter.


The company estimated that approximately 23 miiiion
gallons of water was flowing into the mine in 24 hours and
that approximately 6 million gallons of water was being pumped
from the mine daily.


The rising water, if permitted to continue, would inun-
date the areas below the l,504-foot elevation in the inter-
connected Portal A-2 entries. See mine map, Appendix J.


Management officials had informally discussed plans over
the past two years that would alleviate the threat of water in
the worked-out areas of the Portal A mine from flowing into
the interconnected Portal A-2 mine. During the last six months


27
PART III
FINDINGS: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
The findings in this part are derived from the following
sources: Conditions observed in the mine by MSHA personnel
during recovery operations and the investigation following
the inundation; information obtained from the mine rescue
team and other persons taking part in the recovery operations
and the investigation; information obtained from special
tests conducted by MSHA; information obtained from mine
records and previous Federal coal mine inspection reports
and plans; information obtained from company officials and
miners through interviews. After analysis of all available
evidence, MSHA investigators have summarized their findings
below.


The 1 Right Section of the Moss No. 3, Portal A mine
(the abandoned area that was involved in the accident) was
developed in 1972 and second mining started immediately there-
after.


Pillars of coal were left around the perimeter of the
1 Right area to serve as a bleeder system for the gob area.
This area was ventilated by the Bucu fan.


As retreat mining progressed the lower elevations between
9 Right and 1 Right were inundated with water below the
1,495-foot elevation.


Due to the rising water the Bucu fan became ineffective
and was taken out of service on March 17, 1978.


The rising water sealed the 1 Right abandoned area from
the remainder of the mine, and the area was pressurized by
the encroachment of the water.


The company estimated that approximately 23 million
gallons of water was flowing into the mine in 24 hours and
that approximately 6 million gallons of water was being pumped
from the mine daily.


The rising water, if permitted to continue, would inun-
date the areas below the 1,504-foot elevation in the inter-
connected Portal A-2 entries. See mine map, Appendix J.


Management officials had informally discussed plans over
the past two years that would alleviate the threat of water in
the worked-out areas of the Portal A mine from flowing into


the interconnected Portal A-2 mine. During the last six months
27
prior to the accident, the water problem became more acute
and more discussions were held and informal plans were
developed for the Drainway project.

Management and Safety Department officials discussed
plans that included drilling an 8-inch diameter horizontal
borehole from a surface location to penetrate the abandoned
1 Right area; enlarging the 8-inch borehole to 24 - 36 inches,
and driving a single entry with a continuous mining machine
from the surface to penetrate the abandoned 1 Right area, a
distance of approximately 265 feet. These plans were
designed to provide a path for the rising water to gravity
flow from the worked-out areas of the mine into Fryingpan
Creek wh ich would prevent flooding of the Portal A-2 entries.
(See mine map Appendix J).

lO. Early in March 1978, M. L. West, Manager, Safety De-
partment, met with MSHA officials in Norton, Virginia, and
discussed the company plans for the Drainway project. On
March 17, 1978, West informed MSHA officials in Norton,
Virginia, that the plan to drill the 8-inch diameter bore-
hole into the abandoned area had failed. West requested and
received oral permission from the MSHA District Manager to
proceed wi th the plan to develop the single entry Drainway
with a continuous mining machine. The same day West submitted
a written plan for the Drainway project. This plan was
approved by the District Manager on March 27, 1978. See
Appendix G, Plan No. 1.


During management’s initial planning, and during the final
development of the plans for the Drainway project, the possi-
bili ty of the abandoned 1 Right area containing blackdamp was
not considered and/or discussed, except M. L. West stated that
he discussed with W. B. Couch, Division Manager, the possi-
bil i ty that the abandoned 1 Right area might contain “a body
of methane and/or blackdamp.” However, Couch stated that no
one ever mentioned blackdamp to him during any discussions and
planning of the Drainway project and that he was concerned
only with the hazards of water and methane. During West’s
discussions of the company’ s plan for the Drainway project
with MSHA officials including the written plan, the possi-
bil i ty of the abandoned 1 Righ t containing blackdamp was not
discussed.


The possibili ty of the abandoned 1 Righ t area containing
blackdamp was not discussed wi th Strickler Mullins by
mine management or of ficials of the Safety Department pr ior
to or during the development of the Drainway entry.


28
prior to the accident, the water problem became more acute
and more discussions were held and informal plans were
developed for the Drainway project.

Management and Safety Department officials discussed
plans that included drilling an 8-inch diameter horizontal
borehole from a surface location to penetrate the abandoned

1 Right area; enlarging the 8-inch borehole to 24 - 36 inches,
and driving a single entry with a continuous mining machine
from the surface to penetrate the abandoned 1 Right area, a
distance of approximately 265 feet. These plans were
designed to provide a path for the rising water to gravity
flow from the worked-out areas of the mine into Fryingpan
Creek which would prevent flooding of the Portal A-2 entries.
(See mine map Appendix J).


Early in March 1978, M. L. West, Manager, Safety De~
partment, met with MSHA officials in Norton, Virginia, and
discussed the company plans for the Drainway project. On
March 17, 1978, West informed MSHA officials in Norton,
Virginia, that the plan to drill the 8-inch diameter bore~
hole into the abandoned area had failed. West requested and
received oral permission from the MSHA District Manager to
proceed with the plan to develop the single entry Drainway
with a continuous mining machine. The same day West submitted
a written plan for the Drainway project. This plan was
approved by the District Manager on March 27, 1978. See
Appendix G, Plan No. l.


During management’s initial planning, and during the final
development of the plans for the Drainway project, the possi-
bility of the abandoned 1 Right area containing blackdamp was
not considered and/or discussed, except M. L. West stated that
he discussed with W. B. Couch, Division Manager, the possi-
bility that the abandoned 1 Right area might contain “a body
of methane and/or blackdamp.” However, Couch stated that no
one ever mentioned blackdamp to him during any discussions and
planning of the Drainway project and that he was concerned
only with the hazards of water and methane. During West’s
discussions of the company’s plan for the Drainway project
with MSHA officials including the written plan, the possi-
bility of the abandoned 1 Right containing blackdamp was not
discussed.


The possibility of the abandoned 1 Right area containing
plackdamp was not discussed with Strickler Mullins by


mine management or officials of the Safety Department prior
to or during the development of the Drainway entry.
28
At no time, prior to or during the development of the
Drainway entry, did any mine official or an official from
the Safety Department discuss the pnssibility of the aban-
doned 1 Right area containing blackdamp with any foremen
or workmen at the Drainway project.


The development of the Drainway entry with a continuous
mining machine began on March 28, 1978. On March 31, the
sing le entry Drainway had been driven approximately 191 feet
and the drilling of test boreholes was started.



ties
line
According to mine record books the following air quanti-
were measured by mine examiners at the inby end of the
curtain during development of the Drainway entry:
March 30 - 3,045 cubic feet a minute
April 3 - 4,200 cubic feet a mi nu te
4,600 cubic feet a mi nu te
4,800 cubic feet a mi nu te
April 4 - 5,400 cubic feet a mi nu te
Except for the air measurement of April 4, these air quanti-
ties did not comply with the minimum requirements of the
approved Ventilation System and Methane and Dust Control Plan.
According to records of the preshift examination of the Drain-
way entry on April 4, 1978, no unsafe conditions were found in
the Drainway entry.

On April 4, 1978, at approximately 11:00 a.m. a test bore-
hole, drilled in the face of the. Drainway entry, penetrated
the abandoned 1 Righ t area. Air from the abandoned area flowed
through the borehole into the Drainway entry wi th a high
veloci ty. Mullins and Carson made tests for methane wi th
approved methane detectors and the highest methane content
found was 0.15 percent.

l6. Mullins, anticipating that the abandoned area contained
high concentrations of methane, became concerned wi th the
accuracy of the gas testing equipment which showed the methane
content of the air coming through the borehole from the
abandoned area contained only O. l5 percent. He ordered the
flame safety lamp to be brought in from the surface.


Means for testing for blackdamp were not available
underground at the time the test borehole penetrated the
abandoned area.


While gas tests were being made at the face area with
the flame safety lamp, the flame of the lamp was extinguished
when the lamp was placed in front of the. borehole. The lamp
was relighted and Mullins made additional gas tests at the


29
At no time, prior to or during the development of the
Drainway entry, did any mine official or an official from
the Safety Department discuss the possibility of the aban-
doned 1 Right area containing blackdamp with any foremen
or workmen at the Drainway project.

‘The development of the Drainway entry with a continuous
mining machine began on March 28, 1978. On March 31, the
single entry Drainway had been driven approximately 191 feet

and the drilling of test boreholes was started.

According to mine record books the following air quanti-
ties were measured by mine examiners at the inby end of the
line curtain during development of the Drainway entry:

March 30 - 3,045 cubic feet a minute
April 3 - 4,200 cubic feet a minute
4,600 cubic feet a minute
4,800 cubic feet a minute
April 4 - 5,400 cubic feet a minute
Except for the air measurement of April 4, these air quanti-
ties did not comply with the minimum requirements of the
approved Ventilation System and Methane and Dust Control Plan-
According to records of the preshift examination of the Drain-
way entry on April 4, 1978, no unsafe conditions were found in
the Drainway entry.

On April 4, 1978, at approximately 11:00 a.m
hole, drilled in the face of the Drainway entry, penetrated

the abandoned 1 Right area. Air from the abandoned area flowed
through the borehole into the Drainway entry with a high
velocity. Mullins and Carson made tests for methane with
approved methane detectors and the highest methane content
found was 0.15 percent.
. a test bore-

Mullins, anticipating that the abandoned area contained
high concentrations of methane, became concerned with the

accuracy of the gas testing equipment which showed the methane
Content of the air coming through the borehole from the
Gbandoned area contained only 0.15 percent. He ordered the
flame safety lamp to be brought in from the surface.

Means for testing for blackdamp were not available

underground at the time the test borehole penetrated the
abandoned area.

While gas tests were being made at the face area with

the flame safety lamp, the flame of the lamp was extinguished
when the lamp was placed in front of the.borehole. The lamp
was relighted and Mullins made additional gas tests at the
29
face area with the flame safety lamp, but ne aia not maKe
adequa te tes ts for blackdamp near the mine floor and did not
approach closer than about 4 feet Of the borehole during such
tests. The flame of the safety lamp was not extinguïshed
during these tests. No further tests for gas were made with
the flame safety lamp.


Air from the abandoned 1 Righ t area was permi t ted to
flow through the borehole into the Drainway entry for approxi-
mately 45 minutes. Before determining by adequate testing,
or by air analys is, the content of this air, the mining of
the remaining 13-foot coal barrier was begun at approximately
11:45 a.m. April 4, 1978.


Mullins stated that after the third shuttle car of coal
had been loaded he observed the lighted flame safety lamp
sitting on the continuous mining machine. However, the con-
tinuous mining machine operator stated that he did not see
the flame safety lamp sitting on the continuous mining machine.
The last time he saw the flame safety lamp Mullins had it.


2l. At approximately 12:30 p.m. while cutting coal for the
next shuttle car, the continuous mining machine cut a hole
approxima tely l4 by 20 inches into the abandoned 1 Right area
in the left side of the face of the Drainway entry.


Mullins was on the left side of the machine and Carson
was on the righ t side, both inby the operator, making tests
for methane. Johnson was behind the continuous mining
machine operator observing mining operations when the con-
tinuous mining machine cut into the abandoned area. See
Appendix I, Figure l.


When the continuous mining machine holed through into
the abandoned area, the inrush of blackdamp caught the four
men unaware; Carson, Johnson, and Breeding were overcome
immediately. Mullins dragged Breeding toward the surface
for a distance of approximately 150 feet and left him at the
edge of the waterhole. Although affected by the blackdamp
Mullins struggled to the surface.


Approximately l5 minutes after the accident had occurred,
Ray G. Ross, District Manager, Willis Ison, Subdistrict Mana-
ger, Frank C. Mann, Supervisory Mining Engineer, all MSHA
District 5 personnel from Norton, Virginia, and M. L. West,
Manager, Safety Division, arrived at the Drainway site.
Attèmpts to rescue Carson and Johnson, who were overcome by
blackdamp near the face of the Drainway entry, had already
started. At this time the following persons were underground:
Carson, Johnson, Breeding, Castle, Nowlin and Arden. Mullins,
Shelby and Beverly were on the surface.


30
face area with the flame safety lamp, but he did not make
adequate tests for blackdamp near the mine floor and did not
approach closer than about 4 feet of the borehole during such
tests. The flame of the safety lamp was not extinguished
during these tests. No further tests for gas were made with
the flame safety lamp.

Air from the abandoned 1 Right area was permitted to
flow through the borehole into the Drainway entry for approxi-
mately 45 minutes. Before determining by adequate testing,

or by air analysis, the content of this air, the mining of
the remaining 13-foot coal barrier was begun at approximately
11:45 a.m. April 4, 1978.

Mullins stated that after the third shuttle car of coal
had been loaded he observed the lighted flame safety lamp
sitting on the continuous mining machine. However, the con-
tinuous mining machine operator stated that he did not see

the flame safety lamp sitting on the continuous mining machine.
The last time he saw the flame safety lamp Mullins had it.


At approximately 12:30 p.m. while cutting coal for the
next shuttle car, the continuous mining machine cut a hole
approximately 14 by 20 inches into the abandoned 1 Right area
in the left side of the face of the Drainway entry.


Mullins was on the left side of the machine and Carson
was on the right side, both inby the operator, making tests
for methane. Johnson was behind the continuous mining
machine operator observing mining operations when the con-
tinuous mining machine cut into the abandoned area. See
Appendix I, Figure l.


When the continuous mining machine holed through into
the abandoned area, the inrush of blackdamp caught the four
men unaware; Carson, Johnson, and Breeding were overcome
immediately. Mullins dragged Breeding toward the surface
for a distance of approximately 150 feet and left him at the
edge of the waterhole. Although affected by the blackdamp
Mullins struggled to the surface.


Approximately 15 minutes after the accident had occurred,
Ray G. Ross, District Manager, Willis Ison, Subdistrict Mana~
ger, Frank C. Mann, Supervisory Mining Engineer, all MSHA
District 5 personnel from Norton, Virginia, and M. L. West,
Manager, Safety Division, arrived at the Drainway site.
Attempts to rescue Carson and Johnson, who were overcome by
blackdamp near the face of the Drainway entry, had already
started. At this time the following persons were underground:
Carson, Johnson, Breeding, Castle, Nowlin and Arden. Mullins,
Shelby and Beverly were on the surface.


30


Ross, Ison, Mann, and West joined Mullins, Shelby, and
Beverly in the rescue attempts. None of the rescuers had
protective equipment or adequate gas testing equipment. Ross,
Mann, and West did not have full knowledge of the occurrence
except, that they were informed by Mullins that some men were
down on bad air.


During the rescue attempts 10 men entered the Drainway
entry, some of whom made more than one trip underground.
Three of the rescuers were overcome by blackdamp and perished.
Three others, who were also overcome by blackdamp, were
rescued including one man who returned to the surface unas-
sisted approximately 40 minutes after the ventilation system
had been changed from exhausting to blowing.


A company mine rescue team, self-contained breathing
apparatus, a doctor and two nurses were airlifted to the
Drainway site by a company helicopter. The five bodies were
recovered by the mine rescue team wearing the oxygen breathing
apparatus by 2:35 p.m. April 4.


On April 6 - 7, 1 978, MSHA personnel conducted an under-
ground investigation into the cause of the inunda tion.


The Drainway ventilation system in use at the time of the
inundation was inadequate to dilute, render harmless and
carry away the inrush of blackdamp. Also, the ventilation
system proved to be inadequate during the investigation on
April 6, and a higher capacity ventilating fan had to be
installed to permit the continuation of the underground in-
vestigation.


On April 7, after the ventilation system was reconstructed
and the line curtain repaired by company officials, to simulate
as near as practicable the ventilation system in use at the
time of the inundation, approximately 2,600 cubic feet of
air a minute was measured at the inby of the line curtain.


3l. At the time of the inundation the approved Ventilation
System and Methane and Dust Control Plan was not being complied
with in that, the line curtain was approximately 30 feet
outby the point of deepest penetration of the face and the
continuous mining mach ine operator was approximately 10 feet
inby the end of the line curtain. According to tes timony,
the mine superintendent was not familiar with the requirements
of the approved ventilation and Methane and Dust Control Plan
pertaining to face ventilation.
32. The barometric pressure drops of 0.l2 and 0.06 on
April 4 and April 6, respect ively increased the migrat ion
of blackdamp from the abandoned area into the Drainway.
31


Ross, Ison, Mann, and West joined Mullins, Shelby, and
Beverly in the rescue attempts. None of the rescuers had
protective equipment or adequate gas testing equipment. Ross,
Mann, and West did not have full knowledge of the occurrence
except, that they were informed by Mullins that some men were
down on bad air.


During the rescue attempts 10 men entered the Drainway
entry, some of whom made more than one trip underground.
Three of the rescuers were overcome by blackdamp and perished.
Three others, who were also overcome by blackdamp, were
rescued including one man who returned to the surface unas-
sisted approximately 40 minutes after the ventilation system
had been changed from exhausting to blowing.


A company mine rescue team, self-contained breathing
apparatus, a doctor and two nurses were airlifted to the
Drainway site by a company helicopter. The five bodies were
recovered by the mine rescue team wearing the oxygen breathing
apparatus by 2:35 p.m. April 4.


On April 6 - 7, 1978, MSHA personnel conducted an under-
ground investigation into the cause of the inundation.


The Drainway ventilation system in use at the time of the
inundation was inadequate to dilute, render harmless and
carry away the inrush of blackdamp. Also, the ventilation
system proved to be inadequate during the investigation on
April 6, and a higher capacity ventilating fan had to be
installed to permit the continuation of the underground in-
vestigation.


On April 7, after the ventilation system was reconstructed
and the line curtain repaired by company officials, to simulate
as near as practicable the ventilation system in use at the
time of the inundation, approximately 2,600 cubic feet of


air a minute was measured at the inby of the line curtain.

At the time of the inundation the approved Ventilation
System and Methane and Dust Control Plan was not being complied
with in that, the line curtain was approximately 30 feet

outby the point of deepest penetration of the face and the
continuous mining machine operator was approximately 10 feet
inby the end of the line curtain. According to testimony,
the mine superintendent was not familiar with the requirements
of, the approved Ventilation and Methane and Dust Control Plan
pertaining to face ventilation.

The barometric pressure drops of 0.12 and 0.06 on

April 4 and April 6, respectively increased the migration
of blackdamp from the abandoned area into the Drainway.
31


First~aid equipment was not provided within 500 feet
of the Drainway entry working place on April 4, 1978.


Three of the six test boreholes drilled in the 'ribs of
the Drainway entry as the entry was advanced within 50 feet
of the 1 Right abandoned area ranged from l5 feet 5 inches
to 19 feet 2 inches in depth and were from 13 feet to
19 feet 7 inches apart.


Telephone service or two-way communication facilities
were not provided on t~e surface at the Drainway nor under-
ground in the Drainway entry.


The Marietta continuous mining machine operating in the
face area of the Drainway entry was not maintained in per-
missible condition in that a bolt was missing from the end-
bell housing on the tramming motor, an opening in excess of
.007-inch was present in this motor housing and an opening
in excess of .0 07-inch was present in the left control panel
cover.


The circuit for the continuous mining machine was not
provided with a fail-safe ground check monitoring circuit;
also, a portion of the circuit breakers protecting circuit
conductors originating at the power center were not marked
for identification.


32


First-aid equipment was not provided within 500 feet
of the Drainway entry working place on April 4, 1978.


Three of the six test boreholes drilled in the ribs of
the Drainway entry as the entry was advanced within 50 feet
of the 1 Right abandoned area ranged from 15 feet 5 inches
to 19 feet 2 inches in depth and were from 13 feet to


19 feet 7 inches apart.


Telephone service or two-way communication facilities
were not provided on the surface at the Drainway nor under-
ground in the Drainway entry.


The Marietta continuous mining machine operating in the
face area of the Drainway entry was not maintained in per-
missible condition in that a bolt was missing from the end
bell housing on the tramming motor, an opening in excess of
.007-inch was present in this motor housing and an opening
in excess of .007-inch was present in the left control panel
cover.


he circuit for the continuous mining machine was not
provided with a fail-safe ground check monitoring circuit;
also, a portion of the circuit breakers protecting circuit
conductors originating at the power center were not marked
for identification.


32
PART iv
CONCLUSIONS
MSHA inveiatigatoria conclude that the inundation of blackdamp
from the a;ai.don.ed 1 Right area into the active workings of
the Drainway entry was caused by the following:
l. Failure to consider the possibility that the abandoned
and water-sealed 1 Right area of the mine contained blackdamp.
Failure to develop and initiate adequate plans which would
have permitted the Drainway entry to penetrate the abandoned
area in a safe manner and under controlled conditions which
would have provided protection for the Drainway employees from
the hazard of blackdamp.


Intei:tionaliy cutting into the abandoned 1 Right area
with a cOi:tii:~9US mining machine before first determining by
adeguate ai:d S4fficiei:t testing or by air analysis, the con-
taminates in the air coming from the abandoned area after a
test borehole had penetrated the abandoned area.


Failure to comply wi th the minimum requirements of the
approveq"Ventilation System and Methane and Dust Control Plan
ai:d fail4re to provide an adequate ventilation system for the
Dr:a:iiiwa’t entry.


MSaA investigatQr:s also conclude that the reSC4e attempts by
ther:escners .:iii the blackdamp coqtaminated area of the mine
without pr:otective equipment contributed to the severity of
the accideIlt,
Respectfuily submitted,
/s/ James P. Micheal /s/ Robert A. Elam
James D. Micheal
Coal Mii:e Specialist
Robert A. Elam
Mining Engineer
/s/ Paul J. Componation
Paul J. Componation
Coal Mine Safety Special ist
Approved by:
/ia/ Joseph o. Cook
Jos.eph o. Cook
Admii:istrator for Coal Mine Safety and Health
PART IV
CONCLUSIONS
MSHA investigators conclude that the inundation of blackdamp
from the abandoned 1 Right area into the active workings of
the Drainway entry was caused by the following:


Failure to consider the possibility that the abandoned
and water-sealed 1 Right area of the mine contained blackdamp.
Failure to develop and initiate adequate plans which would
have permitted the Drainway entry to penetrate the abandoned
area in a safe manner and under controlled conditions which
would have provided protection for the Drainway employees from
the hazard of blackdamp.


Intentionally cutting into the abandoned 1 Right area
with a continuous mining machine before first determining by
adequate and sufficient testing or by air analysis, the con-
taminates in the air coming from the abandoned area after a
test borehole had penetrated the abandoned area.


Failure to comply with the minimum requirements of the
approved Ventilation System and Methane and Dust Control Plan
and failure to provide an adequate ventilation system for the
Drainway entry.


MSHA investigators also conclude that the rescue attempts by
the rescuers in the blackdamp contaminated area of the mine
without protective equipment contributed to the severity of
the accident,
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ James D. Micheal /s/ Robert A, Elam
James D, Micheal Robert A. Elam
Coal Mine Specialist Mining Engineer
/s/ Paul J. Componation
Paul J. Componation
Coal Mine Safety Specialist
Approved by:
/8/ Joseph 0. Cook
Joseph 0. Cook
Administrator for Coal Mine Safety and Health
APPENDIX A
Vic tims of Mine Inundation (Blackdamp)
Moss No. 3 Portal A Mine
April 4. 1978
Name and Social Job C1assi- Experience Total Mining
Security Number Age fica tion at that Job Experience
Willis D. Ison 46 MSHA Subdistric t Mgr. 4 months 23 years
402-42-5984
Richard Carson 29 Superintendent 4 months 6 years
420-66-4236
Marion Johnson 34 Maintenance Foreman 2 years, 2 years,
225-62-1317 3 months 3 months
William Arden 25 Roof Bol ter 1 year, 1 year,
226-74-9653 4 months 4 months
Lawrence Shelby 56 Equipment Service 10 years None
410-42-0207 Manager. National 3 months
Mine Service
APPENDIX A
Victims of Mine Inundation (Blackdamp)
Moss No. 3 Portal A Mine
April 4, 1978
Name and Social Job Classi- Experience Total Mining
Security Number Age fication at that Job Experience
Willis D. Ison 46 MSHA Subdistrict Mgr. 4 months 23 years
402-42-5984
Richard Carson 29 Superintendent 4 months 6 years
420-66-4236
Marion Johnson 34 Maintenance Forenan 2 years, 2 years,
25-62-1317 3 months 3 months
William Arden 25 Roof Bolter 1 year, 1 year,
226-74-9653 4 months 4 months
Lawrence Shelby 56 Equipment Service 10 years None
410-42-0207 Manager, National 3 months
Mine Service
2
APPENDIX A
41ë1’Il A lIJ ~…+~¡ -… ~ l
OEARTNENT OF ME TH_BUREAU OF vn Al- JUóCOROS AND HEAL T1 ST ATISl lC-RICHMQNO
_¥I!~ … í:-’ :“;';~;;;-~~-~¡-”"~oC…n J MEDICAl EXAMIN(R’S ~’ "u
::~“.–.TL”“~-”" 125 ---- 12 i CERTIFICATE --'"
-;o.-‘li’~-:… .- --l~.a ~, -;;~~ - tii. ~ -; ~t6
¡‘~;i-; Ii ~i"-.;-’‘:‘t~-’: :’;-T~T;‘3’;'-~lî¡,‘~::i:~="’~'—.=…-‘~’“”-.—;- -'~~ ."…~.O.…c…""Tn…T.OfDl…I…. I . _ .c""…,.,…nt ~ Noe i 0 0 0 Dickenson
lo’n__ii~- 5-~-,ö …~…-…~~……i =- pj¡:‘~;:-~“~__~_ .j, Of-i ~~-~1 M…_T___Oo ___ _ …”“.TAO…Uloa… 0.-”"’‘’’
1:,- _ _ .l… I’ Li Jl 0
fi -.__.",;~…~o
¡i
. !i
R UtH-
i !i
;. l~
~ ¡l
5 :ïEH
. -"
! ñ
iÎ
.11_
I"
d
ji ___------------
…n__a___OO …,…i-
… Ii .
i lùS37
ZI.coo
.,…oo"'…eo_ø-
"‘7AOI-’ K H S! __ ii
_ ..__~… ~~,", 1-----00 DI–I"O n::~…o£:…~,.Q"“.lI .J’~ -r–~=…zr~=…o -Jl H SIb,
_n"X…O’.~-…l —~-OC…-r–.…Of… f”-O-" OO~“IO.O…F”:“…T’‘’! Ii h2 ~ llrr”. ~ _ Su~ ‘VUe -L~. . .::."…-’.…… ______…_OCI…T~…__voo…-
_"‘An’__~
~:… i ===-~.:…:. —
—I! ~~~ --co__… … ._F~OM._COf’-.……-.O… I~-…'~~__…- i… ~uw…T. - 1…
— : _…,.…-.…-- …c… …sc___…l-…A~…
… …=6-:.~ -0 . := -~ 0
–±
,~…, …
ï;;~~:~…-
õ o

…

I
,
; “”'::‘’ , , _ .~… -. …ooOO.,AY. ¡__ _
D '1~'1"i … 4/4178 =: =–=0 IMUr7n~ i Dl Co… Va.a …a… .–…--------.---------…–U.is…–…AiCA…UO -=~…:I __0 _0 …0 0 ~
------- ------ —~-~—~------------- -----T~u~------- -------=;-~ .. 0… ~ … n. … 4/l78
~~ ~…u~~~----------L------~~~~-~LU¿~-----------------Dr. W. A. Davis i St. Paul… Va. 24283–…- … ",A.Ai ……L C…A… .,"'~00…
Ii 0 0 _yA…nc
“~ ~-n:-”~i----
-~-z-dd’R",:.
……, …-.
__ Er–
~.
.
MDl".
.oi.…_.-- ~"Cr -. _.u I
.~.’ 4/Una
.
Dickenson County11 i. ‘" cu _ tI io . “” -i … r.uc~ of ih or ni fi wi ih
Dq… of Hea Clintwod Voq
Do io ) .p(/,;n/71’
(SEA)
~fb d-d,/J
Al¿1’7 Jb
…ø
VOID IF ALTEED OR _ NO
BI! IMPRiuiiD .IE 01" RlEi-
APPENDIX .A
[DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHSUREAU OF VITAL RECOROS ANO HEALTH STATISTICS-AICHMONO
i : (MEDICAL EXAMINER’S,
per
‘Mhodina MoPock
Sa PS SES
dents, Wy | aan eae}
____} kao hz 0207 _'|Service Eogineet Mine Suppiy
ANTI
Vst. Paul, Va. 24263
= Boo | Se cree Aeros Constery, Ermine, Ky
t > “Bl Pooky, EEE pay & Graft Funeral Home,
gp mee ea ee ie = ae omceaiiiadl
‘Thin nwo cry ta this ia tre and correct reprodcton of the vga recorded withthe Dickenson County —
Department of Health, Clintwood Virginia,
putt 29 Zazhe Lelbend
(SEAL) Seg mem
APPENDIX A-.
----…":;–
…
I -
It
…-
ii
I~
…-
MT…-
,n-
l¡.
f~. i …
If =l, .'I -=__ r
ii=-= ~
11=== ;:— ;:
.I
:.
U
J.. .-- õ— ;…–
–
.,:i
Dickenson County
,.
.A"~,‘’“'”‘’‘’‘.’'rl…_.

COllMoNWALÏ1:OF"VIRGINlA:.ÚlTFICÄTE OF DÉATH
UEIAinEl;'OF H~1’eu;:.i OF VITAL RECOROAND t!EA1l sTAr.STICHM

MEDICAL EXAMINER’S
CERTIFICATE- "'.
,"4o

.…:…:.- D “'hUe,__;”(i,£,~…,… --a"'o~Dfi
JOHllSOIl

.2~“;!.~_ l-i’~-i.;…~”
-,.–~ - 1-1-._.
::…~~- ,__"-
B- 30-4)
¡¡
,n"''.~
."… “,.”,
Al’l,;; 1¥__.=~o…,"’ '…TnVT_O…, ,…_
None .,
.,…,…,…0…-…t:…
D Dc’ .D1ckonsnD_____ …_… …‘"…00…Õ xi Jlin 1…aU01~OO’’
Be.
.i…n.o…ça…IOO___ .aco…IM".¥lO"OO ‘’'-.–’
Vir mil lraBlngtontoC,…1’O" _____ …II.'"…1C -~
Abinon ii Õ 241 Gillespie Drbe lI 24210…OOP…OO… .…_O#.~…Jose h Al JoI. Sr. l!1ii eai ton Eler
C,TUI…OI&T–" …~…- -V"=:li =:g l’iä~7~bd-;
V. S. A. Yirgi T--.Ol……no.-… . A~Cl&_ …------."
ii. llja B. Johnson225’:62-1317 ier Blectrl iaCo
“Tl~':;~::~”
.í~.i:=~…:: i–.II–"~-
~..—…-…— -----~OT.5’l.IC…~~‘l…__…’…D"T1----…_…- _Al…".~DD… õ ü
…"~1’__&…-…-… .:.:-…o.- …ac…__……~…_OXD
…0 -0-0 …i:.0I…A’~.~~~..., Iun '2 .l i ‘D~"’-- Co… 'i.-." – –
=~ 4/4/78
.,D—'a.TI~T.__… __.……. . i:=.:QW.::~='~-J)~-O"-~~-T,;…~--------------

Va.
-~ .0.._.... .

=~. Abion. Virginia 24210_n_-,

. "....Ibor___ib
Vk'I laID -i- di ¡,. .. an -- ...

Ð- .. H.. ~ Clb.tw
~/.:n /71'Il _

f

(SEA)

...

~~d. d¿.~
~-? ..

VO IF AL1'1l OR _ NO
MA IMIIM'ID .ui DP IU-l

wvuisions 40 Was axssauara Uva
AON $200 HO GEURLTY 41 GOA

noon Legge was)
Pilg Po te poor om
=A art = WRH pe weenumlo
—eyeneg WoreeTSTE— ° HA prs prams oydyo ppp wopoapaxtas ane pow ont © ORD MR ASD oF ALL

[eR L OWL <4 i

were, see OE
“A ‘vopeutqy ‘Axed Tey rOWeN ZOTATTOUL mle

‘ona ws efhinoe nae

wg $$ rrntgtion— errr tire
een SEE el af

wosuyor “defer ~a- [eon-—uBTHTAIOCTL JOTUO| LICT-z9-Sez|——

uscenao tsuneo: ureween w_snamenve mevet cou saison alten nem em

wrvsta | "V °S “0
‘J8TTa WORT IUD UTE +ag ‘wosuyor persTY udesor

Orne tan ata *Tdsettrp tee [Oe wopouyayy——

uo 2uTWseR ‘ByUTasTA|

¥ oynoy

|

|

i
ae

|

“GRORa ST SDUSIIVAS HLTYSI! HY SOUGOSM WAIA 20 VE IAE-HEWAN 30,1 3M >
HAV3G JO 3LV9IS1LU30-VINIDUIA 30 HLTWAMNONTQO_

w XIGNadav




APPENDI~'A

,::'l

4

-- OOMMONWEÄi. TH OFYIRGINIÁ-(ERTI FICATE óFb"f 1 H

.....oi~..To..

...."\_.zi." ~

DfARTMHT OF HEAL THBUAEAU OF VITAL RECORDs AND HEAL n4 STAtISTiCRicHMD
MeICAL CXAMINtR'S

c:RTlF1CATE I~~;u... - - ~.-..
..;~:-~"'''~ ,¡~~~. ... -

l-~ ~.;~;.~!!- l-'R~"!?!.~"~~-'

IS ..1 - I - l _.. 1-~
:- iw:-

.. -
- Vui

.i~;;i:h. ;78 '-'t-wi

Ot.si~"ll~__
........"' '-"-"- I' ....'~'r."'~'r;b. 1~i-9S) , :r.~'.~;... ~j
..i:o,,~n ,,. .,..~..

Dickensn....."'.IOT..__..___........___-. o oo
..0..__""...."" __._.. ...T..U._...lI../I...O O.~~AC.O'Il....Õ ¡__ _ iif_

ij :;;.'~..

1-
ii..~
i'.
in
IR:"RO ~

:Ii =::. ~
'15:= !:i .
Ii

~.... "____ D
'E!''= ¡

--
..
Il

.a....n..._._o;...."...____ .i~..OfÐ-c._.,.._ ..._...
Y1r~..ø~y__.._..oo.

1I~
_____ ...y_..,...i.~ß".j1.. __Gl__~Õ ii ..i. i. 2~n;¡

r.~~:'~
Ali..

___...~...DlQ_. u._...._ti-..b+II_b-~.- . ClA
_ClT..__T~ __-.__-- _li-iDD ..volOCI ,,-:.::.:...."f"............."'.1I -. --0 iiia ~ Arn.MØ.ai_.._" a_olOL' _c_iW____"'.. \ -...-~..,..._..,.'''
226 - -iì ... JI
_ca_tcM....1'..K _____l..._Cl..~,..Df..no_~....,_..~..
--_.------_._----

----- ~_._ic~..__ou_.._...._TO_-l_----..__.._... ~=:...- Õ o
_1....._nM....--.......- ..__c."_ _ __-"NUT_......_oø.......=Jl..-o-0 -0-0--~OO-=y -i _._ ..--.,_0 -~.~~~.:. i--~..-.. :: :-':0 l1c;......,_I__..__________....____...._ ~i-._:~~~~!!_~~~~9--~~~-~~~-~_~~-~__-----~---- -------
~":!'___.w.:~_~~_J_~~~~___,.~~_=_~=C':-=-!L1ln-I--------__.._-.Ll._...._~_ .----.'"

I

_.

11_ Au. _.. __.. _.._ A-. __-;__
"-r~-- J'.r.

.. _n_-
o 0 =::....J'~-

A-..

Dlek.ao Coallt.y.. ii.. l-...."
YI'I 10 .. .. ii ii 10 . .. .. --... ~

Ð.. ~ . of H'" CllDtviii.
...

Æpb ÆÆJ
~7 ..

~l7hf
(SE)

1I IF AL'r OR _ NO_ IIPR.._ HA 01 _1a

APPENDIX:A,

commer rennet

‘i

~" COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA-CERTIFICATE OF DEATH
DEPARTAEICT OF HEALTH BUREAU OF VITAL RECORDS AND HEALTH ETATISTICS-RICHMOND
so = ‘EDICAL EXAMINER'S
ae CERTIFICATE

Masht

+

qi |

Hl

= Ee

oil dba,

‘Theis is to certify that this fs a true and correct reproduction of the original record filed with the Dickenson County
Degen fH, — Clin

nt Ta

(SEAL) SN 7 Registrar

‘Vom IF ALTERED OR DOES NOT
SEAR IMPRESSED SEAL OF REGISTRAR





.;~-
.. ..-l-

'J l-l --.i"-i.

ii=:
l'l

(
l~~
iflH 5E1--~Î !
I: ~,-_.. ¡

=--:-;

--
c
Sl
-

5

ClAI TH OF -:vlRGíU¡¡:iêi:.oFDETH'
'DEARTMtn OF "EALnl~lIEAI OF VITAL "ECOS AND HEM1M STAT1IlICOf

M£L EXANERlI
CEATE

....h~00i-ø._,4,...nOl_' ~ ._.....?
AprU i.. 1913
...oo..u..__.."".'OlCli-ano ..__.._lI

-
l'llte

? ...~ .... ,,~...fv.....". __-~P-...Ot:

o
ai. no ,12

.D¡~;;~n
""---_.

a o
....,,,__......?O ..----.!P .1..".a...._...__~OlN._Õ i5Il.1-......1"'"'..__"....00___ ~cw____ li__.__1

Yüøm lful~.,.....__.n._...___ .--I4CU.._'I__ _ --_._-
õ :ã ~-&li¡ Z

__01........___~ J. eu. ... ..__.._........ca_
.d r__i:......Of_,~. ..._____ ...._.0 DlVGClO 1I"::=::A.orD.-ØO--G _. &o c8l Al

_so...1"...~n.l-. D._'"~_.._IiZ)6 ...,-- .._...____11.. .._ __00-.,_
Coi Co. CI a. Ca

_ ÇAi.OI oc.._it_______-...._.l._T~..TM_~.'"--- ..i(..~~~:::..-
~.-.---___io__~.~--

---
_. ---_.-i-i__.._-i_~....,__-i~___."' o-"--_." õ:=~~.:..l- M'II.._-.IT_::.. 0 _____....~.._...M.._..C1

..0 "O~D____" -l _ _ _..,,_. .. &O'O'II"'___.__.._1'I."'IC -: 4'4/18 =-..0 ar 12.. Dlke Co., Va.
..=:~~õ-~ti~-e--=.ei-=:=-::Õ-~l__-----~~-~--------------------------------~ñ__~---- --- -------~_. IN.".:n - .( ¡ i 4/1/78--__-__.~.~~-----~-~---------T~r_~..~Fi~-----------------Dr. W. Á.. Da'l. i ft. Pa. Vl. 24283

--- -, -

p. __ _OI' __~ ----- ___I -
.- ""=::-..I'&n_. ~.\h- &e

1C~. 4/17na

.an...... nc &l wi.. Dickenson Count..

.Do
tl ... -i _ iI.a - .. -- ...

CU"t-
a-¿nhF //PH-d. ~.¿ ..

//

'01~
Di l-

I (SE)

.-

vi
AA¿_

".

_ IF ALTID OR _ lI
l- 1M--m .a OP IlIa

Tan a -
|

oe

1p

il
iL

(===

_——————— ze SE
a a a

——— npn, fn_lew_ sree tenet

Efizas = aarre | sayy sero wctare fi nina’ | Dickenson Gon, Vee

HE aire Hg 2 eters Hate | peetneen oo

for. W. A. Davie (st. Paul, va. 24203
‘80 = Provence, Alsbem——
Parva Ses Ferris Funeral Service
Y nt Lawad Banani

Than o cxrtly tht ths oa tre and caret seprodaction othe original recoded wid the Dickenson County —
Department of Heakh,Clintwood __. Viegiaia
‘a beet 7a Lb wa!

S
‘sen EG nates

‘VOID IF ALTERED OR DOES NOT
” (SEAR IMPRESSED SEAL OF REGISTRAR





APPENDIX A

~~._~_..ni...._.'..-
....~.m

1-'..
Ho'~.¡
lr::$"-
i¡l _YaOFr!~-~i¡!_

. 'I
z: : ~:;g
~ Î~

! :¡. Ii.E i~
= e:i
; i1

I!
II

n'.
Ii

M-Ð-", ..--- ¡:__..0
~::= ~:.
------_..--

_..--
~.
,
--

6

",ví~wW(;ìI..í.Ä";-~""~¡-1 ...._~__,_ ~-.
DEAfll1lf Of HE TH..REAU OF VITAL RECORDS AND HEALTH BY A nSTlIlCtWOND

::=i: ~..~U...

'::~ vuiT.
II J

. ii
MEDICAL EXAMINER"S

CERn FICA TE 1:'~::Lf
.M_ -- '''acf

1:_ 11 0 W1i ~..

F~~~'ñ -' -- 45 _r~r-:;~t.!~f~
r._oo_i.__.....nn___.... ..___'"

.l:......O. -"-'-' '..ut'."'".....H.....". .....~...D.O"(:.'~:: ¡l
No. 26. 32
. ",,_nO.DOA'" 1.._...___.,Dldt__. o oo

..C,:n__..01... __..__ .........._aa_......_~_DlA...- -o :iDar .._n......_.._... ..-----,....q_.o_..~____
KemUd ~r

aon'___ _..OC _....__ ...._u_.O......._Ol_Dl-iÕ 1; T _co..
"1824I:som___.&._....__0 ._...._.._......._"_D

Je~ x- -l. Ad_..-~.. -~--- ."--0 -- ..".._.DO...._II.___
-CJ _DO &l';~. Ho XII+U.S.A._~n'_. ""_"-OCA_ ~---- __.__Ofi..~_..i-

2~2-5984 Co lt. Re11.. X-_i~.

~~:r;:f
Fe.

_~Of""""'" ___, ....__C.._D...
____.-._li.

_.._.. A:. pH'I ')' 1t

--_.-----_..._---- -- -
._-

--~o-.._IC_Dn__.._-l-l_...._T*~____..__.-l."" oõ
:.:~~:_.._-l ~--..nã ~=.1;-¡..L-~::.._aa_D~-0 -0-0 -, ~ v~= _T__.... _i- _ _ _.__..~D _ _i-_._. 1--- --:: ,.~h-~ '/ 7~ :: =-":0 .~ë£-r"-""',,¿i ì).a.....,... c.. \/0.,

.. 1C!"......_.__*'_~_____.________.._-- .'" _._- )
~~~~_~_~_~_~9__~_a-_~~~_(l_~_~ñ~______.;________
~':~___l~.L:~:._~-l~_____.. __i-_r:!-12~____~--____DoU'_. ,._~_ . _'_DO."-

I
Dr. w. A. Davia -n. ...... .._.. -~ _.._--,::~.TCx. Cl ---,

_._.-----,
Leer

Wht:_li.rg. Ky.L _..-...., 4/1217

TI is.... ..lh 10. "" -i _ .....__ "'.. cw- &I_lI
CliJtv

Dlc.u. Coldty

Ð- '" He VI
~~ ¿7,d ~.J'~

4jh' JI
il i- f'/n/n

(I)
... -iD IF ..UR OR _ NO

Bl _-- H: CW ".ClIS

APPENDIX A

0 ke

poe Se =o ea
H U.S.A. | Kentucky. s—e}_—o=-G| Hellen Marie toe Ison
H 14 _| Fed. inspector Coal mining | wr. Hellen Ison~wite

ates.

‘This is wo cently that this io true and correct reproduction of the original record filed withthe Dickenson County

‘Department of Heahth, Clint Virginie.
‘Dats ined lez Let Buh Lt sel

(seal) 22g vim

VOID IF ALTERED OR DOES NOT
= BEAR IMPRESSED SEAL OF REGISTRAR





1

APPENDIX B

GENERAL INFORMATION

Portal A-2 mine was opened in June 1976, and is located
approxirna tely 4,000 feet north of and interconnected with
Portal A mine. In Portal A-2 mine, three entries were driven
from the surface and intersected the parallels of 5 Right off
1 Right off A Main of Moss No. 3 Portal A mine. The Drainway
entry (accident scene) was developed to allow incoming water
to flow to the surface before flowing into the Moss No. 3
Portal A-2 mine. Mining had been completed at Portals B, C
and D. Mining at Portal A is near completion with present
act ivi ty cons isting of one coal producing sect ion mining in
barrier pillars. Two coal producing sections are active in
developing the new Portal A-2 mine.

The Thick Tiller coal bed averages about 12 feet locally and
consists of the Tiller and Jawbone Coalbeds. In some areas
of the mine, where the coalbeds were separated by a relatively
thin part ing, mining was done in both coal beds . In areas
where the rock parting between coalbeds was too thick to mine,
only the upper (Jawbone) coalbed, which averages 7 feet in
thickness was mined. Approximately 70 percent of all mining
in Moss ,No. 3 Portal A mine, including the abandoned area
where the Drainway entry penetrated, was mined in the Jawbone
coal bed.

At the Drainway entry a total of 14 men was employed on
3 shifts a day, 5 days a week. The entry was to be developed
approximately 265 feet from the surface into the mined out
1 Right area of the Moss No. 3 Portal A mine. The Drainway
entry, designed to be used as a waterway for the extensive
gob area, was located in an area where elevation of the coal-
bed was determined to be low enough to permi t water to
gravity flow out the opening before reaching the active mine
workings in Moss No.3 Portal A-2 mine. Reportedly, the
water level in the Portal A mine had been rising daily since
pumping stations in 9 Right off A Mains had been deactivated
when pillar recovery was started in the area in August 1977.

MINING METHODS, CONDITIONS AND EQUIPMENT

Mining Methods

The Drainway entry was being developed with a Marietta
(drum-type) continuous mining mach ine. The coal was mined
and loaded into a Joy l5-SC shuttle car which transported
the coal to the surface coal storage area. Approximately
2 - 8 inches of water was present along the shuttle car
roadway beginning about 75 feet from the portal and extending

APPENDIX B

GENERAL INFORMATION

Portal A-2 mine was opened in June 1976, and is located
approximately 4,000 feet north of and interconnected with
Portal A mine. In Portal A-2 mine, three entries were driven
from the surface and intersected the parallels of 5 Right off
1 Right off A Main of Moss No. 3 Portal A mine. The Drainway
entry (accident scene) was developed to allow incoming water
to flow to the surface before flowing into the Moss No. 3
Portal A-2 mine. Mining had been completed at Portals B, C
and D. Mining at Portal A is near completion with present
activity consisting of one coal producing section mining in
barrier pillars. Two coal producing sections are active in
developing the new Portal A-2 mine.

The Thick Tiller coalbed averages about 12 feet locally and
consists of the Tiller and Jawbone Coalbeds. In some areas

of the mine, where the coalbeds were separated by a relatively
thin parting, mining was done in both coalbeds. In areas
where the rock parting between coalbeds was too thick to mine,
only the upper (Jawbone) coalbed, which averages 7 feet in
thickness was mined. Approximately 70 percent of all mining
in Moss No. 3 Portal A mine, including the abandoned area

where the Drainway entry penetrated, was mined in the Jawbone
coalbed.

At the Drainway entry a total of 14 men was employed on

3 shifts a day, 5 days a week. The entry was to be developed
approximately 265 feet from the surface into the mined out

] Right area of the Moss No. 3 Portal A mine. The Drainway
entry, designed to be used as a waterway for the extensive
gob area, was located in an area where elevation of the coal-
bed was determined to be low enough to permit water to
gravity flow out the opening before reaching the active mine
workings in Moss No. 3 Portal A-2 mine. Reportedly, the
water level in the Portal A mine had been rising daily since
pumping stations in 9 Right off A Mains had been deactivated
when pillar recovery was started in the area in August 1977.

MINING METHODS, CONDITIONS AND EQUIPMENT

Mining Methods

the Drainway entry was being developed with a Marietta
(drum-type) continuous mining. machine. The coal was mined
and loaded into a Joy 15-SC shuttle car which transported

the coal to the surface coal storage area. Approximately

2 - 8 inches of water was present along the shuttle car
roadway beginning about 75 feet from the portal and extending




2

inby for a distance of approximately 30 feet. Roof bolts
were installed on not more than 4-foot centers in the l5-foot
wide entry in accordance with the Approved Root Control Plan,
dated April 16, 1976. A hand-held air operated drill was
utilized to drill 2-inch diameter test boreholes in the
Drainway face and ribs as the entry face approached the
abandoned area. See Appendix I, Fig. 2

ventilation
The Moss No.3, Portal A mine was being ventilated by a
Jeffrey, Model 8H~84 Aerodyne fan driven by a 300 horsepower
al ternating current electric motor. During the survey con-
ducted March l3 and 14, 1 978, by personnel from MSHA vent i-
lation section, District 5 office, Norton, Virginia, the fan
was exhausting 224,000 cubic feet of air a minute at 2.25 inches
water gauge pressure. The methane content of the return air
was O.ll percent. Approximately l69,000 cubic feet of air a
minute was measured at the three intake openings. The dif-
ference between return and intake air quanti ties, as measured,
was due to air intaking through numerous breaks to the surface
in the abandoned pillared areas. Air flow was controlled by
permanent stoppings, overcasts and regulators constructed of
incombustible material. plastic, flame resistant, brattice
material was used to direct the ventilation to the working
faces. All accessible areas of the mine were ventilated.
Much of the abandoned area was inaccessible due to bad roof
conditions and water.

Preshift and onshift examinations and tests were made by
certified persons and the results were recorded in a book
on the surface.

The ventilation System and Methane and Dust-control plan for
the Moss No.3, Portal A mine, of which the Drainway entry
was a part, was approved by the MSHA District Manager on
July 14, 1970, amended May 5, 1975, and last reviewed
February 6, 1978.

ventilation of the Drainway entry was induced by a Jeffrey
61"-28 Aerodyne fan located on the surface and operated
exhausting. The fan was operating in the "S" blade position.
Motive power was provided by a 440 volt, 3 phase 40 horse-
power electric motor rated at 3,450 r.p.m. In directing the
ventilating current through the entry, 24-inch spiral wound
collapsible tubing was utilized from the fan installation
inby for a distance of approximately 50 feet. Flame resis-
tant line brattice was used from the end of the tubing to
conduct the air to the working face. See Appendix 1",
photo Nos. 1, 5, and 6.

inby for a distance of approximately 30 feet. Roof bolts
were installed on not more than 4-foot centers in the 15-foot
wide entry in accordance with the Approved Roof Control Plan,
dated April 16, 1976. A hand-held air operated drill was
utilized to drill 2-inch diameter test boreholes in the
Drainway face and ribs as the entry face approached the
abandoned area. See Appendix I, Fig. 2

Ventilation

The Moss No. 3, Portal A mine was being ventilated by a
Jeffrey, Model 8H-84 Aerodyne fan driven by a 300 horsepower
alternating current electric motor. During the survey con-
ducted March 13 and 14, 1978, by personnel from MSHA venti-
lation section, District 5 office, Norton, Virginia, the fan
was exhausting 224,000 cubic feet of air a minute at 2.25 inches
water gauge pressure. The methane content of the return air
was 0.11 percent. Approximately 169,000 cubic feet of air a
minute was measured at the three intake openings. The dif-
ference between return and intake air quantities, as measured,
was due to air intaking through numerous breaks to the surface
in the abandoned pillared areas. Air flow was controlled by
permanent stoppings, overcasts and regulators constructed of
incombustible material. Plastic, flame resistant, brattice
material was used to direct the ventilation to the working
faces. All accessible areas of the mine were ventilated.

Much of the abandoned area was inaccessible due to bad roof
conditions and water.

Preshift and onshift examinations and tests were made by

certified persons and the results were recorded in a book
on the surface.

The ventilation System and Methane and Dust-control plan for
the Moss No. 3, Portal A mine, of which the Drainway entry
was a part, was approved by the MSHA District Manager on

July 14, 1970, amended May 5, 1975, and last reviewed
February 6, 1978.

Ventilation of the Drainway entry was induced by a Jeffrey
6F-28 Aerodyne fan located on the surface and operated
exhausting. The fan was operating in the "B" blade position.
Motive power was provided by a 440 volt, 3 phase 40 horse~
power electric motor rated at 3,450 r.p.m. In directing the
ventilating current through the entry, 24-inch spiral wound
collapsible tubing was utilized from the fan installation
inby for a distance of approximately 50 feet. Flame resis—
tant line brattice was used from the end of the tubing to

conduct. the air to the working face. See Appendix F,
Photo Nos. 1, 5, and 6.




3

Electriçal Equipment

The electric face equipment in use at the Drainway entry was
of the permissible-type and consisted of a Marietta drum-type
continuous mining machine, a Fletcher roof~bolting machine,
and a Joy 15-SC shuttle car. Generally the equipment was
maintained in good condi tion by qualified personnel ¡ however,
a bolt was missing from the end-bell housing on the tramming
motor and an opening in excess of .007 inches was present in
the motor housing of the continuous mining machine.

Communication and First Aid Equipment

There was no communication system provided underground in
the Drainway entry or at the Drainway site. The nearest
two-way communication facilities at the time of the accident
were located at the Bucu airshaft approximately 1,500 feet
from the Drainway entry. First-aid equipment was not avail-
able at the Drainway site.

Training Program - Medical Assistance Program

The training program for the Moss No. 3 mine was approved by
MSHA District Manager during 1970. Clinchfield Coal Company
also operates a training mine for new employees. The new
employee receives training in First-Aid Methods, Principles
of Mine Rescue, Use of Self-Rescuer, the Coal Mine Safety
and Health Act, Coal Mine Vent ila tion, Roof and Rib control,
and Electricity. Certified officials receive the training
required by the Act. Workmen are assigned duties at other
company mines, as required, upon completion of training at
the training mine. Workmen at the Drainway entry were as-
signed from the training mine.

According to company records, the fourteen men at the Drain-
way site except Dale Hess, a certified foreman, have received
the above training.

On August ll, 1971, management submitted to MSHA an accept-
able Emergency Medical Assistance program. There are five
company ambulances available on mine property. First-aid
equipment and supplies were provided at Moss No. 3 mine but
were not provided at the Drainway site.

Mine Rescue

The company maintains five mine rescue teams in the area
and rescue teams from other nearby companies are available
in an emergency. Two mine rescue teams from the Moss
Nos. 2 and 3 mines participated in the recovery operations.
M.S.A. self-rescuers were provided for all underground
employees and they have been trained in their use.

Electrical Equipment

The electric face equipment in.use at the Drainway entry was
of the permissible-type and consisted of a Marietta drum-type
continuous mining machine, a Fletcher roof-bolting machine,
and a Joy 15-SC shuttle car. Generally the equipment was
maintained in good condition by qualified personnel; however,
a bolt was missing from the end-bell housing on the tramming
motor and an opening in excess of .007 inches was present in
the motor housing of the continuous mining machine.

Communication and First Aid Equipment

There was no communication system provided underground in
the Drainway entry or at the Drainway site. The nearest
two-way communication facilities at the time of the accident
were located at the Bucu airshaft approximately 1,500 feet

from the Drainway entry. First-aid equipment was not avail-
able at the Drainway site.

Training Program - Medical Assistance Program

The training program for the Moss No. 3 mine was approved by
MSHA District Manager during 1970. Clinchfield Coal Company
also operates a training mine for new employees. The new
employee receives training in First-Aid Methods, Principles
of Mine Rescue, Use of Self-Rescuer, the Coal Mine Safety
and Health Act, Coal Mine Ventilation, Roof and Rib control,
and Electricity. Certified officials receive the training
required by the Act. Workmen are assigned duties at other
company mines, as required, upon completion of training at

the training mine. Workmen at the Drainway entry were as-
signed from the training mine.

According to company records, the fourteen men at the Drain-

way site except Dale Hess, a certified foreman, have received
the above training.

On August 11, 1971, management submitted to MSHA an accept-
able Emergency Medical Assistance program. There are five
company ambulances available on mine property. First-aid
equipment and supplies were provided at Moss No. 3 mine but
were not provided at the Drainway site.

Mine Rescue

The company maintains five mine rescue teams in the area
and rescue teams from other nearby companies are available
in an emergency. Two mine rescue teams from the Moss

Nos. 2 and 3 mines participated in the recovery operations.
M.S.A. self-rescuers were provided for all underground
employees and they have been trained in their use.




1

APPENDIX C

List of persons who participated in or were present during
recovery operations and/or investigation.

Clinchfield Coal Company

Frank Phillips
Robert Gullet
Sidney Southerland
Harold N. Phillips
Milton McArthur Kiser
Homer Wayne Fields
Archie E. Salyer
David Lee Moore

vice President of Operations
The Pittston Company
Director of Health and Safety
The pittston Company
Vice President
General Manager
Division Manager
Assistant Division Manager
Assistant to the Division
Manager
Construction Foreman
Safety Inspector
Staff Assistant
Mine Rescue Team Trainer
Member Mine Rescue Team
Member Mine Rescue Team
Member Mine Rescue Team
Member Mine Rescue Team

John Nypaver

John W. Crawford

Max Bales
Henry L. Kiser
W. B. Couch
Walter B. Crickmer
Pete Capelli

Virginia Division of Mines and Quarries

Auty Branham
Fred Carty
Clyde Breeding

Inspector
Inspector
Inspector

Uni ted Mine Workers of America

Willard A. Esselstyn

International Safety Inspector
International Safety Inspector
Assistant Safety Coordinator,
District 28
International Safety Inspector
Safety Inspector and
International Teller
Secretary and Treasurer

Donald Dalton
Danny Davidson
Alonzo Mullins

Harold Hartsock
Jonathan Willims

Mine Safety and Health Administration

Elmer Simmons

District Manager
Trial Attorney - U. S. Depart-
ment of Labor
Mining Engineer
Coal Mine Safety and Health
Specialist
Supervisory Mining Engineer

Ray G. Ross
Robert A. Cohen

Robert A.. Elam
Paul J. Componation

APPENDIX C

List of persons who participated in or were present during
recovery operations and/or investigation.

Clinchfield Coal Company

John Nypaver
John W. Crawford

Max Bales

Henry L. Kiser

W. B. Couch
Walter B. Crickmer
Pete Capelli

Frank Phillips
Robert Gullet

Sidney Southerland
Harold N. Phillips
Milton McArthur Kiser
Homer Wayne Fields
Archie E. Salyer
David Lee Moore

Vice President of Operations
The Pittston Company
Director of Health and Safety
The Pittston Company

Vice President

General Manager

Division Manager

Assistant Division Manager
Assistant to the Division
Manager

Construction Foreman

Safety Inspector

Staff Assistant

Mine Rescue Team Trainer
Member Mine Rescue Team
Member Mine Rescue Team
Member Mine Rescue Team
Member Mine Rescue Team

Virginia Division of Mines and Quarries

Auty Branham
Pred Carty
Clyde Breeding

Inspector
Inspector
Inspector

United Mine Workers of America

Donald Dalton
Danny Davidson
Alonzo Mullins

Harold Hartsock
Jonathan Willims

Willard A. Esselstyn

International Safety Inspector
International Safety Inspector
Assistant Safety Coordinator,
District 28

International Safety Inspector
Safety Inspector and
International Teller

Secretary and Treasurer

Mine Safety and Health Administration

Ray G. Ross
Robert A. Cohen

Robert A. Elam
Paul J. Componation

Elmer Simmons

District Manager

Trial Attorney - U. S. Depart-
ment of Labor

Mining Engineer

Coal Mine Safety and Health
Specialist

Supervisory Mining Engineer




2

APPENDIX C (cont inued)

Harry Markley
David Wolfe
Raymond A. Strahin

Supervisory Coal Mtne
Technical Specialis.t
Coal Mine Inspection supervisor
Mining Engineer - Technical
support
Mining Engineer, Technical
Support
Coal Mine Inspecto.i;
Coal Mine Inspector
(Special Invest igator)
Member M,SHA Mine Rescue Team
Member MSHA Mine Rescu.: Team
Member MSHA Mine Rescue Team

Merian O'8ryan

Ewing C. Rines
James L. Banf ield

Edward J. Miller

Arvil C. Gallihar, Jr.
Clarence A. Goode

APPENDIX C (continued)

Merian O'Bryan

Ewing C. Rines
James L. Banfield

Edward J. Miller

Arvil C. Gallihar,
Clarence A. Goode

Harry Markley
David Wolfe
Raymond A. Strahin

See

Supervisory Coal Mine
Technical Specialist

Coal Mine Inspection Supervisor
Mining Engineer - Technical
Support.

Mining Engineer, Technical
Support

Coal Mine Inspector

Coal Mine Inspector

(Special Investigator)
Member MSHA Mine Rescue Team
Member MSHA Mine. Rescue Team
Member MSHA Mine Rescue Team




1

APPENDIX 0

Persons who participated in or were present during ihterviews:

David Lee Moore

Clinchfield Coal Company

Vice President of Operations
The Pittston Company
Director of Health and Safety
The pittston Company
Attorney, The pittston Company
General Manager (witness)
Division Manager (witness)
Manager Safety Division (witness)
Superintendent (wi tness)
Safety Inspector
Foreman (wi tness)
Foreman (witness)
Continuous Mining Machine
Operator (witness)
Continuous Mining Machine
Operator (witness)
Shuttle Car Operator (witness)
Roof bolter (witness)
Continuous Mining Machine
Operator (witness)
Shuttle Car Operator (witness)
Mine Rescue Team Trainer
(wi tness)
Member Mine Rescue Team
(wi tness)
Member Mine Rescue Team
(wi tness)
Member Mine Rescue Team
(witness)
Member Mine Rescue Team
(witness)

John Nypaver

John W. Crawford

Raymond E. Davis
Henry L. Kiser
W. B. Couch
M. L. West
Strickler MUllins
Edward Coffey
Delmer Hess
Gary Owens
Darrell Lynn Stoots

Charles Breeding

John B. Porter
Jack Nowlin
Eugehe Marshall

Earl Castle Jr.
Harold N. Phillips

Milton McArthur Kiser

Homer Wayne Fields

Archie E. Salyer

~ational Mine Service Company

Ambrose Grayson Conley
Glen Darrell Beverly

Representative
Representative

Virginia Division of Mines and Quarries

Frank Linkous Technical Assistant

APPENDIX D

Persons who participated in or were present during interviews:

Clinchfield Coal Company

John Nypaver
John W. Crawford

Raymond E. Davis
Henry L. Kiser

W. Bs Couch

M. L. West
Strickler Mullins
Edward Coffey
Delmer Hess

Gary Owens

Darrell Lynn Stoots

Charles Breeding
John B. Porter
Jack Nowlin
Eugene Marshall

Earl Castle Jr.
Harold N, Phillips

Milton McArthur Kiser
Homer Wayne Fields
Archie E. Salyer

David Lee Moore

Vice President of Operations
The Pittston Company

Director of Health and Safety
The Pittston Company
Attorney, The Pittston Company
General Manager (witness
Division Manager (witness

Manager Safety Division (witness)

Superintendent (witness)
Safety Inspector

Foreman (witness)

Foreman (witness)
Continuous Mining Machine
Operator (witness)
Continuous Mining Machine
Operator (witness)
Shuttle Car Operator (witness)
Roof bolter (witness)
Continuous Mining Machine
Operator (witness)
Shuttle Car Operator (witness
Mine Rescue Team Trainer
(witness)

Member Mine Rescue Team
(witness)

Member Mine Rescue Team
(witness)

Member Mine Rescue Team
(witness)

Member Mine Rescue Team
(witness)

National Mine Service Company

Ambrose Grayson Conley

Glen Darrell Beverly

Representative
Representative

Virginia Division of Mines and Quarries

Frank Linkous

Technical Assistant




2

APPENDIX D (Continued)

United Mine Workers of America

Edward Gilbert
Floyd T. Mullins

International Safety Director
Safety Coordinator, District 2B

Min~ Safety and Health Administration

Clarence A. Goode

District Manager
Coal Mine Specialist
Mining Eng ineer
Coal Mine Safety and Health
Specialist
Supervisory Coal Mine
Technical Specialist
Coal Mine Inspector
(Special Investigator)
At torney, Department of
Labor

Ray G. Ross
James D. Micheal
Robert A. Elam
Paul J. Componation

Mer ian O' Bryan

Robert A. Cohen

APPENDIX D (Continued)

United Mine Workers of America

Edward Gilbert International Safety Director
Floyd T, Mullins Safety Coordinator, District 28

Mine Safety and Health Administration

Ray G. Ross District Manager

James D. Micheal Coal Mine Specialist

Robert A. Elam Mining Engineer

Paul J. Componation Coal Mine Safety and Health
Specialist

Merian O'Bryan Supervisory Coal Mine
Technical Specialist

Clarence A. Goode Coal Mine Inspector
(Special Investigator)

Robert A. Cohen Attorney, Department of

Labor




i
APPENDIX E

JNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR - MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRAT~IDN N~ .033901. MSHA FORM 7000-3 (3'781 - __ .
ÇlC.'TATIDN o 

ORDER OF WITHDRAWAL DATE0,2,2.:'L TIME.L.éLQ ,~(5EE REVERSE) (SEE REVERSEI MQ OA VR (24 HR CLOCK)
SERVED TO STRICKLER .MULLINS OPERATOR ~IINc:~i=Ii=1 n ("OAt rnUPAlIlV _____
MINE MOSS NO.3, PORTAL. "A" MINE I.D... ~ - ~ -i.J ~ i - _ _ _ (CONTRACTOR)
tYPE OF ACTION -.~~-~- -f------- VIOLATION OF SECTION ___-_-_OFTHEACTOR
(5EE REVERSE)

. 7 5 3 a 1 OF TITLE 30 CODe OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.PART AND SECTION _ _. _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ __
TYPE OF INSPECTION ~ -- ~ 0 SIGNIFICANT AND SUBSTANTIAL (SEE REVERSE)

CONDITION OR PRACTICE At approxlmatelv 12:30 p.m., April 4, 1978, the volume and velocitv of the current of 8lrven'tiløtlnn lhA
workIng face of the Dralnway was not suffk:ient to dilute, render harmless and carry awaY the blacirdamD loxvoen defir.lllt\'t ølr\ ""hl.-h

entered the working face when the Drainway holed through Into an unventilated Inaccessible abendoned area of the sae mine. The
blackdamp resulted In the death of five men. This citation is being issued as a reslt of the subsequent fatal accident Investigation.

AREA OR EQUlPMENT

''iC.OA.íA rCOOE5

DATE - Î
ASMT. TRANS. 0

p

INITIAL ACTION ~ NOTICE
TERMINATION DUE DATE I

o CITATION

TIME

o ORDER NO.
SIGNATURE~/.

DATED_~'__'__
V t: .11~'O ~~ YR

ACTION TO TERMINATE This violation was abated prior to the issuance of the citation
c pleted and abandon

TIME .LeL~SIGNATURElr? .lLd/~
(24 HR CLOCK) , 7"~--- - L.

drBinway pro t having been

DATE ~12n ,.;L-
MO DA VR o SEE SUBSEQUENT

ACTION SHEET

~~h~\1¿;J,aT7'lJ~i~J,MENT OF LABOR - MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINIS~ATION No :. n 3 3902

r;CITATION ! 0 ORDER OF WITHDRAWAL DATE((Z 7-, Z~J Z JiTIME a CJ.2:tL!(SEE REVERSE). (SEE REVERSE) MO OA VR (24 HR CLOCK)
SERVED TO STRICKLER MULLINS OPERATOR 1'1 INI'i-i:ii:1 n COAL COMPANY
MINE MOSS NO.3, PORTAL "A"
TYPE OF ACTION -l-l"!- -A - _ _ __ -_ -_(SEE REVERSE) i
PART AND SECTION -2 í _ ~ ~ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ OF TITLE 30 CODe OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.

TYPE OF INSPECTION -. L.. GSIGNIFICANT AND SUBSTANTIAL (SEE REVERSE)

MINE I.D... .l - -i --.. ~ i - _ _ _ (CONTRACTOR)

VIOLATION OF SECTION _ _ _ - _ ~ _ OF THE ACT OR

CONDITION OR PRACTICE _On. Apri~ 4; 1978, means were not available in the workin9 place of the Orainway to make onshrft
examinations and tests for oxygen deficiency immediately after 8 test dril hole penetrated an unventilated and Inaccessible abandoned

area of the same mine. Ahe.- B flame safety lamp was obtained from the surface of the Orainway, examinations and tests for oxygen

deflcie!'cy were not made continuously dui-ng the holing through operations Into the abandoned area by the continuous mining mach1ne.

Blackdamp (oxygen deficient alr) entered the active workings of the Dralnway and five men died as a result. This citation Is being
IsstJed as a result of the subsequent fatal accident investigation.

AREA OR EQUIPMENT
J

INITIAL ACTION D~OTICE ' D CITATION
TERMINATION DUE OAT¿ -I TIME

NO.

SIGNATURE~
R

ActiON TO TERMINATE This violation was abated prIor to the Issuance of
completed an . a an on

been

OATEtZ.: ,.2..,-2 '
MO OA YR

TIME -l q cf~ SIGNATURElr--y/
(24 HR CLõCK) , /' o SEE SUBSEQUENT

ACTION SHEET

APPENDIX E
1 PARTMENT OF LABOR ~ MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION Now
MRI SRA TREE SI out 033901
crTATiON eapen.cemmmnonawat = vate) 22) 2H we 6 6e
BEER MeRse) BERN CEASE ao! BRIE WOES
SERVED TO__STRICKLER MULLINS OPERATOR —_CLINGHEIELD coat
(MINE MOSS NO. 3, PORTAL “A” MINE 1.0.4 4 —_0 1.6 4 2—______(conTRAcToR)
TYPE OF ACTION 10.4—-A- ==" VIOLATION OF secrion ___ - __-__oF THE ACTOR
{SEE REVERSED OF TITLE 30 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.
PART AND SECTION 7 6.30 1 __
TYPE OF INSPECTION -A FA De] stanirtcawr ano suasTANTIAL (see REVERSE)

CONDITION OF PRACTICE __At epproximetely 12:90 pam. April 4, 1978, the volume and velocity of the current of ait ventilating tha
working face of the Drainway was not sufficient to dilute, render harmless end car
Tentered the working face when the Dreinway holed through into an unventilated Inaccestible abandoned area of the same rit

"The

bbleckdemp resulted in the death of five men. This cltstion ls boing Issued as a result of the subsequent fatal eccident Investigation.

— rm
[RES Gaia jcoues APA CY 7-ncun, TRANS, DAIE

AREA Om EOUIPMENT pave Beal Th no

TIAL ACTION nonce [_Javaniow [_Jonoen DATED Ia dg

= ee ONAN D ghee CM
Tenmmation oue Okte 5) ME oe ces Z

ACTION TO TERMINATE This violation war abated prior to the tsuance of the cltaion 24 1 the arainway a faving been
epinptered nd abandoned.

OLD EER WL Edad wanna D pire 7 MF rig |)

HEITERSTATERBSTANEMENT OF LABOR ~ MiNE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION we
crrATION, Sf ware, 71 2.21 28 re 2 933902
FP yqnonn ce wer
BEER nse REPEL EAHORAMA toot! Ao! ZB re OFS:
SenveD To. sTelckun MULLing orenatoR—-cusscuisisin Coat COMPAR
ne MoeS wo, 9, PORTAL =A= MINEL0.44~-o 1-8 4.2. (onTmacTon
TRE QAGHIQN 124A = WiotaTion oF section ~~ or tue act on
Re ys 208 oe OF TITLE 30 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.
TYPE OF INSPECTION -A FA [a sewiricanr ano susstantiat sce nevense)

CONDITION OR PRACTICE __On April 4, 1978, means wore not avalablo in the working place of the Oreinway to make onmhife
‘examinations and torts for oxygen deficiency Immediately after test drill hole penetrated on unventilated and inaccessible abandoned
‘area of the some mine.

‘Alter a flame safety lamp was obtained from the surface of the Drainway, examinations and tests for oxygen

deficiency were not made continuously during the holing through operations into the abandoned area by the continuous mining machine,

Blackdamp (oxygen deficient air) entered the sctive workings of the Drainway and five men died as a rewit. This citation Ie being
ult of the subsequent fetal occident Investigation.

ued 98 @

“AREA OR EQUIPMENT. 2 es OPEC Mr TRANS DATE |
5) 93 — —
INITIAL ACTION one LJeration ‘ORDER paTeo I
TERMINATION DUE DATE) time
ONO OA ag mag ME a= OMRON DD Lia lense

ACTION TO TERMINATE This violation was absted prior to the Issuance of the citation due 26 the drainway projet having beon
compteted_and_ abandoned:

NEE BIR E  Pehe ee Jo mersa





2

APPENDIX E

\I~~Ti~d;riaV¡i)¿il~~!JIMENT OF LABOR - MINE SAFETY AND HeALTH APMINISTJ\ATIDN NO - n 3 3 9 0 ":

EJfJltWt'EREI 0 ?s~~e:E9&JlJ;HDRAWAL pAn ~t i-i,l i 2,(. TIW~c-tP~i,( ..
SERVED TO STRICKLER MULLINS OPt:RATQR Çl.INCHflELD CQAL ÇPMP.~NY
MINE MOSS NO.3, PORTAL "A" MU\IE I.D.~ l-...J -i.. -l ~..,. -. _ (CONTRACT'oR)
TYPE OF ACTION -l -- ~.... -.., _ _ _ - _ - __ VIQt.ATION OF SECTION _ _ _., _ ~ _ OF THE ACT OR(SEE REVERSE) . .
PART AND SECTION 2 2.2 2 ~ _ _ __ _ _ _ OF TITLe;l CIlDE OF FePeRAL ReQLILATIDNS.
TYPE OF INSPECTION ~ ~.. G SIGNIFICA~T AND SUBSTANTIAL (SEE REVERSE)

CONDITION OR PRACTICE The ventilation system and methane-and-dust-control plan for this mine' ás eipprov~ July 14, 1970, and amendod
May 7, 1915, end last reviewed in February 1978, requiring 'te line brattice to I:e malntalried to within 18 feet of the point of deepest
penetration of the face, that the continuous mining machine operator shall remõ!lfl ~ minimum of two flQt OLlt1y the end of the line brattlc8
and that 8 minimum quantity of 5,000 cubic feet of air a minuw be maintalnl! at the end of the Ijn, brlltt¡Çl In all places where coal 111

.?elng cu~, driled, mined or loaded Bnd where roof bolts are being Install~. was not being complied with In the Dralnway entry when the
entry was mined through into an abandoned area of the mlnl at approxirnaielV 12:30 p,m., A,prU 4. 1978. Thii Investigation on April 6 and 7

AREA OR EQUIPMENT ISE~ CONTINUATIQN SHEET)
INITIAL ACTION 2 NOTICE 0 CITATION D~RDER NO. . DATED - _1- _1-,-~- ;0 ii0 PA YR.fERMINATIONDUEDAT __1__1__ TIME____SIGNATURE ¿¡ ~ -----MO DA VR (?4 HR (:1 O(:K\ 'AR

This violation was abated prior to the issuance of the citation due to the dr81nway project høving been
l.u.I...I,,~..J ....J ul.....J....l:d.

ACTION TO TERMINATE

DATE_iL.£12£12J: TIME.L d g- 0 SIGNATURE"MO DA VR (24 HH CLOCK) , d.. -AR OSEE SUBSEQUENTACTION SHEET

o ORDER DA TEi2 fLl -2.512 JrMO OA v~

DATED 0 !L i 25:12$MO DA VR
TIMEJ13S-S

(24 HR CLOCK)

d'HTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF lABOR
liNE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
fSHA FORM 7000-33 13-781

o ¡ie~i"õ~UENT GJ CONTINUATION D CITATION

No~~~-l__I?_2-_-_

orERATOR

P4INE 1.0. ~ 4 - 0

CLINCHFIELD COAL COMPANY
SERVED TO STRICKLER MULLINS

l'vllNE MOSS NO.3, PORTAL "A" 6 4 2_ _ (CONTRACTOR:

JUSTIFICATION fOR ACTION CHECKED BELOW 1978, ni\/eal~fl tti..lt'thl! end of the line brattîce was 30 feet from the face of the 
entry 

at the cut-through point. and the operator's control station on tlw çontlnuous mining machine was 1Q feet ¡"by the end of the line brattice.
On April 7, 1978, after the ventilation system had been reconstructed and the line branice repair~d: tiy company officials In the presence of
MSHA parsonnel, approximately 2,600 cubic feet of air a minute wes measured at the ¡nby end of the line brønice. This citation 111 being
issued as 8 result of a subsequent fatal accident Investigation.

L :::TEnA2~r~;yS ~,~;~ASMT TRANS. DATE E

TIME.:___ DVACATED DATE_~f__f_- '1ME____(24 HR CLOCK) MO DA VR (24 HR CLOCK) _,
o SEE SUBSeQUENT ACTION SHEET t1 ¡J .

SIGNATURE~ /J¡J~~a, ~____(/1 AR
O EXTENDED TO, DATE_ -1- -1--MO DA VR
DTERMINATEO 0 MODIFIED

TYPE OF INSPECTION tl £4-

APPENDIX E
RERATRRTERIENTor omer nmveninsouNrEN  M -933908
FARTMence — Cheneensgnrronamae oe $2528 wee fa,
Senven To. SUMCKLEN LLM creraron_-cuNCHTIELO COAL GOMRANY
MINE _. MOSS NO. 3, PORTAL “A” MINE 1.D.4 4 ~ © 1 6 4 2—______(conTRAcToR)
TYPE OF ACTION 1 © 4~ 0 — 4, =__ = VIOLATION OF SECTION ______ — _~ __ OF THE ACTOR

Gee REVERS
PART AND secrion 7. 8...3_1 6 9-9
TYPE OF INSPECTION AF A, Lx] sicniricant AND SUBSTANTIAL (SEE REVERSE)

CONDITION OF PRACTICE — The ventilation system and methaneend-dustcontol plan for this mine a approved July 14, 1970, and emended
May 7, 1975, end last reviewed in February 1976, requiring the tine bratice to be melntsiyed to within 18 fest of the point of deepert
Denetration of the foce, that the continuous mining machine operator shall remain « minimum of wo feet outby the end of the Hine bration
and that a minimum quantity of 5,000 cubic feet of alr e minute be meintsined at the end of the ling bration In oll places where coal te
boeing cut, drilled, mined oF loaded and where root bolts are being installed, was not being complied with In the Drainway entry when the
«mined through into an sbandoned area of the rine at approximataly 12:90 p.m., April 4, 1978. The investigation on April 6 end. 7
AREA OR EQUIPMENT (SEE CONTINUATION SHEET)

(OF TITLE 30 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.

TWTIAL AeTION worice [Jewarion [-Jonven

TERMINATION DUE DATA, Jf —___ souarunt)Cbrenr A Hobe
Date I a yg ME ae eames SIGNATURE| A. Soke

ACTION TO TERMINATE This violation was absted prior to the issuance of the citation due to the drelnway project having been

ORD ET ZEIZE "HEL A 8D sannrone) Mp, es an Sez eseauenT

(28 R ELOTRI

2 ne OS, 25) 28

051 25/78 me 0.255

Gran ccocK

MESRAEESVERIRS (UATE ARANIERA TION No.9 2.3.
SHA FORM 7000-2a (3-78

(Cy s2958QUENT Ex] conrmuation [CJerration [CJonven are

SERVED TO__STRICKLER MULLINS OPERATOR —CLINCHFIELD COAL COMPANY

MINED. 4 4 ~ 0 1 -2 = — — contractor:

MINE

JUSTIFICATION FOR AGTION CHECKED BELOW _ 1078, raveslbd Thet We end of the Tine brettice was 30 fost from the fece of the entry
ing_machine was 10 fest Inby the end of the line brattice,

cutthroush point, and the operator's control station on the continuous mi
‘Oe Apri 7, 1978, after the ventilation system hed been reconstructed and the line brattice repaired by company officials in the presence of
MSHA personnel, approximately 2,600 cubte feet of air a minute was measured ot the Inby end of the Tine brattice, This cltotion being

izued os a result of » subsequent fatal accident Investigation.

rn
: “canes ALA LAA Taxsni. TRANS. OTE
za l-2y x a

ae ie LdvecareD ware ay

[renmwareo  [CJmoorrieo [see susseouewr acrion suce

tyre oF inspection At EA. sionatune )(Nocercee- Cl,

[lextenoeo ro: ore,

va BSR CLOCK,





3

APPENDIX E

TATES ÒjPA'MENT OF LABOR - MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION NO J 3 2 3 2.41ß~ifJl"" 700 13' -- -- .// A
iJ~"" N o ORDER OF WITHDRAWAL DATEQ.2I-.IL:i TlMELQ¿ . .
fI l'1A'J1~"ERSE)- (SEE REVERSE) Me DA VR (24 HR CLOCK)
~f5~E R STRICKLER MULLINS . _ OPERATOR CLINCHFIELD COAL COMPANY
~,,~ø ~c:5S NO.3 PORTAL "A"" MINE I.D.~ ~ - ~ -. ~ ~ ~ - _ _ _ (CONTRACTOR)
5 IrF ~~ION.. ~ ~- ¿ - _,_ __ - _ - _ VIOLATION OF SECTION _ _ _ - _- _ OF THÈ ACT DR
¡v ýf'f',tVE..SE1 7 5 5 0 3 OF TITLE 30 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS..1",," NDSECTION--.----------
~..,.1' ~F INsPECTION ~ £. ~ 0 SIGNIFICANT AND SUBSTANTIAL (SEE REVERSE)

-(ýf'f3 _" OR PRACTICE Thepeissible-type Mariett continuous mining machine Serial Number 7486 was opB't in the face 8~e8
,.01'110 .t the dralnway entr on April 4.1978. 8nd was not maintained in pe.mlssb1e condition in that 8 bolt was missing from theí:øf'ine- .. -. -. _ ..

l .. - .;.&ln9 on the tramming motor and an opening in exce of .OO7-inch was presnt In this motor housing; also, an opening In excess" /'..I..~
- -iø-=. . h was prest in the left control panel COVel. This citation is being Issed as . reslt of the subseuent fatal accident Investl tlon.V' ~~~ .
"l .

~UIPMENT
1',.0,.fi

ACTION t).NOTICE 0 CITATION ORDER NO.
1'1,.1- ~1,.1 ATION DUE DATE __1__1_ _ TIME ____ SIGNATURE~.ì
,...1,.

1't I' "TO TERMINATE This violation was abated prior to the issuance of the cItation due

"~~'( and ndooed.
~~ 1:2.Q125L TIME LtzZ'£SIGNATURE"'/7 ~ø.'("I~ 0 DA YR (24 HR CLOCK) , 7-

\ REC. DATA 'CODES -I1..tlASMT. TRANS nATE. IDATE -7
DATEO__I__I__MO OA YR

5r''Y~ -/ AR o SEE SUBSEQUENl
ACTION SHEET.~

L..

~~.
01' EQUIPMENT.~

ACTIOII 0 1I0TICE ~ CITATIOII 0 ORDER NO. C' .7(;' 3ci,,riAl- ,( . / ..11' TIOII DUE DATEC. .i1..s:12 TIME _;LL1L SIGIIATURE,.

f'ro11IAte II TO tERMINATE . . . i Æ.c110 ~.,. ~
o,.te~o IY"A1 YR 'äíd.t;z.A/

.L. ¿~ L v..'R
I 0 SEE SUBSEQUENT-r -AR -i ACTION SHEET

APPENDIX E

ANT OF LABOR — MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
STO OT

ep pitense, CURR AEHONANAL —onre 2; (BL ZH ve LOR ae
rt Berens cxuen mucins OPERATOR CLINCHFIELD COAL COMPANY
6 TOs no. 3 PORTAL "A

MINE LD. 4-0. 2. =_____(contracror)
VIOLATION OF SECTION ___~ __~ OF THE ACT OR

OF TITLE 30 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.

"Gi srcmiricanr ao SussTANTIAL (see REVERS)

OR PRACTICE ___The pennisbletype Mariott Continugus mining machine Sarat Number 7486 was operated in the face area
ono ine a Sly ai om AO 4.197, and war not mansion in perme condition in tat «
ne

was mizing from the
Si Fea on te womming Oto and an opening in excers of _OU7-inch wes present n this motor howsng: sso, en opening in excee
so

oo
a

‘present in the left control panel cover. This cltation is being Issued ose result of the subsequent fatal sccldont Investigatios

FEC. DATA [CODES APEC Tse TRANS. DATE
pate _fe-al-7e

< aint ACTION {NoTIce Ulerration LJonver
” <

er tae I es Dee

TERMINATE This violation wos abated prior to the issuance of the citation due 34 the daln

on aren
Baap ag 2k Tie BE Benton) 7? Jom 0 Bey om, 40 Tee suesequent

ACTION SHEET

s ernTESPFTARIIMENT OF Lavon — MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
Pe ak
aigePor™

re Cesesn.grqumonawas, owt $4 9h rae 7
‘
ee 0, 2 crema SC psbiilonl (lange
ve? “Wien We A-we Bk mine 0.2L ~ Sg —eonrherom)
mint — erin L CL-A-_,___-_-__" vioation oF section _____- _~_oF THe act on
ascaeen on 25.2 CD OF TITLE 30 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.
See tN sec - -—
come inseonon BE A [7 scurcnnr av susranriay ee sevense .
Pam oe Checl que tag Copied,
a fo Foe Manis AEB)
Lege The Da Mehra?”
Fea eae
6
gi RON [nonce DXlerrarion [ Jonoen

13 oi £78, 78
nario oveoareC ti LO 2K me L ZL sronarone per atten ie —

i 70 TERN The Fang cance paclag PW ATER aE aaah
gi Dh Chee eo Mig, ae 1 fen ei Cee ee CJe Cee
ETE Sree te Fe OTT

ice. 7 JO seer

ACTION SHEET

(20 ae ELOCRY




4

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR - MINE SAFET AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION NO - 030304MSHA fORM 100-3 f~78) _ / i
rYCITATION 0 ORDER OF WITHDRAWAL DATE ()~ ¡-lD ¡ 7.L TIML_( O~OK)Q é'7~ (SEE REV 5£) (.E EVERSE.L. MO OA - X-R l.~ HR.. ;-" ,. '/
SERVED TO :,,, .'/ ~ ",t'. ~ OPRATORl-k.......l-~ r- ..,"'r-.~v
MINE.~ -/1' 'J ~ MINEI.D.Jk!1-£!.L lJ fl-___ICONT"'CTORlO
TYPE OF ACTiON -l.c d_ ¡l - ~ _ _ _ - _ - _ VIOLATION OF SECTION _ _ _ - _ - _ OF THE ACT OR
(SEE REVERSE) n '1 ó 0 J I OF TITLE 30 CODE OF FEOERAL REGULATIONS.
PART ANDSECTJON -- ..-l _J. _ - _____
TYPE OF INSECTION d£ /l 0 SIGNIFICANT ANa,SUBSANTlAL

A../ / L¿.../J . () , t
I'

JCONDITION ÖR PRACTICE

l- ,

~L- --4- -

AREA OR EQUIPMENT

INITIAL ACTION 0 NonCE
TERMINATION DUE DATE t! 4- / L 0 i

CITATION 0 ORDER NO. It
.$ TIME L1. Q..Q SIGNATURE~

'ú ~. C~

¡gC' ¡ 78OA VR~---
.,./ :z

t/7't.--AR-i o SEE SUBSEQUENT
ACTION SHEET

UNITED STATES DEPART)MENT OF LABOR - MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATÆ/ION No - n') 3 9 0 4MSHA FORM 7003 13'7B \.
nCITATION 0 ORDER OF WITHDRAWAL DATE fJ.. 2 £ Z TIME a rr..~~(SEE REVERSE) (SEE REVERSE) MO DA VR (24 HR è"OCKJ
SERVED TO STRICKLER MULLINS OPERATOR CLINCHFIELD COAL COMPANY
MINE _ MOSS NO.3, PORTAL "A" MINE i.D.~ ~ - ~ -l ~ ~ 2 - _ _ _ (CONTRACTOR)
TYPE OF ACTION --~~-~- -1------ _ VIOLATION 

OF SECTION _ __- _-_OF THE ACTOR¡SEE REVERSE)
7 5 1 6 0 0 OF TITLE 30 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.PART AND SECTION _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

TYPE OF INSPECTION ~ -l ~ ß SIGNIFICANT AND SUBSTANTIAL (SEE REVERSE)

CONDITON OR PRACTICE
on the surface of the Dralnway nor underground ¡nthe Orainway entry which had been advanced approxlmataly 260 feet underground.

ThIs citation Is being Issued as a result of ~ subsequent fatal accident Investigation.

On April 4, 1978, telephone service or two-way communication facilities were not provided

AREA OR EQUIPMENT 1:~ED:~~J~O;r ~', (~Acrn mAPlE. D.nE ¡

INITAL ACTION 0 NOTICE

TERMINATION DUE DAT¿ _ i
o CITATION

¡ TIME
o ORDER NO.

SIGNATURE ~

~~ AR OSEE SUBSEOUENTACTION SHEET

ACTION TO TERMINA TE This violation was abated prior to the f5Suanc~ of the citation
completed and abandoned.

DATEl¿,£ ¡ Æ..I.2 c. TIME / .Q g L2 SIGNATURE'" 7')
MO OA YR (24 ~CLOClq ,

APPENDIX E
- INISTRATION

RITE? SEA TESPERAREMENT OF LABOR — mine SAFETY AND anes apm oF 930304

\cITATION Coesvercemmonanat — vareOt ) £0,235 re JO rr

(See Rew ep pevense) $ @,

Md OPERATOR Hwee [fact Pe PI tree,

SEAVED TO ¢
mine Maso # mune. 2-216 FE-__  conirdactory:
type oF action fC sf ‘VIOLATION OF SECTION ____- ___— __OF THE AcT on.

(Bee ReveRse)

See od Sein m guot ar eben noanarios
Trcormarccnon 2 £4. Clmauncany anoumstaymatycenevense -
CONDITION On PRACTICE DEL 24G C Cac fie fy oe, HG, EE GCE { fo yac SE) Tex Lely)

1 Led ae ee Coal

"AREA OR EQUIPMENT

INITIAL ACTION L)sonce crvation [_Jonven yg 3004 _ oareo lO 101 a
renminarion ove oare 241 £0. ZF nme 123 Osionarunth A. LE.

AGTIONTO TERMINATE nA” Zip teoch, reise, heel (eA fbn CM Presi
Cs 1 Pe OPED, ET
J al SEE SUBSEQUENT
a ACTION SHEET

OEE Che BS Som LE? floor

pure MENT OF LABOR ~ MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION we
OREO ERB 1390" TY AND Hea pa 033904
cirATiOn QRDER OF WITHORAWAL O57. 1"
BEER MMensey — )QRRER CE MMonamat — ore OF) 2B ZH we OL o9
‘MINE MOSS NO. 3, PORTAL “A” MINE I.D.4 4— 0 1 6 4 2—-_____ ‘contractor)

TYPE OF acTION 1 © _4— A —
(See aeVERSED

PART AND SECTION es
TYPE OF INSPECTION AF _A La stomercant ano suasTaNTiAL (see reverse)
‘CONDITION OR PRACTICE ‘Gn Apt 4, 1078, Wlephone service or twoswny Communicotion Teliion were not provided

on the surfece of the Drainwoy nor underground In the Dreinwey entry which had been edvanced spproximetely 260 feet underground
is citation Is being Isved a6 « result of 9 subsequent fatal accident Investigation,

VIOLATION OF SECTION ___~ _-__oF THE ACT OR
OF TITLE 30 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.

‘AREA OR EQUIPMENT DATE eae ot

INITIAL ACTION Diners TLJerration [Jonoen DATED
yee _TME

TERMINATION DUE DATE ee oe am

[AETION TO TERMINATE This viotation war sbsiad prior to fw tvoncd of we chan de 36 me omic Soke ole
Somali and sbandone

NEE AR LE keh) 7) gett Clg |)





5

APPENDIX E

~~~~~diT~TliM!~~,~JiENT OF LABOR - MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH AmINISfRATlQN No - 033906

r;CITATION 0 ORDER OF WITHDRAWAL DATE.D 5 12!i1 i.t TIME Q!ltiiIl2CSEE REVERSE) (SEE REVERSE) MO DA VR (24 HR CLOCK)
SERVED TO STRICKLER MULLINS OPRATOR CLINCHFIELD COAL COANY
MINE MOS NO.3 PORTAL uA'. MINEI.D.~..--.~-.~2-___(CONTRACTOR)
TYPE OF ACTION -L ~ ~ - ~ - _, _ _ _ - _ - _ VIOLATION OF SECTION -- OF THE"ACT OR(SEE REVERSE) - - - - -
PART AND SECTION 7 5 1 7 0 1 _ OF TITLE 30 CODe OF FEDERAL REGULATION
TYPE OF INSPECT10;;~ -= ~ - - - ~ -;G~;;CA--T AND SUBSANTIAL (SEE REVERSE)

CONDITION OR PRACTICE Three of the she boroles drilled In the ribs of the Drainway entr as the entr 'N adan within
50 fe of an abandoned are of tho mine range frm 15 fee 5 Inches to 19 foet and 2 inches In dep1h an rang úom 13 feet to
19 feet and 7 Inches apart This citation Is being issed as . reslt of . subsuent: fal &eent Invigtion.

AREA OR EQUIPMENT I REC. DATA ¡CODES
': DATF-

. . ~~~F~C 1/ ."'MT T;'ANS OATE f=

INITIAL ACTION / 0 NOTICE D CITATION
TERMINATION DUE DATE I I TIME

o ORDER NO.
SIGNATURE~

ACTION TO TERMINATE

DATE__12:!J12
MQ OA YR

This violation was abated prior 1:0 the Issuance of the citation due to tho drainway project having been

completed and abandoned.

SIGNATUREL h 0 SEe SUBseQUENT, ~CL ~. ACTIDN SHEET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR - MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH A. DMINISTRATlON NO - n') 3908MSHA FORM 7003 (3'18) --,u
nCITATION 0 ORDER OF WITHDRAWAL DATE O.L i..d' Z7JT1ME L l2 O..~(SEE REVERSE) (SEE REVERSE). MO DA VR (24 HR CLOCK)
SERVED TO STRICKLER MULLINS OPERATOR CLINCHFIELD COAL COMPANY
MINE MOSS NO.3. PORTAL "AU MINE i.D_~'~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ 2 - _ _ _ (CONTRACTOR)
TYPE OF ACTION ~ ~ ~-~- _,___-_-_ VIOLATION OF SECTION _ __-_-_OFTHE ACTOR(SEE REVERSE) OF TITLE 30 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.
PART AND SECTION ~ ~. -- .. ~ ~ - _ _ _ _ _

TYPE OF INSPECTION ~ -- ~ ß SIGNIFICANT AND SUBSTANTIAL (SEE REVERSE)

On April 4, 1918, first aid equipment was not provided within 500 feet of the Oralnway entry -working

place. This cltation II being issued as a result of the subseuent fatal accident investigation.
CONDITION OR PRACTICE

1-~9~~~~r3l:ï~c;TASMT TRANS.O:E IAREA OR eaUIPMENT

INITIAL ACTION fl NOTICE 0 CITATION

TERMINATION DUE DATE I I TIME
o ORDER NO.

SIGNATURE~

ACTION TO TERMINATE

DATE

This violation was abated prior to the Issuance of the cItation
pleted and abandoned.

TIME ¡ -iLlZ SIGNATURE'" n
(21t l~CLOCK) , rY;0U AR -10 SEE SUBseQUENT

ACTION SHEET

APPENDIX E

MANTERSTATISPERARIMENT OF LABOR — MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

renee senone 5 ra 2.260 23906
BzEUM ease, TREES CEWWORAWAL — pare OB 2ST K me OS,

SERVED TO__STRICKLER MULLING OPERATOR CLINCHFIELD COAL COMPANY

Mine (MOSS NO. 3, PORTAL mine 1p._4 4-016 4 2—_ contpacton)
RUEQE ACTION! © 4-A- | wiouarion oF secrion _—___~_-_or mie act on

PART AND secriom _7 5. OF TITLE 30 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.

Tyre oF inspecTion AF _& [x] SIGNIFICANT AND SUBSTANTIAL (see REVERSE)

CONDITION OR PRACTICE __ Three of the six borcholes dried In the ribs of the Oreimway enuy es the enuy wer edvencel within
50 feet of an abandoned area of the mine ranged from 15 feet 5 Inches to 19 fost and 2 Inches In depth and ranged from 19 feet to
19 foot and 7 inches sport. This cltation le being lesved ar a result of © subsequent fetal eccidant Investigation.

4
REG. oata coves AFA CY" nour ai

‘DATE.

‘AREA OF EQUIPMENT

wimiataction > []wonee Cera Claes

ae a tiga
remarion oe Kare eT ee tONAT Low
a ee a ss

ACTION TO TERMINATE This violation wae abated prior to the Ieuan of he ctdon due 10 we aloe pret heig Dos
completed and_abandoned.

DE REL eas orm) oorrce G dem (OEE

RITER STATES PENASIMENT OF LABOR — MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

£33908

crTaTioN eave ormmmonana — vate. I-97) £5) ZK me f COS

BEE RMenses PECL CE NSE weLEs
SERVED TO__ STRICKLER MULLINS orenaron _ CLINGHFIELD COAL COMPANY
(MINE MOSS NO. 3, PORTAL “A” MINE 1.0.4.4--0 1 6 4 2—- ____ _ (contractor)
INPE OF ACTION.1. 9 4—- A= oo =_ = VIOLATION OF SECTION _____— __— __ OF THE ACTOR.

BEE ERED
PART AND SECTION 7. ae
TYPE OF INSPECTION AF _A Ly sicniricant ano suBsTANTIAL (see REVERSED

OF TITLE 30 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.

aid equipment was nat provided within 600 feat of the Drainway entry working
‘cident Investigation.

CONDITION OR PRACTICE __On April 4, 1978,
place. This citation Is being ewved a¢ « rewult of the subsequont fe

Se
a SA pee TRET

“AREA OR EQUIPMENT ee £ -

TaITiAL nerion nonce [Jaan [Jonoen ag, DATED Ia

TERMINATION DUE ONE og yg Wf arranas MNO 7 ra Bie

TRETION TO TEWMINATE yur voor wav soecd pir tothe scat tha con Zea te tao ats haa hm

completed and_abandoned.

OME AZIZ WL CLC sanntunty A Agheoe Clef a SEE aupsequenr





APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES OEPARTMENT OF LABOR - MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRA TIQN NO - 0 3 2 2 6 4
MSHA FORM 1003 (3'181

OCITATION lV ORDER OF WITHORAWAL DATE 0 ili g- -l i 7!l TIME -l L s ~(SEE REVERSE) ~ (SEE REVERSE) MO DA VR (24 HR CLOCK)
SERVEDTO /?nl",fl CdUC i, /)¡r/"r/,,'" 6~P¡:DPERATDR Ch'- r,Á F/e'ld CoA / CdA/,APYd J ..MINE __ _ J ~LA-d MINE 1.0. Q !/- Q -- t.!t ;, - _ _ _ (CONTRACTOR)
TVPEOF ACTION L a~ - k- _, _ _ _ - _ - _ VIOLATION OF SECTION --OF THE ACT OR
(SEE REVERSE) OF TITLE 30 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.
PART AND SECTION _ _ - - - - - - - - - --
TYPE o-F INSPECTION _ ~ _ 0 SIGNIFICANT AND SUBSTANTIAL (SEE REVERSE)

CONDITON ORPRACT'CE .,in" t; ('_L. R. ".. , .,-.. rIC' d (1".eE-&Ji-.LE1LA /
Acr:..d~..l-A""rI ¡~ ¡'A/ ££Ff't" r ¡i"~~9 TAt" ,';r/eJ_f;.9.Ar;d-v
_" ¡: TAL- ""n- ,.,/"./ r A /iP-4. ' .- .._~--A/ /y..~JJ e--Ci--4.v 5d=CJ;sA II ~~LLLr(' T Á e .. p ves ,r~~ A TJ dP
t1,c ne. Acc,'d"'4T,rA&L be ~cr.h~'rr('d 7I E~-Lr'r A/feA-.,
AREAOR EOUIPMENT.ze. EN T,q Y
lhl? A.l .M_'Ae

INITIAL ACTION 0 NOTICE

.he /ky L)Æ','i/ep l-4 r L) ¡t.A ;'..A a e /'. 7b-

TERMINATION OUE DATE

ACTION TO TERMINATE

I TIME

o ORDER NO_
SIGNATURE~

o CITATION

DATE__/~_I,._ TIME _~__SIGNATURE~MO DA VR (24 HR CLOCK) ,
i O. SEE SUBSE~UENT

- -AR -i ACTION SHEET-- ...

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR - MINE SAFETV AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION NO - 033644MSHA FORM700G-3 13QO) -
O. CITATION fì ORDER OF WITHORAWAL DATE (7 ~ 111 K i 2- r TIME 1. Z. :' 5.(SEE REVERSE) "¡. (SEE R,VERSE) MO 0/\ VR ).24 HR.fLOCKl
SERVEOTO--'IL.L:"""h _ OPERATOR-./~f,,;..td (1""..( (!,,""pali:;
MINE __~_j'aS3__.1O.c-i.E,,;Jji-l--l-- MINE 1.0._ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ (CONTRACTOR)
TYPE OF ACTION -i.1 .2 - il _ _, _ _ _ - _ - _ VIOLATION OF SECTION _ _ _ - - - - OF THE ACT OR
(SEE REVERSE) OF TITLE 30 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.
PART AND SECTION _~_._ ___- -----
TYPE OF INSPECTION A E 4- ~ SIGNIFICANT AND SUBSTANTIAL (SEE REVERSE)

CONDITON OR PR~~TlC. E TIÍ'r .aiu,_L_ß.. r-h1 ~~--.'e.-g()..~d el/ t.~,tt. hid,.: '-L-"

(OX~'1('l deftcel'... --. .6ßA "é'ç"/~:f IILJt~£tl-&. LeN~"';.S."H; rÆL~
/'u.LfJl'((, /gcJLn;¡,J,-_J£d.££fAN-_~ fL tl,, SÚLfde dJlLnw4J JLn-rt;i-.ßr:. ..
0, 1'1 ~ C(. ._lmt1.s.Ih..ld:LLL(~; (;'ìKtJL$~.:-;l'J r-:"rnh' ~'-r ,,/, ".-d r---g..dÚ~dh

aiid fl,t'st c",n.J.tL..:- ",__k JhL_ ~ "" /r;5.:y,hl'J-t" .A7;/Lf'.r.i.vú.l.-
AREA DREOUIMENT~ 1Xe_s~-;;¡r ~,-l ----:¡ t;'~6 'I (7,.,. e k

I-I) i ( '6" 6 1--=-=
i I Àl ACTION 0 NOTICE 0 CITATION

TERM'NATION DUE DATE

ACTION TO TERMINA TE

_i TIME

o ORDER NO.
SIGNATURE ~

DATE_ _1__1- ~ TIME _--- SIGNATUREIiMO DA VR (24 HR CLOCK) , --AR o SEE SUBSEQUENT
ACTION SHEET

APPENDIX E

UBNIERSTARBERATAMENT OF LAOOR — MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION no - 0 32264
Clazatoy. ORDER OF WITHDRAWAL pare OH 2 Ay Z, BK ume L ZS

Beene) EERE 5 Th bose
senveoto Luck Covch, Mvisiow Supf- orenaron. Ch cblreld CoAl CarPary
wine AZ 2 a7@ mine0.4 4-O/ a #2-___(contancron)
TIRE OF ACTION LO9- A VIOLATION OF SECTION OF THE ACTOR

PART Ano SECTION —
Thre or mtrecrion Clstomirican ano SuBstaNTiAt (ce nevense)

Gonoitiqn onrnacnce This Greek fs sssued Due Gaul Ti ple_FaTal__§
wl Aud (sth ELFCCT peasal ise; Ac vacye s Tig Alea

(OF TITLE 30 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.

eer Z, LES ee GALE aie e AAD Thad he Lhe ra Ves Jig AT 4a
ob the Aide Cled ft Euler Tht S ARC he

“hnexontourment (Be Lu lA) heres phew fit DRATH AGE “wo
he AS Awe

INITIAL ACTION []wonce [Jeranion [Jonoen yo are

i! we! pa mam SOMATURE ee
emMNATION DUE DATE —ys-/ «Wiese esate Mab o

ACTION TO TERMINATE

on — —
—— —— jose
muraaeraypeoromn-onc or movecmsomanron 983644

lerration QRDER OE wirHoRAWAL — DATE J. 19812, £ rime 1

seweote IW. Goa eh orenaron EE EPI (cn mpant-

mine fos MINE 1.0.__ =. — — (CONTRACTOR)
type oF action | O.Z- ay - VIOLATION OF SECTION _____- __~ _ OF THE ACTOR

BEER ARES
OF TITLE 30 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.
PART AND SECTION __-_- = __-_- _- —-— F

wee or mnsecenion AE A. lsc am svesrayrng one neverse
BONDITION OR PRACTICE TA 2 re contalmnited uulh Black chemp
(oxy gen deliceney ath_ot MS) persons. Ther
mali, hp fole ( aoa y bites The - 77
thing Weep films ols ea theo. (e
‘4 ¢ 7

and these cand

(prev
serait ep. “dam 4 goles foc. i Leb ight Cmek
applortmarely ix iad fez hey £20 la:

OPP naence [Jenarton’ []onoen Fe Ig

TERMINATION DUE DATE =f 3 yg TW sremarar sonar) 7 poy yy, ie

‘ACTION TO TERMINATE

DATE TIME ‘SEE SUBSEQUENT
a a) —oe Dae





.~
;,- i

,1. ?.

:
. .,f ~ -, 11.-','

..' 4f

'\ .

No. 1 End ot 1 ine curtain wi th continuous mining
machine at face

. ..

,o. ~ .~:;i . - .

";' . t

.'~-':'-
:--~---.

.',;

"t.
4l

,.
¡

"
\

.~

...'.
"7 ·

\. .

:£" :t~. ~¡,
£.. ~\ _'.

No. 2 Offset left side showing extent of last continuous
mining machine advance in Drainway entry

No. 1 End of line curtain with continuous mining
machine at face

No. 2 Offset left side showing extent of last continuous
mining machine advance in Drainway entry




APPENDIX F 2

~~ ..-~

" .. - --'.
"---,#"

." .-,L:,~ .,' jj¡...."'' ..,
.'~ ;.'. \t if '""'~~

1 Q
-, .~;. l:~'" :.

~."'~ t~~- .;; -" ~. t';

r ..~ ':'~l:
~:...,\..-~_:lo,'. /'.';; " "':"T~

....'

),: J,:
~... :-, ....

'.~ ~'
~~--:./~,

.,
~'.

r-\'-4~~,

f ,o''l-.

No. 3 Position of continuous mining machine at time
of cut through into abandoned area

----.

~..:'-
~., F ",.,----~"'." ...-,'-I

--, ... ~-
"~ -~

. ..-".' ",

.~

--.

..

"0-

No. 4 Opening made by continuous mining machine at
time of inundation

APPENDIX PF

No. 3 Position of continuous mining machine at time
of cut through into abandoned area

No. 4 Opening made by continuous mining machine at
time of inundation




3
APPENDIX F

, ""--

':.~.....l.¡ 4~.~-:'~ -l -- ~~

-.--..:-

_.

~...
- .

-t

No. 5 View from waterhole looking outside showing
line curtain and ventilation tubing

.l?~

Ih.;\/'. .~i
'\ ~

,-..

"
.~ "l

,
l

Jt \~ 1-

,
..

i/

.~~~ .:

"-

e

~
No. 6 View from face area looking toward outs ide
showing return air side of line curtain

APPENDIX F

No. 5 View from waterhole looking outside showing
line curtain and ventilation tubing

No. 6 View from face area looking toward outside
showing return air side of line curtain




APPENDIX F 4

~,\r~"".,:''~'.";~..~ --~
- ~'-

-!. ".'.l-"1 ('.. ,-"ß... -. ""
"\ ...:.. 11';' ~'; .-."" _ t~' .~.

lo ,. ...\ .'" i; ~j.

";\.

~

.'

,.~
.r

No. 7 Right side of continuous mining machine after
last advance

.-
~~." ~""''

..

;

"~
'.'J 'I'.
f

~

. \

-~. -
-,-,

j

'\

No. 8 Mine rescue team members near face area of
Drainway entry during investigation

APPENDIX F

No. 7 Right side of continuous mining machine after
last advance

No. 8 Mine rescue team members near face area of
Drainway entry during investigation




APPt:NDIX G , P Ian No. 1 ~~ f I
U.S. DEPARTME~T OF LABOR ~. I,.."yr."

MINE SAFETY Al"D HEALTH ADMI:-ISTRATION 1 _ ,,'f' '.0
COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH DISTRICT 5, S~ 'P. O. BOX 560 ';. ~~=:'- ':;lÐ,_. -.NORTON, VIRGINIA 24273 't Jf.:t ~_ _,:,~

v(/Utv --~J:tLQ'-

J it(z-

March 24, 1978

Mr. M. L. West, ~~nager
Safety Division
Clinchfield Coal Company
Dante, Virginia 24237

Dear Nr. West:

This acknowledges receipt of your letter of ~~rch 17, 1978, outlining
your plans to make an opening from the surface into an abandoned area
of your Noss No.3 "An Nine for water cirainage purposes.

The procedure as outlined is acceptable.

Sincerely,

~I:z~~ ~ ~,
Ray . Ross
Dis.. rict ~~nager

cc: j
F. C. ~lann

APPENDIXG , Plan No. 1

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH DISTRICT 5

P. 0. BOX 560

me
NORTON, VIRGINIA 24273 Re: fel
eo

March 24, 1978

Mr. M. L. West, Manager
Safety Division
Clinchfield Coal Company
Dante, Virginia 24237

Dear Mr. West:

This acknowledges receipt of your letter of March 17, 1978, outlining
your plans to make an opening from the surface into an abandoned area
of your Noss No. 3 "A" Mine for water drainage purposes.

The procedure as outlined is acceptable.

Sincerely,

Raas C
tayo nn
District Manager

ce: J
F.C. Mann





APPENDIX G, Plan No. 1 continued

CLINCHFIELD COAL COi-,oANY
DIY1~IDNO" "'H'~ rITT~"ON COM,...i1T

DANTE, VIRGINIA 24237

l-Iarch 17, 1978

l-Ir. Ra)' G. Ross
District Manager
Coal Nine Health & Safety
District 5, NSHA
P. O. Box 560
Norton, Virginia 24273

Dear Mr. Ross:

Re: Our conversation this A.M.

Permission is requested to make an opening from the sur-
face into an abandoned area of our Hoss t 3 "A" I-line for
the purpose of alleviating a threatening water situation
in our "A" i-iine and "A"2 l-line.

The connection is to be made with a continuous mining
machine with test holes kept 20 feet in advance of the
face _ Our surveys show that the abandoned area where
the connection will be made does not now contain water
but the elevations at this point are 3 feet lower than
the "A" Mine connection \vi th "A"2 l-line; consequently,
the water will flow out of the abandoned area connection
before reaching our "A"2 l-line.

The opening will be about 225 feet in length. A fan with
ventilation tubing will be utilized to provide adequate
face ventilation. The roof will be supported wi th either
conventional roof bol ts or resin grouted rods ana supple-
mented with timbers and/or crossbars where needed. The
map submi tted shows other pertinent information concerning
the operation.

We will promptly submit any other information you' may need
in considering this request.

Sincerely, J' '
/17£~ ¿~¿?c-¿:
N. 1. West
Manager, Safety Division

APPENDIXG , Plan No. 1 continued

CLINCHFIELD COAL COMPANY

DIVIEION OF THE PITTSTON COMPANY

DANTE, VIRGINIA 24237

March 17, 1978

Mr. Ray G. Ross
District Manager

Coal Mine Health & Safety
District S, MSHA

P. O. Box S60

Norton, Virginia 24273

Dear Mr. Ross:

Re: Our conversation this A.M.

Permission is requested to make an opening from the sur-
face into an abandoned area of our Moss #3 "A" Mine for
the purpose of alleviating a threatening water situation
in our "A" Mine and “A"2 Mine.

The connection is to be made with a continuous mining
machine with test holes kept 20 feet in advance of the
face. Our surveys show that the abandoned area where

the connection will ‘be made does not now contain water
but the elevations at this point are 3 feet lower than
the "A" Mine connection with "A"2 Mine; consequently,
the water will flow out of the abandoned area connection
before reaching our "A"2 Mine.

The opening will be about 225 feet in length. A fan with
ventilation tubing will be utilized to provide adequate
face ventilation. The roof will be supported with either
conventional roof bolts or resin grouted rods and supple-
mented with timbers and/or crossbars where needed. The

map submitted shows other pertinent information concerning
the operation.

We will promptly submit any other information yow may need
in considering this request.

Sincerely,

Jb LL

Ltzn4
M. L. West
Manager, Safety Division





. - -,.~ . -j.

.) \

.. ---: .: ~ -= -- .:--- ---....a ........n .,
1:.
1I
0:

"
,~





1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

1
APPENDIX G , Plan No. 2

CLINCHIELD COAL COMAN

PLA TO COME CONNCTION OF DRAINY nro

MOSS NO.3" A" MINE

Big fan operating blowing to provide ventilation.

Five-ma crew underground guring hole-through o~eration
with every man under oxygen utilizing Draeger 0 breath-
ing apparatuses. Men to be assigned as follows:

(a) Certified ma with methane and oxygen detecting
devices at continuous mining machine. He is to
make necessar tests at not more than five-minute
intervals with CM machine shut down. Continuous
tests are to be made during mining operations.

(b) Continuous miner operator - He will work under
strict instructions from the certified ma.

(c) One shuttle car operator.

(d) Two men stationed near halfway point uf drainway.
They ,will be equipped with methane and oxygen
detecting devices and smoke tube assembly and
tubes. They are to constantly monitor the move-
ment of air and test for methane and oxygen.
They will determine each re-entry of the shuttle
car and operator.

Two-way commnications to be established from surface
to the certified ma underground.

Complete backup mine rescue team will be on the surface
and kept in a state of preparedness.

Line curtain is to be maintained to th last permaent
support.

Operation to be stopped at any disruption of the vent-
ilation fan or controls until adequate repairs are made.

Comply with existing rules governing methane content
during operation.

8. Equipment to be checked for permssibility and safe
operating condition and any defects found will be
corrected before operation begins.

APPENDIXG , Plan No. 2
CLINCHFIELD COAL COMPANY

PLAN TO COMPLETE CONNECTION OF DRAINWAY INTO
MOSS NO. 3 "A" MINE

Big fan operating blowing to provide ventilation.

Five-man crew underground during hole-through operation
with every man under oxygen utilizing Draeger 0* breath-
ing apparatuses. Men to be assigned as follows:

(a) Certified man with methane and oxygen detecting
devices at continuous mining machine. He is to
make necess; tests at not more than five-minute
intervals with CM machine shut down. Continuous
tests are to be made during mining operations.

(b) Continuous miner operator - He will work under
strict instructions from the certified man.

(c) One shuttle car operator.

(4) ‘Two men stationed near halfway point of drainway.
They will be equipped with methane and oxygen
detecting devices and smoke tube assembly and
tubes. They are to constantly monitor the move-
ment of air and test for methane and oxygen.
They will determine each re-entry of the shuttle
car and operator.

Two-way communications to be established from surface
to the certified man underground.

Complete backup mine rescue team will be on the surface
and kept in a state of preparedness.

Line curtain is to be maintained to the last permanent
support.

Operation to be stopped at any disruption of the vent-
dilation fan or controls until adequate repairs are made.

Comply with existing rules governing methane content
during operation.

Equipment to be checked for permissibility and safe
operating condition and any defects found will be
corrected before operation begins.




- 2 -
APPENDIX G, Plan No.2 continued

9. After -connection is made, the continuous miner and
shuttle car will be brought to the surface.

10. The roof bolting machine will be tramed to the connect-
ion area. Two roof bolters under oxygen will install
bolts under the direction of the certified ma who will
perform the same tests as outlined in Item 2(a).

11. Line curtain is to be mantained to the last row of
bolts as roof bolting progresses.

12. If the shuttle car is needed to transport supplies during
roof support operations, the shuttle car operator will
move the car under the direction of the two men stationed
at the half-way point.

13. All underground work during this phase of operation will
be done on the day shift. If more than one shift is
needed, responsible persons will be kept on duty during
idle hours.

14. After this phase of operation is completed, the fan will
be changed to operate exiiausting so as to pull any un-
desirable atmosphere directly to the fan if possible.
The fan is to be operated in this maner for 24 hours.
At the end of that period, at least three persons
(memers of the mine rescue team) are to examne the
drainway to the inby end of the line curtain (where
the last support was installed) and at that point,
tests for methane and oxygen are to be made. Six team
members will be on the surface as backup. If oxygen
and methane contents are satisfactory, this plan of
operation will be completed.

1l.,¿ dJ
'Wleh

-2-

APPENDIX G, Plan No. 2 continued

10.

11.

12.

13.

MW/eh

After -connection is made, the continuous miner and
shuttle car will be brought to the surface.

The roof bolting machine will be trammed to the connect-
jon area. Two roof bolters under oxygen will install
bolts under the direction of the certified man who will
perform the same tests as outlined in Item 2(a).

Line curtain is to be maintained to the last row of
bolts as roof bolting progresses.

I£ the shuttle car is needed to transport supplies during
roof support operations, the shuttle car operator will
move the car under the direction of the two men stationed
at the half-way point.

All underground work during this phase of operation will
be done on the day shift. If more than one shift is
needed, responsible persons will be kept on duty during
idle hours.

After this phase of operation is completed, the fan will
be changed to operate exiausting so as to pull any. —
desirable atmosphere directly to the fan if possible.
The fan is to be operated in this manner for 24 hours.
At the end of that period, at least three persons
(members of the mine rescue team) are to examine the
drainway to the inby end of the line curtain (where
the last support was installed) and at that point,
tests for methane and oxygen are to be made. Six team
members will be on the surface as backup. If oxygen
and methane contents are satisfactory, this plan of
operation will be completed.




1

APPENDIX G, Plan No. 3
PLAN fOR COMPLETION OF ~AOSS NO. 3 "A" NINE

DRAINWAY PROJECT

1. Drainway floor to be cut 12-13 feet wide down to 1501.50

foot level from surface to the 1501. SO level underground, a

distance of about iSO feet (see attached profile sketch).

2. A Marietta continuous mining machine will be used to cut

the floor from about SO feet outby the drainway entrance to

the lSOl.SO level underground. A backhoe will establish the

desired grade from the point on the surface where continuous

miner started to near Frying Pan Creek.

3. Ventilation will be maintained in the drainway during

grade work with a minimum of 7,000 CFM of air intaking over

the continuous mining machine.

4. Underground grade work will be done on one shift a day

(day shift) with a 4~man crew (certified foreman, continuous

miner operator. continuous miner operat~r' s helper and a
shuttle car operator). These men are to work open face.

S. Two trained rescue men wearing Draeger Oxygen breathing

apparatuses will patrol the drainway inby the continuous

mining machine. Continuous tests for methane and oxygen

deficiency will be made and air measurements will be made

at no more than one-hour intervals.

6. One of the mine rescue men underground will be in con-

stant communications (sound powerd telephone) with person

APPENDIX G, Plan No. 3
PLAN FOR COMPLETION OF MOSS NO. 3
DRAINWAY PROJECT

MINE

1. Drainway floor to be cut 12-13 feet wide down to 1501.50
foot level from surface to the 1501.50 level underground, a
distance of about 150 feet (see attached profile sketch).

2. A Marietta continuous mining machine will be used to cut
the floor from about 50 feet outby the drainway entrance to
the 1501.50 level underground. A backhoe will establish the
desired grade from the point on the surface where continuous
miner started to near Frying Pan Creek.

3. Ventilation will be maintained in the drainway during
grade work with a minimum of 7,000 CFM of air intaking over
the continuous mining machine.

4, Underground grade work will be done on one shift a day
(day shift) with a 4-man crew (certified foreman, continuous
miner operator, continuous miner operator's helper and a
shuttle car operator). These men are to work open face.

5. Two trained rescue men wearing Draeger Oxygen breathing
apparatuses will patrol the drainway inby the continuous
mining machine. Continuous tests for methane and oxygen
deficiency will be made and air measurements will be made
at no more than one-hour intervals.

6. One of the mine rescue men underground will be in con-

stant communications (sound powerd telephone) with person




i
APPENDIX G, Plan No. 3 continued

on surface near drainway entrance. All tests and measure-

ments will be logged.

7. Six trained rescue men with Draeger Oxygen breathing ap-

paratuses will be kept on surface in state of preparation

while grade work undtrground is done.

8. teÒ
It is estimated that the underground grade will be comple .

in five working shifts.

9. After grade work (underground and surface) is completed a

quonset shaped metal drain pipe 8 feet high will be instaiied-

The pipe will extend about 20 feet underground and to near

Frying Pan Creek (see attached sketch).

10. The openings around the drain pipe at the drainway entrance

will be closed. wi th 8 inch concrete block with mortared jointS.
Posi tive ventilation will be maintained in the area where work

is being done to seal the openings.

11. . 11The open end of the drain pipe (Near Frying Pan Creek) w~

be guarded with metal rods or the equivalent. Also a chain

link fence at least 10 feet high will be erected at least 10

feet away from the end of the pipe.

12. Danger signs will be posted around the fence and vehicie

access from the main road to across Frying Pan Creek will be

removed.

13. A trained mine rescue team will be kept at the work site

while work is in progress until the project is completed.

14. All tests, examinations and other pertinent information

relative to the project will be recorded.

~L L. West
Manager Safety Division

APPENDIX G, Plan No. 3 continued
on surface near drainway entrance. All tests and measure-

ments will be logged.

7. Six trained rescue men with Draeger Oxygen breathing ap-
paratuses will be kept on surface in state of preparation
while grade work underground is done.

8. It is estimated that the underground grade will be complete?
in five working shifts.

9. After grade work (underground and surface) is completed #
quonset shaped metal drain pipe 8 feet high will be installed’
The pipe will extend about 20 feet underground and to near
Frying Pan Creek (see attached sketch).

10. The openings around the drain pipe at the drainway entranc®
will be closed.with 8 inch concrete block with mortared joint®*
Positive ventilation will be maintained in the area where wor
is being done to seal the openings.

11. The open end of the drain pipe (Near Frying Pan Creek) wil?
be guarded with metal rods or the equivalent. Also a chain
link fence at least 10 feet high will be erected at least 10
feet away from the end of the pipe.

12. Danger signs will be posted around the fence and vehicle
access from the main road to across Frying Pan Creek will be
removed.

13. A trained mine rescue team will be kept at the work site
while work is in progress until the project is completed.

14. All tests, examinations and other pertinent information

relative to the project will be recorded.

M. L. West
Manager Safety Division




,
1\

1

APPENDIX H

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR .IUN
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

APPROVAL AND CERTIFICATION CENTER ...., Li
Box 201H, Route 1

Industrial Park Road
Triadelphia, West Virginia 26059

June 26, 1978

MEMORANUM FOR: Ray G. Ross
District Manager, Coal Mine Health and Safety, District 5

FROM: !:'::'!:7A-)
Chieft Approval and Certification Center

SUBJECT: Evaluation of an MSA "Spotter" Methane De~ector and an MSA
Wolf Flame Safety Lamp from the Moss No.3, Portal A Mine,
Clinchfield Coal Company accident investigation

Our Intrinsic Safety and Instrumentation Branch has completed tests on the sub-
ject methane detector and flame safety iamp~ Both instruments were found to be
in permissible condition. Details of the evaluation are documented below. If
you have any technical questions on these tests, feel free to contact Mr. Robert
Lenart of the Intrinsic Safety and Instrumentation Branch, under whose direction
the tests were conducted (412 621-4500). ext. 357). These tests were witnessed
by Mr. Calvin Philips of the Clinchfield Coal Company.

MINE SAFETY APPLIANCES COMPAN "SPOTTER" METHANE DETECTOR, APPROVAL NO. 8C-
24, Pa,ct No. 457176:

The MSA HSpotterll Methane Detector was visually examined and no defects in
the instrument construction were observed. The battery was discharged and
as a result, the instrument did not respond to methane as received. After
the battery was charged, the inst rument sensor was exposed to a series of
five calibrated gas mixtures ranging from 0.25% to 2.01% methane in air by
volume. In all instances the detector indication was within the accuracy
limits of 30 CFR, Section 22.7 (d) (2). These tests were repeated on the
following day with similar results.

MINE SAFETY APPLIANCES COMPAN FLAM SAFETY LAM, APPROVAL NO. 210:

.A visual inspection of the flame safety lamp revealed that it was assembled
in a permissible manner. However it was not operational because the wick
and igniter assemblies were covered with close to one inch of coal dust and
the wick and fuel cotton were waterlogged.

After the lamp was cleaned and dried, it was performance tested in methane-
air mixtures. and oxygen deficient atmospheres.

APPENI

June

DIX 4

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
APPROVAL AND CERTIFICATION CENTER
Box 201B, Route 1
Industrial Park Road
Triadelphia, West Virginia 26059

26, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ray G. Ross

District Manager, Coal Mine Health and Safety, District 5

Sow Z yp?

FROM: Stephen G. Sawye
Chief, Approval and Certification Center
‘SUBJECT: Evaluation of an MSA "Spotter" Methane Detector and an MSA

Wolf Flame Safety Lamp from the Moss No. 3, Portal A Mine,
Clinchfield Coal Company accident investigation

Our Intrinsic Safety and Instrumentation Branch has completed tests on the sub-

ject

methane detector and flame safety lamp. Both instruments were found to be

in permissible condition. Details of the evaluation are documented below. If
you have any technical questions on these tests, feel free to contact Mr. Robert
Lenart of the Intrinsic Safety and Instrumentation Branch, under whose direction
the tests were conducted (412 621-4500), ext. 357). These tests were witnessed
by Mr. Calvin Philips of the Clinchfield Coal Company.

MINE SAFETY APPLIANCES COMPANY "SPOTTER" METHANE DETECTOR, APPROVAL NO. 8C—
2h, Pact No. 457176:

The MSA "Spotter" Methane Detector was visually examined and no defects in
the instrument construction were observed. The battery was discharged and
as a result, the instrument did not respond to methane as received. After
the battery was charged, the instrument sensor was exposed to a series of
five calibrated gas mixtures ranging from 0.25% to 2.01% methane in air by
volume. In all instances the detector indication was within the accuracy
limits of 30 CFR, Section 22.7 (d) (2). These tests were repeated on the
following day with similar results.

MINE SAFETY APPLIANCES COMPANY FLAME SAFETY LAMP, APPROVAL NO. 210:

4 visual inspection of the flame safety lamp revealed that it was assembled
in a permissible manner. However it was not operational because the wick
and igniter assemblies were covered with close to one inch of coal dust and
the wick and fuel cotton were waterlogged.

After the lamp was cleaned and dried, it was performance tested in methane-
air mixtures. and oxygen deficient atmospheres.




APPENDIX H continued -2-
Methane Detection Tests:

The lamp was placed in a plexiglass chamber and exposed to a series
of gas mixtures ranging from 1.0% to 4.0% methane in air by volume.
The flame height rose accordingly, indicating proper flame safety
lamp function. On a few occasions the methane concentration was
increased to 8.3% and the flame safety lamp was promptly extinguished.

OXYKen Deficiency Tests;

The flame safety lamp was placed in a plexiglass chamber and exposed
to various oxygen deficient atmospheres containing 15% to 20% oxygen.
The flame size decreased accordingly until it was finally extinguished
in an atmosphere containing approximately 16.25% oxygen.

All of the above tests indicate that the subject methane detector and flame safety
Lap were constructed and maintained in permssible condition.

APPENDIX H continued

The lamp was placed in a plexiglass chamber and exposed to a series
of gas mixtures ranging from 1.0% to 4.0% methane in air by volume.
The flame height rose accordingly, indicating proper flame safety
lamp function. On a few occasions the methane concentration was
increased to 8.3% and the flame safety lamp was promptly extinguished.

Oxygen Deficiency Tests:

‘The flame safety lamp was placed in a plexiglass chamber and exposed
to various oxygen deficient atmospheres containing 15% to 20% oxygen.
‘The flame size decreased accordingly until it was finally extinguished
in an atmosphere containing approximately 16.25% oxygen.

ALL of the above tests indicate that the subject methane detector and flame safety
lamp were constructed and maintained in permissible condition.